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1.	  Introductory	  remarks	  (concern	  &	  scope)	  
	  The	  concern	  for	  dynamic	  efficiency,	  through	  securing	  and,	  if	  possible,	  fostering	  technological	  innovation	  in	  infrastructures	  and	  infrastructure-­‐based	  services	  poses	  a	  wicked	  regulatory	  challenge.1	  	  At	  the	  very	  least,	  regulation	  should	  be	  flexible	  in	  the	  sense	  of	  keeping	  pace	  with	  technological	  advancement	  and	  ergonomic,	  by	  not	  posing	  obsolete	  constraints.2	  To	  truly	  foster	  innovation,	  regulators	  should	  reach	  beyond	  mere	  
relief	  from	  administrative	  burden	  or	  regulatory	  hassle	  (i.e.	  by	  ‘dumb	  regulation’,	  rigidly	  restricting	  innovation),3	  by	  lifting	  regulatory	  constraints	  through	  a	  
relaxation	  of	  standards	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  a	  greater	  priority	  on	  innovation	  (and	  tolerance	  of	  risk-­‐taking)	  as	  against	  protecting	  other	  public	  interests.4	  Furthermore,	  the	  challenge	  would	  be	  to	  reach	  beyond	  removing	  deliberate	  	  
constraints	  to	  innovation,	  and	  deploy	  types	  of	  regulation	  that	  facilitate	  innovation,	  by	  (also)	  securing	  and	  providing	  legal(ly	  arranged)	  resources	  or	  legal	  access	  to	  them–	  such	  as	  by	  legal	  powers,	  legal	  monopolies	  (e.g.	  concessions,	  (intellectual)	  property	  rights),	  through	  public	  procurement,	  (public)	  rights	  of	  access	  to	  and/or	  use	  of	  information,	  expertise,	  space,	  people,	  and	  capital.5	  	  	  *	  Lesley	  Broos	  is	  assistant	  professor	  of	  Business	  Law	  &	  Technology,	  University	  of	  Twente,	  the	  Netherlands;	  **	  Marc	  Harmsen	  is	  assistant	  professor	  of	  Constitutional	  &	  Administrative	  Law,	  University	  of	  Twente,	  the	  Netherlands;	  ***	  Michiel	  Heldeweg	  is	  full	  Professor	  of	  Law,	  Governance	  &	  Technology,	  University	  of	  Twente,	  the	  Netherlands.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  For	  the	  original	  typology	  of	  tame	  and	  wicked	  policy	  problems	  see:	  Rittel,	  H.	  and	  M.	  Webber,	  Dilemmas	  in	  a	  General	  Theory	  of	  Planning,	  Policy	  Sciences	  (1973)	  Vol.	  4,	  pp.	  155-­‐169,	  Elsevier	  Scientific	  Publishing	  Company,	  Inc.:	  Amsterdam.	  2	  Ensuring	  to	  be	  up	  to	  the	  ‘technological	  state	  of	  the	  art’	  or	  avoiding	  ‘regulatory	  gaps’	  from	  arising.	  As	  with	  very	  general	  2	  Ensuring	  to	  be	  up	  to	  the	  ‘technological	  state	  of	  the	  art’	  or	  avoiding	  ‘regulatory	  gaps’	  from	  arising.	  As	  with	  very	  general	  and	  open	  clauses,	  such	  as	  the	  command	  to	  apply	  BAT-­‐standards	  or	  provisions	  that	  order	  adherence	  to	  technical	  standards	  that	  are	  formulated	  by	  epistemic	  communities.	  (For	  the	  latter,	  see:	  Peter	  M.	  Haas,	  Introduction:	  Epistemic	  Communities	  and	  International	  Policy	  Coordination,	  International	  Organization,	  Vol.	  46:,	  nr.	  1	  (1992),	  pp.	  1-­‐35.	  “An	  epistemic	  community	  is	  a	  network	  of	  professionals	  with	  recognized	  expertise	  and	  competence	  in	  a	  particular	  domain	  and	  an	  authoritative	  claim	  to	  policy-­‐relevant	  knowledge	  within	  that	  domain	  or	  issue-­‐area.”,	  p.	  3.)	  	  3	  See	  the	  January	  2011	  statement	  by	  US-­‐President	  Obama:	  http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424052748703396604576088272112103698	  relating	  to	  http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-­‐press-­‐office/2011/01/18/fact-­‐sheet-­‐presidents-­‐regulatory-­‐strategy	  [Both	  sites	  accessed	  08-­‐08-­‐2014].	  4	  Which,	  admittedly,	  amounts	  to	  either	  a	  different	  ‘trade-­‐off’;	  one	  which	  increases	  the	  relative	  importance	  of	  innovation	  (or	  the	  freedom	  to	  innovate)	  as	  against	  other	  public	  interests	  (as	  something	  we	  would	  be	  willing	  to	  take	  or	  tolerate	  more	  risks	  for	  and/or	  that	  may	  be	  left	  to	  dealt	  with	  through	  private	  interest/market	  transactions),	  or	  the	  policy-­‐view	  that	  ‘taking	  a	  chance’	  at	  technological	  innovation	  will	  ultimately	  (upon	  a	  ‘Pareto-­‐or	  Hicks-­‐Kaldor-­‐utilitarian	  balance’)	  be	  to	  the	  benefit	  of	  other	  public	  interests	  (so	  in	  fact	  there	  is	  no	  change	  in	  trade-­‐off,	  but	  a	  more	  dynamic	  way	  of	  ‘trading	  off’).	  5	  About	  the	  challenge,	  see:	  Heldeweg,	  M.A.,	  Legal	  Design	  of	  Smart	  Rules	  and	  Regimes:	  Regulating	  Innovation,	  In:	  Heldeweg,	  M.A.	  &	  Kica,	  E.	  (2011),	  Regulating	  Technological	  Innovation.	  A	  Multidisciplinary	  Approach.	  Hershey:	  Palgrave	  MacMillan,	  pp.	  37-­‐52.	  (Parts	  of	  the	  book	  are	  accessible	  through	  Google	  books.]	  
	   3	  
While	  these	  ambitions	  may	  already	  challenge	  the	  capacity	  of	  ‘evidence-­‐based	  or	  -­‐informed	  regulation’,6	  the	  issue	  of	  regulatory	  ‘validity’	  (in	  the	  legal	  sense)	  or	  of	  regulatory	  ‘legitimacy’	  (in	  the	  informal	  sense	  of	  acceptance’	  by	  regulatees,	  third	  parties	  and	  the	  general	  public)	  calls	  for	  attention	  to	  the	  ‘institutional	  regulatory	  context’.7	  When	  introducing	  regulation	  fostering	  technological	  innovation	  (‘exploration’	  –	  by,	  broadly	  speaking,	  new	  inventions)	  and	  its	  uptake	  (‘exploitation’	  –	  by,	  broadly	  speaking,	  new	  applications),8	  regulators	  operate	  in	  particular	  institutional	  environments	  with	  given	  empirically	  established	  and	  normatively	  prescribed	  patterns	  of	  interaction.9	  	  Regarding	  exploration,	  concern	  should	  especially	  go	  out	  to	  general	  (non-­‐)legal	  standards	  as	  regards	  generally	  acceptability	  of	  (the	  burdens	  and	  benefits	  of)	  risks	  concerning	  all	  stakeholders,	  and	  reasonable	  measures	  of	  risk-­‐management,	  reflecting	  a	  default	  social	  and	  the	  legal	  licence	  to	  operate,10	  as	  matters	  of,	  inter	  alia,	  due	  care,	  duty	  of	  care,	  precaution	  and	  distributive	  justice,	  when	  allowing	  and	  performing	  experiments	  towards	  technological	  breakthroughs.	  	  As	  regards	  exploitation,	  concern	  for	  the	  institutional	  context	  relates	  to	  the	  proper	  fit	  of	  new	  technological	  applications	  (as	  production	  techniques	  or	  processes,	  or	  as	  products	  or	  services)	  involving	  interactions	  and	  transactions	  in	  different	  (ideal	  type)	  governance	  environments	  (with	  specific	  social	  and	  legal	  norms):	  those	  of	  ‘competition	  &	  exchange’	  in	  the	  market,	  ‘hierarchy	  &	  orders’	  under	  government	  and	  ‘cooperation	  &	  reciprocity’	  in	  civil	  society.11	  Fostering	  innovative	  exploitation	  by	  regulation	  may	  clash	  with,	  for	  example,	  legal	  demands	  of	  fair	  competition	  and	  of	  public	  service	  in	  the	  hybrid	  setting	  of	  regulated	  competition	  in	  liberalized	  infrastructures	  and	  infrastructure-­‐bound	  services.	  Such	  would	  be	  the	  case	  if,	  for	  example,	  requirements	  of	  universal	  access	  would	  be	  relaxed	  (to	  allow	  niche	  innovation)	  or	  when	  legal	  rules	  concerning	  fair	  competition	  would	  be	  set	  aside	  by	  (temporary)	  ‘monopoly	  regimes’	  of	  intellectual	  property,	  cooperation,	  or	  network	  exploitation.12	  In	  exploitation	  the	  issue	  is	  that	  of	  (smart)	  governance	  innovation.	  	   From	  this	  it	  follows	  that	  our	  general	  focus	  is	  on	  freedom	  to	  engage	  in	  undertakings	  of	  exploration	  and/or	  of	  exploitation,	  as	  a	  matter	  of	  ‘innovative	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  6	  See,	  inter	  alia,	  PM.	  For	  example	  literature	  on	  ‘Evidence-­‐based	  legislation’(EBL):	  http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Evidence-­‐based_legislation	  The	  point	  being	  that	  to	  reach	  the	  3	  ambitions	  requires	  knowledge	  about	  effects/effectiveness	  (next	  to	  understanding	  (legal)	  norms.	  See	  also	  the	  work	  done	  under	  the	  EU-­‐Regulatory	  Impact	  Assessment	  approach	  (see	  work	  by	  Claudio	  Radaelli	  et	  al.).	  7	  The	  concept	  of	  a	  ‘wicked	  policy	  challenge’	  (as	  opposed	  to	  a	  tame	  problem)	  often	  combines	  to	  challenges:	  uncertainty	  about	  knowledge	  and	  uncertainty	  about	  support/acceptance	  –	  see	  footnote	  1.	  8	  See,	  inter	  alia,	  The	  Netherlands	  Scientific	  Council	  for	  Government	  Policy	  (WRR:	  Innovatie	  vernieuwd.	  Opening	  in	  
viervoud,	  Amsterdam:	  Amsterdam	  University	  Press	  2008,	  p.	  18	  (further	  references	  to	  be	  added)	  9	  See	  Ruiter,	  D.W.P.,	  (2004),	  Types	  of	  institutions	  as	  patterns	  of	  regulated	  behavior.	  Res	  Publica	  10	  (3).	  10	  See,	  on	  the	  concept	  of	  the	  ‘social	  licence	  to	  operate’	  (possibly	  being	  more	  stringent	  than	  the	  legal	  license),	  Gunningham,	  N.,	  Kagan,	  R.	  and	  Thornton,	  D.,	  Social	  License	  and	  Environmental	  Protection:	  Why	  Businesses	  Go	  beyond	  Compliance,	  Law	  
&	  Social	  Inquiry,	  Vol.	  29	  (2004),	  No.	  2,	  pp.	  307-­‐341.	  The	  default	  ‘legal	  license	  to	  operate’	  refers	  to	  non-­‐specific	  guidelines,	  such	  as	  Learned	  Hand’s	  ‘calculus	  of	  negligence’	  (see:	  http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Calculus_of_negligence	  [Accessed	  11-­‐09-­‐2014])	  or,	  somewhat	  more	  ‘remote’,	  	  the	  precautionary	  principle’	  (see:	  Andy	  Stirling,	  Science,	  Precaution,	  and	  the	  Politics	  of	  Technological	  Risk.	  Converging	  Implications	  in	  Evolutionary	  and	  Social	  Scientific	  Perspectives	  (2008)	  Annals	  of	  
the	  New	  York	  Academy	  of	  Sciences,	  pp.	  95-­‐110).	  11	  See	  Powell,	  W.W.,	  Neither	  Market	  nor	  Hierarchy:	  Network	  forms	  of	  organization,	  Research	  in	  Organizational	  Behavior,	  12,	  pp.	  295-­‐336	  1990	  and	  Thompson,	  G,	  J.	  Frances,	  R.	  Levačiċ	  and	  J.	  Mitchell	  (eds.),	  Markets,	  Hierarchies	  and	  Networks:	  
The	  Coordination	  of	  Social	  Life,	  London:	  Sage	  1991.	  12	  The	  ‘Deutsche	  Telekom-­‐case’	  being	  an	  example	  that	  was	  not	  accepted	  by	  the	  ECJ	  (C-­‐424/07	  Commission	  v.	  Germany,	  3	  December	  2009).	  Germany	  granted	  its	  then	  recently	  (and	  still	  partly	  state-­‐owned)	  telecom-­‐company	  a	  ‘regulatory	  holiday’	  from	  mandatory	  access	  of	  third	  parties	  on	  its	  yet	  to	  be	  realized	  new	  infrastructure	  for	  VDSL	  –	  a	  relaxation	  of	  competition	  rules.	  It	  was	  cautioned	  in	  2007	  by	  the	  European	  Commission	  and	  subsequently	  brought	  before	  the	  ECJ.	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entrepreneurship’,	  whether	  with	  a	  commercial	  or	  a	  non-­‐commercial	  objective	  or	  whether	  by	  public	  or	  private	  actors,	  but	  with	  a	  promise	  of	  societal	  benefits.	  More	  specifically,	  our	  focus	  is	  on	  situations	  where	  regulation	  provides	  (or	  can	  provide)	  an	  experimental	  setting	  for	  such	  innovative	  entrepreneurship,	  which	  otherwise	  would	  be	  hampered	  either	  by	  regulatory	  	  constraints	  or	  by	  lack	  of	  facilitation	  of	  (access	  to)	  resources.	  	  	   As	  the	  magnitude	  of	  such	  a	  challenge	  calls	  for	  modesty,	  in	  this	  paper	  we	  look	  at	  regulation	  fostering	  technological	  innovation	  with	  a	  fivefold	  focus:	  1. firstly,	  a	  focus	  on	  seeking	  new	  applications	  of	  technological	  innovation,	  considered	  primarily	  as	  a	  concern	  for	  smart	  governance	  regarding	  implementation	  of	  new	  technologies	  (rather	  than	  of	  high	  tech	  research	  settings);13	  2. secondly,	  a	  focus	  on	  fostering	  technological	  innovation	  through	  regulatory	  
relaxation	  and	  regulatory	  facilitation,	  rather	  than	  ‘merely’	  to	  keep	  pace	  (avoiding	  ‘regulatory	  gaps’),	  or	  to	  provide	  relief	  from	  burdensome/dumb	  regulation;	  3. thirdly,	  a	  focus	  on	  exceptional	  regimes	  towards	  fostering	  technological	  innovation,	  possibly	  with	  a	  general	  scope	  but	  always	  as	  an	  ‘case-­‐related’	  and	  ‘temporary’	  deviation	  from	  ‘normal’	  regimes	  –	  as	  already	  indicated	  by	  the	  above	  remarks	  on	  our	  general	  focus.	  To	  be	  more	  precise;	  we	  look	  at	  dedicated	  regulatory	  arrangements	  for	  particular	  experimental	  activities	  (as	  intentionally	  organised	  isolated	  cases,	  situations,	  events	  or	  as	  a	  (first	  and	  vulnerable)	  stage	  of	  a	  successive	  (‘normal’)	  activity	  (under	  normal	  regulation),	  14	  which	  are	  expected	  to	  (probably)	  result	  in	  a	  disruptive	  innovation	  with	  a	  promise	  of	  societal	  benefits.15	  4. fourthly,	  a	  focus	  on	  infrastructure	  based	  services,	  especially	  in	  the	  liberalized	  energy	  and	  telecommunication	  sectors,	  which	  implies	  that	  we	  take	  into	  account	  specific	  network	  characteristics	  concerning	  both	  technological	  innovation,	  economic	  transactions	  and	  regulation.	  	  Given	  that	  this	  paper	  reflects	  work	  in	  progress,	  it	  does	  not	  include	  a	  further	  elaboration	  of	  specific	  aspects	  that	  come	  with	  experimentation	  in	  networks.	  In	  as	  much	  as	  experimentation	  and	  competition	  can	  sometimes	  clash,	  clearly	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  13	  This	  choice	  of	  priority	  is	  fuelled	  by	  OECD	  concerns	  (‘i.e.	  The	  Dutch	  Paradox’),	  that	  the	  Netherlands	  are	  doing	  fine	  on	  exploration,	  but	  rather	  badly	  at	  exploitation	  –	  OECD	  Economic	  Surveys,	  Netherlands	  2006,	  2,	  Paris:	  OECD,	  p.	  104.	  Meanwhile	  we	  prefer	  to	  speak	  of	  ‘application’	  rather	  than	  of	  exploitation,	  firstly	  because	  exploitation	  is	  often	  understood	  as	  ‘commercialized’,	  secondly	  because,	  as	  will	  be	  discussed	  later	  exploration	  and	  exploitation	  (increasingly?)	  coincide	  or	  iterate,	  and	  are	  relevant	  to	  both	  technological	  and	  governance	  innovation.	  Application	  is	  taken	  here	  to	  be	  about	  valorisation	  of	  new	  technology	  through	  new	  processes,	  machines,	  products	  and	  services,	  whether	  through	  market,	  government	  or	  civil	  society	  channels,	  or	  hybrid	  forms	  of	  these	  and	  without	  excluding	  further	  technological/exploratory	  innovation	  refinement.	  14	  More	  on	  this	  terminology	  later.	  The	  essential	  element	  about	  an	  experiment	  (Oxford	  dictionary:	  ‘A	  course	  of	  action	  tentatively	  adopted	  without	  being	  sure	  of	  the	  outcome’	  –	  see:	  	  http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/english/experiment)	  is	  that	  there	  is	  considerable	  risk	  of	  activities	  not	  to	  yield	  the	  desired	  outcome	  (e.g.	  the	  technology	  does	  not	  work	  in	  practice	  or	  not	  in	  a	  viable	  or	  otherwise	  acceptable	  way),	  but	  even	  so	  it	  would	  be	  worthwhile	  finding	  out,	  given	  that	  there	  is	  (a)	  a	  promise	  that	  it	  will	  work,	  (b)	  a	  promise	  that	  if	  it	  works	  it	  brings	  if	  it	  brings	  societal	  benefits,	  and	  (c)	  a	  promise	  that	  whatever	  the	  outcome,	  we	  will	  learn	  from	  the	  results.	  	  This	  does	  exclude	  a	  general	  scope	  of	  regulation	  (temporarily)	  allowing	  incidental	  projects	  merely	  for	  a	  particular	  interest	  (e.g.	  economic	  growth)	  that	  is	  considered	  of	  such	  (almost	  ‘self-­‐evident’)	  magnitude	  that	  other	  concerns	  are	  set	  aside.	  	  15	  Again,	  more	  later,	  but	  ‘disruptive’	  describes	  (the	  opposite	  of	  ‘sustaining	  innovation’	  as)	  a	  situation	  of	  an	  innovation	  that,	  due	  to	  the	  unexpected	  new	  technology,	  products	  or	  services	  that	  it	  brings,	  disrupts	  (an)	  existing	  market(s)	  and	  value	  chains	  or	  networks	  (having	  existed	  with	  some	  permanence;	  of	  years	  or	  decades).	  See	  Bower,	  Joseph	  L.	  and	  Christensen,	  Clayton	  M.,	  Disruptive	  Technologies:	  Catching	  the	  Wave,	  Harvard	  Business	  Review	  73,	  no.	  1	  (January-­‐February	  1995),	  pp.	  43-­‐53.	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the	  tendency	  of	  networks	  towards	  natural	  monopolies	  is	  a	  factor	  to	  count	  with.	  5. fifthly,	  a	  focus	  on	  legal	  aspects,	  or	  slightly	  more	  specific	  of	  legal	  governance	  so	  as	  to	  include	  the	  perspective	  of	  legal	  design	  (as	  a	  method	  of	  well-­‐considered	  rule-­‐making)16	  of	  smart	  rules	  and	  regimes	  (fostering	  innovation).	  	  We	  do	  not	  want	  to	  go	  into	  the	  discussion	  about	  economic	  or	  policy	  effectiveness	  or	  efficiency	  of	  exceptional	  legal	  regimes	  for	  application	  of	  technological	  innovation	  on	  (esp.	  energy	  and	  telecommunication)	  networks.	  We	  assume	  that	  under	  certain	  conditions	  a	  case	  can	  be	  made	  for	  such	  a	  promise,	  as	  seems	  to	  be,	  for	  example,	  the	  premise	  under	  an	  example	  that	  is	  limited	  to	  exemption	  from	  obligatory	  rules,	  included	  in	  Article	  101(3)	  TFEU.	  This	  Article	  states	  that	  the	  prohibition	  of	  cartels	  (of	  Article	  101(1)	  TFEU)	  may	  be	  declared	  inapplicable	  in	  a	  case	  of	  undertakings	  (that	  normally	  amount	  to	  a	  prohibited	  cartel),	  “which	  
contributes	  to	  improving	  the	  production	  or	  distribution	  of	  goods	  or	  to	  promoting	  
technical	  or	  economic	  progress,	  while	  allowing	  consumers	  a	  fair	  share	  of	  the	  
resulting	  benefit,…’.17	  	  	  It	  is	  our	  objective	  to	  map	  and	  compare	  possible	  designs	  of	  (models	  of)	  experimental	  regimes,	  as	  a	  basis	  for	  a	  better	  understanding	  of,	  inter	  alia,	  relevant	  exceptional	  entitlements	  (as	  rights	  &	  obligations)	  following	  from	  applicable	  (dedicated)	  legal	  relations,	  so	  that	  an	  economic	  or	  policy-­‐effectiveness	  analysis	  and	  assessment	  may	  (then)	  be	  made	  (by	  others)	  upon	  a	  proper	  and	  sufficiently	  nuanced	  basis.	  In	  the	  following	  sections	  we	  will	  first	  offer	  some	  further	  delineation	  of	  our	  object	  of	  design,	  in	  four	  steps:	  par.	  2.,	  looking	  at	  practice;	  par.	  3.,	  looking	  at	  legal	  theory;	  par.	  4.	  looking	  at	  experimentation;	  par	  5.,	  looking	  at	  networks;	  par	  6.,	  considering	  legal	  design	  for	  practice.	  Next	  we	  will	  address	  2	  main	  examples	  of	  network	  related	  regimes	  for	  experimentation:	  in	  par.	  7,	  looking	  at	  Dutch	  telecommunication	  legislation;	  in	  par.	  8,	  looking	  at	  Dutch	  electricity	  and	  natural	  gas	  legislation.	  We	  then,	  in	  par.	  9.,	  attempt	  at	  some	  comparisons	  between	  examples	  and	  between	  examples	  and	  theory,	  to	  conclude	  this	  paper,	  in	  par.	  10,	  with	  our	  conclusions	  and	  suggestions.	  	  	  	  
2.	  Some	  Practice	  	  A	  first	  concern	  of	  delineating	  our	  focus	  of	  attention	  is	  to	  avoid	  a	  narrowing	  down	  of	  the	  concept	  of	  regulating	  experimentation18	  to	  mere	  regulatory	  relaxation	  in	  the	  form	  of	  ‘regulatory	  holidays’.	  	  In	  this	  respect	  Monti’s	  description	  of	  regulatory	  holidays,	  offers	  an	  interesting	  scope:19	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  16	  See	  Heldeweg,	  supra,	  footnote	  5.	  Also	  see	  Heldeweg	  &	  Ruiter,	  Types	  of	  Legal	  Channelling	  and	  their	  design,	  forthcoming	  (2015).	  17	  Antoni	  J.P.	  Brack,	  Regulation	  for	  Innovation:	  A	  Comparative	  Inquiry	  into	  a	  regulatory	  Pair	  of	  Twins,	  In:	  M.A.	  Heldeweg	  &	  E.	  Kica,	  Regulating	  Technological	  Innovation.	  A	  Multidisciplinary	  Approach,	  Houndmills:	  Palgrave	  MacMillan	  2011,	  pp.	  17-­‐35.	  18	  The	  theme	  of	  ‘Legal	  Design	  of	  Regulating	  &	  Organising	  Experimentation’	  is	  the	  new	  research	  topic	  of	  the	  Chair	  of	  Law,	  
Governance	  &	  Technology,	  University	  of	  Twente,	  the	  Netherlands.	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  “….	  a	  mechanism	  that	  could	  be	  used	  by	  a	  regulator	  to	  prioritise	  dynamic	  over	  allocative	  efficiency	  is	  
a	  ‘regulatory	  holiday’	  that	  suspends	  regulatory	  obligations	  when	  a	  regulated	  firm	  develops	  a	  new	  
product.	  The	  idea	  behind	  a	  regulatory	  holiday	  is	  akin	  to	  granting	  an	  IP	  right:	  the	  holder	  is	  free	  from	  
competition	  for	  a	  particular	  time	  period,	  and	  the	  prospects	  of	  this	  holiday	  are	  an	  incentive	  to	  
innovate.”	  	  	  His	  definition	  relates	  to	  the	  context	  of	  competition	  law	  in	  telecommunication.	  Monti	  notes	  that	  in	  this	  field	  the	  European	  Commission	  takes	  a	  critical	  stance:	  	  
“….	  the	  (European)	  Commission	  thinks	  that	  competitive	  markets	  are	  the	  best	  way	  
to	  encourage	  investment	  and	  is	  against	  regulatory	  holidays.”	  	  	  This	  quote	  relates	  to	  the	  run-­‐up	  to	  the	  2009	  ECJ-­‐decision	  in	  the	  Deutsche	  Telkom	  case	  (as	  the	  European	  Commission	  informed	  the	  German	  government	  of	  its	  criticism),20	  but	  anecdotally	  also	  fits	  the	  more	  recent	  rejection,	  in	  March	  2012,	  by	  mrs.	  Kroes,	  then	  vice-­‐president	  of	  the	  European	  Commission	  and	  commissioner	  for	  the	  Digital	  Agenda,	  of	  calls	  for	  regulatory	  holidays	  (especially	  for	  telecom	  operators):	  	  	  “They	  (the	  proponents	  of	  such	  holidays	  –	  LB/MH/MH)	  claim	  we	  should	  grant	  operators	  a	  regulatory	  
holiday…	  They	  want	  a	  holiday	  from	  the	  stress	  of	  innovating	  in	  a	  competitive	  market	  and	  a	  return	  to	  
an	  ‘idyllic’	  business	  environment	  sheltered	  from	  real	  competition”.21	  	  	  Interestingly,	  in	  the	  same	  year,	  in	  a	  different	  area,	  that	  of	  car	  manufacturing,	  the	  European	  Commission	  seemed	  to	  take	  an	  opposite	  position.22	  An	  online	  article	  under	  the	  caption	  “EU	  Commission	  plans	  regulatory	  holiday	  for	  auto	  sector”	  relates	  of	  how	  mr.	  Tajani,	  the	  then	  EU	  commissioner	  for	  Enterprise	  and	  Industry,	  faced	  with	  threats	  from	  the	  car-­‐manufacturing	  industry	  of	  closing	  down	  European	  plants,	  made	  the	  announcement	  of	  having	  instructed	  his	  directorate-­‐general:	  	  “…	  to	  implement	  a	  regulatory	  moratorium	  to	  avoid	  new	  costs	  and	  limit	  relocations”,	  and	  also	  to	  “…	  
propose	  to	  my	  colleagues	  to	  examine	  the	  possibilities	  of	  similar	  initiatives	  in	  their	  areas	  of	  
expertise.”	  	  	  The	  online	  caption	  implicitly	  suggests	  a	  broader	  definition	  of	  a	  regulatory	  holiday	  as	  it	  extends	  to	  regulatory	  moderation,	  by	  not	  readily	  introducing	  new	  and	  burdensome	  regulation.	  Clearly,	  this	  reaches	  beyond	  Monti’s	  definition	  (“...	  
suspends	  regulatory	  obligations”),	  and	  beyond	  our	  focus,	  as	  both	  this	  definition	  and	  our	  focus	  are	  limited	  to	  creating	  temporary	  exceptions	  to	  existing	  obligating	  rules.	   Furthermore,	  mr.	  Tajani’s	  approach	  holds	  no	  explicit	  reference	  to	  any	  prospect	  or,	  at	  least	  promise,	  of	  innovation,	  which	  also	  is	  vital	  to	  both	  Monti’s	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  19	  Giorgio	  Monti,	  Managing	  the	  intersection	  of	  Utilities	  Regulation	  and	  EC	  Competition	  Law,	  The	  Competition	  Law	  Review	  Vol.	  4	  Issue	  2	  (2008)	  pp.	  123-­‐145	  (also	  available	  online:	  http://www.clasf.org/CompLRev/Issues/Vol4Iss2Art2Monti.pdf	  [Accessed	  08-­‐08-­‐2014].	  Monti’s	  article	  relates	  to	  the	  issue	  of	  the	  Deutsche	  Telekom-­‐case,	  supra,	  footnote	  12.	  20	  See	  footnote	  12.	  21	  See:	  http://www.computing.co.uk/ctg/news/2158268/european-­‐commission-­‐regulatory-­‐holidays	  [Last	  accessed	  07-­‐08-­‐2014].	  22	  See:	  http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/03/08/eu-­‐auto-­‐regulations-­‐idUSL5E8E8ALJ20120308	  [Last	  accessed	  07-­‐08-­‐2014].	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definition	  (“…	  when	  a	  regulated	  firm	  develops	  a	  new	  product”;	  “…	  and	  the	  
prospects	  of	  this	  holiday	  are	  an	  incentive	  to	  innovate.”)	  and	  to	  our	  focus	  on	  
experimentation	  with	  a	  view	  on	  possible	  disruptive	  innovation.	  We	  consider	  mr.	  Tajani’s	  proposals	  not	  to	  be	  about	  a	  regulatory	  holiday,	  as	  we	  choose	  to	  follow	  Monti’s	  more	  specific	  definition	  of	  that	  concept.	  Nor	  is	  it	  about	  a	  form	  of	  regulating	  specified	  forms	  of	  experimentation	  –	  whether	  or	  not	  one	  chooses	  to	  regard	  this	  as	  a	  strict	  and/or	  necessary	  element	  of	  a	  regulatory	  holiday.	  Finally,	  we	  find	  no	  indication	  of	  mr.	  Tajani’s	  proposal	  displaying,	  beyond	  mere	  regulatory	  permissiveness,	  a	  hint	  of	  a	  facilitative	  regulatory	  function.	  In	  the	  next	  paragraphs	  (3-­‐5)	  we	  will	  focus	  on	  these	  aspects.	  	  
3.	  Some	  Legal	  Theory	  
	  Legal	  theory	  can	  provide	  us	  with	  insights	  by	  which	  we	  can	  formulate	  basic	  definitions	  of	  permissiveness	  and	  facilitation,	  which	  we	  can	  then	  apply	  to	  the	  field	  of	  regulating	  experimentation.	  We	  will	  first	  (in	  3.1)	  look	  at	  basic	  normative	  positions	  in	  general,	  then	  (in	  3.2)	  at	  aspects	  of	  permissiveness,	  next	  (in	  3.3)	  at	  forms	  of	  permissiveness,	  and	  (in	  3.4)	  at	  legal	  facilitation,	  and	  finally	  (in	  3.5)	  at	  powers	  to	  permit	  and	  facilitate.	  	  
3.1	  –	  Basic	  normative	  positions	  From	  a	  perspective	  of	  legal	  design,	  regulatory	  permissiveness	  (to	  experiment)	  should	  be	  understood	  against	  the	  backdrop	  of	  basic	  positions	  of	  legal	  regulation	  of	  an	  activity	  (say	  ‘A’).	  These	  positions	  are:23	  	  
A. a	  regulated	  order	  or	  command	  of	  an	  activity	  (‘shall	  do	  A’;	  also	  known	  as	  ‘green	  channelling’	  of	  behaviour);	  
B. a	  regulated	  prohibition	  of	  an	  activity	  (‘shall	  not	  do	  A’;	  also	  known	  as	  ‘red	  channelling’	  of	  behaviour);	  
C. a	  regulated	  permissiveness	  regarding	  an	  activity,	  either	  as	  	  permission	  (C1	  -­‐	  as	  ‘may	  do	  A’)	  in	  logical	  opposition	  to	  a	  prohibition,	  or	  dispensation	  (C2	  -­‐	  as	  ‘shall	  not	  do	  A’)	  in	  logical	  opposition	  to	  a	  command;	  together	  also	  known	  as	  ‘amber	  channelling’	  of	  behaviour);	  Furthermore,	  we	  should	  consider	  the	  possibility	  of	  there	  not	  being	  any	  regulation	  creating	  obligations	  concerning	  a	  particular	  act	  type	  (‘A’):	  
D. an	  unregulated	  permissiveness	  regarding	  an	  activity	  (‘may	  and	  may	  not	  do	  A’;24	  resulting	  in	  ‘amber	  channelling’	  of	  behaviour	  by	  absence	  of	  channelling	  in	  obligating	  forms	  A.	  and	  B.).25	  So,	  in	  all	  there	  are	  six	  normative	  positions,	  as	  shown	  in	  the	  following	  table	  (1.).	  	  [See	  next	  page]	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  23	  As	  will	  become	  clear,	  we	  build	  here	  on	  the	  distinction	  used	  by	  Roger	  Brownsword,	  Rights,	  Regulation	  and	  the	  
Technological	  Revolution,	  Oxford	  University	  Press:	  Oxford	  2008,	  p.	  19,	  and	  Roger	  Brownsword	  &	  Han	  Somsen,	  Law,	  innovation	  and	  technology:	  before	  we	  fast	  forward	  –	  a	  forum	  for	  debate,	  in:	  Law,	  Innovation	  and	  Technology	  (2009),	  p.	  15-­‐16,	  and	  also	  on	  that	  of	  Heldeweg	  &	  Ruiter,	  supra	  footnote	  16.	  24	  This	  combined	  position	  is	  logically	  possible	  as	  the	  relation	  between	  permission	  and	  dispensation	  is	  subcontrary	  (i.e.	  the	  type	  of	  relation	  between	  x	  and	  y	  where	  x	  and	  y	  can	  be	  the	  case	  at	  the	  same	  time	  (e.g.	  a	  permit	  and	  a	  dispensation;	  bilaterally),	  but	  it	  cannot	  be	  that	  none	  of	  both	  is	  the	  case	  at	  any	  particular	  time	  (e.g.	  a	  permit	  nor	  a	  dispensation).	  	  25	  We	  apply	  the	  logical	  rule	  that	  absence	  of	  obligations	  implies	  presence	  of	  permissions	  and	  we	  look	  at	  single	  regulation	  of	  a	  single	  type	  of	  activity	  –	  of	  course	  in	  reality	  a	  type	  of	  activity	  may	  be	  a	  subtype/-­‐set	  of	  other	  categories/types	  that	  are	  encompassed	  by	  other	  regulations.	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Table	  1.	  Six	  normative	  positions	  following	  basic	  types	  of	  	  (non-­‐)regulation	  	  	  
Table	  1	  -­‐	  Six	  normative	  positions	  Regulated	  Obligation	  to	  	  (A.	  or	  B.)	   A.	  Command	  (‘Green’)	  ‘Shall	  do	  A’	   B.	  Prohibition(‘Red’)	  ‘Shall	  not	  do	  A	  Regulated	  Permissiveness	  to	  (C1.	  or	  C2.)	   C1.	  Permission(‘Amber’)	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  or	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  C2.	  Dispensation	  (‘Amber’)	  ‘May	  do	  A’	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  ‘May	  not	  do	  A’	  Unregulated	  Permissiveness	  to	  (D1	  and	  
D2.)	   D1.	  Permission(‘Amber’)	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  and	  	  	  	  	  	  	  D2.	  Dispensation	  (‘Amber’)	  ‘May	  do	  A’	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  ‘May	  not	  do	  A’	  	  	  
3.2	  –	  Aspects	  of	  permissiveness:	  unilateral	  and	  bilateral	  When	  permissiveness	  has	  a	  ‘double	  aspect’,	  including	  both	  permission	  and	  dispensation,	  we	  call	  this	  bilateral	  permissiveness;	  if	  there	  is	  only	  one	  aspect	  at	  play,	  we	  speak	  of	  unilateral	  permissiveness	  (permission	  or	  dispensation).	  Unilateral	  and	  bilateral	  permissiveness	  become	  manifest	  in	  various	  situations:	  
1. Permission	  is	  unavoidably	  unilateral	  when	  it	  is	  merely	  logically	  implicated	  as	  permission	  in	  the	  existence	  of	  a	  Command	  (A.),	  or	  as	  dispensation	  in	  a	  Prohibition	  (B.).	  Clearly,	  these	  unilateral	  types	  of	  permissiveness	  are	  mere	  implicitly	  regulated	  forms	  of	  permissiveness,	  following	  a	  regulated	  obligation.26	  	  
2. In	  permissiveness	  type	  D.,	  there	  is	  no	  regulator;	  or	  the	  regulator	  is	  not	  regulating.	  Permissiveness	  follows	  merely	  from	  absence	  of	  (regulation	  prescribing)	  obligations;	  prohibition	  and	  command	  –	  A.	  and	  B.	  Hence,	  this	  permissiveness	  is	  not	  unilateral	  but	  unavoidably	  bilateral.27	  This	  situation	  is	  also	  known	  as	  ‘freedom’,	  or,	  from	  a	  regulatory	  standpoint,	  	  ‘indifference’:	  the	  ‘regulatee’28	  can	  do	  as	  he	  or	  she	  pleases:	  act	  (‘may	  do’)	  or	  refrain	  (‘may	  not	  act’).	  	  
3. Type	  C.	  regulated	  permissiveness	  can	  also	  be	  bilateral,	  but	  only	  if	  and	  when	  a	  norm	  is	  introduced	  prescribing	  that	  some	  act	  may	  be	  performed	  or	  refrained	  from,	  as	  desired	  by	  the	  regulatee.29	  An	  example	  would	  be	  the	  explicit	  permissiveness	  of	  a	  human	  right:	  this	  could	  include	  both	  the	  right	  to	  voice	  opinions	  through	  telecommunication	  and	  to	  refrain	  from	  doing	  so	  by	  using	  telecommunication;	  a	  right	  to,	  no	  duty.	  Often	  the	  norm	  itself	  is	  formulated	  as	  permission,	  but	  is	  understood	  to	  include	  dispensation.	  This	  type	  of	  regulated	  permissiveness	  co-­‐exists	  with	  bilateral	  unregulated	  permissiveness,	  as	  this	  follows	  logically	  from	  the	  absence	  of	  obligations.	  	  
4. In	  a	  rather	  theoretical	  sense,	  there	  is	  room	  for	  regulated	  unilateral	  permissiveness,	  outside	  implicated	  unilateral	  permission	  (see	  the	  above	  no.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  26	  Following	  the	  previous	  footnote,	  obligations	  always	  come	  in	  regulated	  form.	  The	  underlying	  relationship	  with	  permissiveness	  is	  subaltern:	  a	  command	  implicates	  permission,	  but	  permission	  may	  exist	  without	  a	  command,	  and	  a	  prohibition	  implicates	  dispensation	  but	  a	  dispensation	  may	  exist	  outside	  a	  prohibition.	  Of	  course	  in	  practice	  regulators	  should	  make	  sure	  that	  this	  logic	  is	  adhered	  to	  in	  practice	  so	  no	  normative	  inconsistencies	  arise	  (e.g.	  prohibited	  but	  not	  allowed	  to	  refrain;	  i.e.	  without	  dispensation).	  27	  If	  we	  think	  of	  an	  unregulated	  unilateral	  dispensation,	  we	  need	  absence	  of	  a	  command	  (hence	  dispensation),	  in	  presence	  of	  a	  prohibition,	  to	  exclude	  permission	  (for	  else	  the	  permissiveness	  would	  be	  bilateral).	  Such	  a	  prohibition	  would,	  however,	  as	  a	  regulated	  obligating	  norm,	  logically	  implicate	  dispensation.	  As	  this	  latter	  dispensation	  would	  be	  implicitly	  unilaterally	  regulated:	  a	  dispensation	  following	  a	  regulator’s	  explicit	  desire	  to	  regulate.	  Unregulated	  permissiveness	  exists	  by	  virtue	  of	  regulatory	  silence.	  28	  Between	  quotation	  marks,	  as	  in	  a	  state	  of	  absence	  of	  regulations,	  there	  are	  no	  regulatees.	  29	  Logically	  this	  would	  have	  to	  be	  without	  there	  being	  any	  obligation	  to	  (not)	  perform	  the	  act,	  as	  this	  would	  clash	  with	  contradictory	  permissiveness:	  permit	  against	  prohibition	  or	  dispensation	  against	  command.	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1.).30	  In	  the	  human	  rights	  example	  (in	  the	  above	  no.	  3)	  a	  description	  as	  permission	  is	  understood	  to	  include	  regulated	  dispensation.	  Unilateral	  regulated	  permissiveness	  would	  occur	  when	  there	  is	  no	  basis	  for	  the	  assumption	  that	  the	  regulator	  implicitly	  regulated	  the	  matching	  subcontrary	  permissiveness.	  Such	  situations	  unavoidably	  come	  with	  matching	  unregulated	  bilateral	  permissiveness,	  as	  they	  cannot	  exist	  other	  than	  in	  absence	  of	  obligations	  (see	  the	  above	  2).31	  Again,	  this	  seems	  rather	  theoretical,	  but	  as	  regulated	  and	  unregulated	  permissions	  differ	  (more	  on	  which	  in	  the	  below)	  it	  seems	  proper	  to	  make	  the	  distinction.32	  	  	  
Table	  2.	  Aspects	  of	  (un)regulated	  permissiveness:	  bilateral	  or	  unilateral	  	  
Table	  2	  –	  Aspects	  of	  (un)regulated	  permissiveness	  Permissiveness	  
C.	  (regulated)	  or	  	  
D.(unregulated)	   Unilateral	  ‘may	  do’	  or	  ‘may	  not	  do’	   Bilateral	  ‘may	  do’	  and	  ‘may	  not	  do’	  	  Regulated	  (C.)	  
Permissiveness	  following	  
regulatory	  act	  
By	  subaltern	  implication	  	  (1)	  -­‐	  command	  =>	  permission	  -­‐	  prohibition	  =>	  dispensation	  
By	  absence	  of	  obligations	  (4)	  -­‐	  matched	  by	  bilateral	  unregulated	  permission	  (2)	  
Only	  as	  freedom	  (3)	  -­‐	  e.g.	  human	  rights	  	  	  
	  Unregulated	  (D.)	  
Permissiveness	  following	  
absence	  of	  a	  regulatory	  act	  
Impossible	  	  Would	  implicate	  a	  corresponding	  regulated	  obligation,	  which	  would	  implicate	  a	  regulated	  subaltern	  permission	  
Always	  (2)	  In	  absence	  of	  any	  obligation	  (A	  contrario	  from	  case	  explained	  in	  box	  to	  the	  left	  	  	  	  
Piecemeal	  Permissiveness	  Normative	  positions	  have	  so	  far	  been	  discussed	  as	  general	  norms,	  for	  some	  generic	  norm-­‐object	  (or	  act-­‐type),33	  under	  some	  norm-­‐operator	  (or	  prescriptive	  mode	  of	  ought),34	  directed	  at	  a	  set	  of	  norm-­‐subjects	  (or	  regulatees),35	  perhaps	  under	  particular	  norm-­‐conditions	  of	  time,	  place	  or	  circumstance.36	  In	  practice,	  there	  are	  many	  cases	  where	  specific	  norms	  purport	  exceptions	  to	  some	  general	  obligating	  norm,	  so	  to	  exclude	  a	  subset	  of	  norm-­‐subjects	  and/or	  act-­‐types	  from	  that	  obligation	  –	  thus	  reclaiming	  permissiveness.	  Permit	  systems	  operate	  this	  way	  as	  they	  hold	  a	  general	  norm	  of	  prohibition	  (e.g.	  to	  generate	  electricity	  or	  transmit	  cell-­‐phone	  signals),	  followed	  by	  an	  exception	  to	  this	  prohibition	  in	  case	  a	  permit	  is	  granted	  (e.g.	  to	  a	  limited	  number	  of	  companies)	  –	  and	  similar	  arrangements	  exist	  with	  commands	  followed	  by	  dispensation.	  A	  permissive	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  30	  Perhaps	  regulated	  only	  for	  reasons	  of	  providing	  legal	  certainty,	  or	  as	  a	  regulatory	  device	  that	  allows	  other	  rights	  and	  duties	  to	  be	  connected	  to	  it	  (see	  later)	  –	  but	  not	  as	  a	  distinct	  form	  of	  permissiveness.	  31	  Note	  that	  regulated	  unilateral	  permissiveness	  by	  explicit	  exclusion	  of	  the	  complementary	  permissiveness	  would	  turn	  the	  expressly	  regulated	  permissiveness	  into	  no	  more	  than	  explicit	  formulation	  of	  implicated	  permissiveness	  (e.g.	  permission	  following	  command	  –	  see	  1.).	  See	  previous	  footnote.	  32	  The	  norm,	  “All	  natural	  persons	  are	  allowed	  to	  refrain	  from	  therapeutic	  cloning.”,	  could	  merely	  be	  about	  providing	  (protective)	  legal	  certainty,	  without	  the	  regulator	  wanting	  to	  suggest	  permission	  to	  such	  cloning.	  Still,	  by	  lack	  of	  a	  prohibition	  (which	  would	  make	  the	  dispensation	  implicated),	  such	  permission	  would	  ensue	  in	  unregulated	  form.	  33	  Or	  category	  -­‐	  a	  plain	  example:	  ‘(not)	  generating	  electricity’;	  a	  subset	  could	  be	  ‘…	  (not)	  using	  coal’,	  ‘….	  (not)	  using	  natural	  gas’	  etc.	  34	  Such	  as	  the	  above	  named:	  ‘shall’	  and	  ‘may’.	  35	  Also	  a	  class	  of	  abstractly	  described	  norm-­‐subjects:	  e.g.	  all	  persons	  or	  any	  person,	  but	  also,	  for	  example,	  all	  Internet	  providers,	  all	  grid-­‐operators,	  all	  private	  persons	  involved	  in	  household	  energy-­‐generation.	  36	  E.g.	  an	  imminent	  threat	  to	  life,	  power-­‐shortage,	  public	  uproar,	  internet-­‐disturbance.	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exception	  is	  made	  to	  the	  general	  norm,	  for	  a	  subset	  of	  regulatees,	  and/or	  of	  conditions	  under	  which	  the	  (more)	  general	  obligation	  applies.37	  	  Logically	  speaking,	  it	  seems	  strange	  to	  separate	  piecemeal	  permissiveness	  as	  an	  exception	  to	  a	  general	  obligating	  norm.	  After	  all,	  one	  can	  always	  regard	  the	  exception	  as	  the	  further	  delineation	  of	  the	  existing	  general	  norm,	  as	  regards	  the	  almost	  always-­‐applicable	  specifications	  of	  norm-­‐subjects	  and	  norm-­‐conditions.38	  Thus	  every	  permit	  or	  dispensation	  would	  merely	  be	  understood	  as	  a	  specification	  by	  which	  the	  scope	  of	  application	  of	  a	  general	  prohibition	  or	  command	  becomes	  more	  narrow	  (in	  respect	  of	  ‘(some)	  subjects	  in	  (some)	  cases’)	  than	  it	  was	  before	  the	  permissiveness	  was	  granted.	  We	  believe	  that	  it	  makes	  sense	  to	  regard	  such	  a	  (subject/condition-­‐subset)	  piecemeal	  permissiveness	  as	  a	  separate	  norm,	  given	  that	  we	  ultimately	  aim	  to	  relate	  norms	  to	  the	  brute	  facts	  of	  reality,	  rather	  than	  to	  merely	  regard	  them	  as	  prescriptive	  logic	  outside	  time	  and	  space.	  Thus	  specification	  of	  ‘subjects	  in	  particular	  cases’	  can	  have	  exceptional	  relevance	  in	  two	  distinct	  ways:39	  	  a. in	  placing	  the	  relevant	  (subjects-­‐cases)	  subset	  under	  a	  separate	  expressly	  regulated	  norm	  of	  permissiveness	  (so	  ‘shall	  (not)	  do’	  becomes	  ‘may	  (not)	  do’;	  contradictory	  to	  the	  obligating	  direction	  of	  ought	  that	  applies	  to	  the	  superset),	  with	  its	  very	  own	  specifications	  in	  terms	  of	  norm-­‐objects,	  -­‐operators,	  -­‐subjects	  and/or	  –conditions	  –	  rather	  than	  merely	  placing	  this	  subset	  outside	  the	  realm	  of	  obligation	  into	  unregulated	  permissiveness	  (merely	  redrawing	  boundaries	  of	  regulation).	  	  b. by	  doing	  so	  through	  the	  performance	  of	  a	  separate	  legal	  act	  (as	  an	  announced	  or	  unannounced	  possibility),	  with	  distinct	  conditions	  of	  validity	  (relating	  to	  power	  of	  its	  introduction,	  change	  or	  termination)	  which	  allowing	  for	  the	  possibility	  that	  at	  some	  point	  the	  piecemeal	  permissiveness	  ends	  and	  the	  general	  obligation	  regains	  its	  hold	  over	  the	  once	  excepted	  subset.	  Clearly	  the	  distinctness	  of	  a	  permissive	  exception	  is	  most	  manifest	  when	  brought	  about	  by	  a	  power	  that	  is	  not	  included	  in	  the	  same	  legal	  rule	  that	  holds	  the	  general	  obligating	  rule.	  The	  latter	  is	  generally	  the	  case	  in	  permits	  systems	  (allowing	  exceptions	  in	  individual	  cases	  or	  as	  general	  permissive	  norms	  for	  subsets),	  so	  that	  the	  permissions	  do	  not	  come	  unannounced.40	  The	  former	  applies	  when	  a	  permissive	  legal	  rule	  is	  introduced	  that	  has	  priority	  over	  the	  rule	  that	  holds	  the	  prohibitive	  norm	  	  -­‐	  such	  as	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  the	  ‘lex	  specialis	  rule’.41	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  37	  Alternative,	  frequently	  used,	  terminology	  for	  (sub)set	  would	  be	  (sub)category	  or	  (sub)class.	  The	  term	  ‘piecemeal’	  is	  used	  to	  underscore	  the	  difference	  to	  ‘general’	  permissiveness.	  Keep	  in	  mind	  that	  the	  latter	  would	  –logically–	  not	  allow	  for	  existence	  of	  a	  prohibition	  or	  a	  command	  alongside	  permissiveness.	  The	  former	  (i.e.	  piecemeal/for	  a	  subset)	  is	  an	  arrangement	  that	  is	  ‘illogically’	  bound	  by	  subject’s/regulatee(s)’s	  or	  case-­‐	  (including	  time-­‐	  and	  place-­‐)constraints	  (being	  a	  non-­‐general	  exception).	  38	  Only	  a	  limited	  number	  of	  norms	  apply	  to	  all	  persons	  at	  all	  times,	  in	  all	  places	  and	  under	  any	  circumstances	  –	  such	  as	  the	  prohibition	  of	  genocide	  and	  slavery.	  Even	  to	  prohibition	  of	  discrimination	  there	  are	  conditions	  –	  excepting	  positive	  discrimination.	  	  39	  It	  should	  be	  kept	  in	  mind	  that	  often	  a	  general	  prohibition	  or	  command	  is	  primarily	  intended	  to	  function	  as	  a	  regulatory	  ‘rule	  of	  closure’:	  	  it	  is	  predominantly	  a	  means	  to	  enable	  granting	  piecemeal	  permissions	  under	  piecemeal	  conditions,	  not	  so	  much	  to	  actually	  result	  in	  a	  de	  general	  state	  of	  prohibition	  or	  command	  –	  so	  not	  intent	  exists	  to	  extinguish	  type	  D.	  unregulated	  permissiveness.	  	  40	  Of	  course	  an	  obligating	  general	  norm	  may	  be	  phrased	  as	  such	  that	  it	  only	  obligates	  as	  regards	  ‘acts	  x,	  when	  performed	  outside	  of	  permits	  or	  dispensation’.	  As	  this	  amounts	  to	  the	  same	  as	  prohibiting	  or	  commanding	  the	  full	  range	  of	  ‘acts	  x’	  while	  elsewhere	  in	  the	  same	  legal	  rule	  it	  reads	  that	  there	  are	  exceptions	  when	  permits	  or	  dispensations	  apply,	  we	  do	  not	  elaborate	  on	  this.	  41	  ‘Lex	  specialis	  derogat	  legi	  generali’:	  the	  more	  specialized	  norm/rule	  overrides	  the	  norm/act	  with	  a	  more	  general	  arrangement.	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Exceptional	  or	  piecemeal	  permissive	  norms	  have	  the	  peculiarity	  that	  as	  a	  regulated	  exception	  to	  an	  obligating	  norm	  (i.e.	  permission	  from	  prohibition	  and	  dispensation	  from	  command),	  they	  disable	  the	  contradictory	  obligating	  norm	  for	  that	  particular	  (subject-­‐case)	  subset,	  which	  constitutes	  an	  absence	  of	  obligations	  (as	  the	  disabled	  obligating	  norm	  would	  not	  allow	  for	  the	  existence	  of	  a	  contrary	  obligating	  norm	  –	  command	  and	  prohibition	  cannot	  coexist),	  resulting	  in	  a	  subset-­‐realm	  of	  bilateral	  unregulated	  permissiveness.	  So,	  it	  would	  depend	  on	  the	  regulators	  intent	  and	  perhaps	  express	  regulation,	  if	  the	  piecemeal	  permissive	  exception	  is	  to	  be	  understood	  as	  regulated	  bilateral	  permissiveness	  (no.	  3.	  in	  the	  above	  list)	  or	  as	  a	  ‘hybrid’	  overlap	  of	  a	  unilateral	  regulated	  permissiveness	  with	  a	  bilateral	  unregulated	  permissiveness	  (no.	  4.	  in	  the	  same	  list).	  	  Logically	  bilateral	  piecemeal	  permissiveness	  is	  impossible	  if	  it	  is	  understood	  to	  hold	  that	  the	  complementary	  permissiveness	  is	  also	  piecemeal,	  as	  this	  would	  suggest	  that	  it	  exempts	  only	  from	  some	  contradictory	  obligating	  norm	  –	  which	  could	  not	  exist,	  as	  said	  in	  the	  above.	  So,	  bilateralism	  can	  only	  exist	  logically	  as	  a	  conjunction	  of	  one	  piecemeal	  type	  of	  permissiveness	  and	  one	  subcontrary,	  general	  type	  of	  permissiveness.	  For	  all	  practical	  purposes,	  however,	  the	  nature	  of	  the	  subcontrary	  permissiveness	  may	  be	  considered	  as	  regulated	  (so,	  in	  all	  bilateral	  –	  see	  no.	  3)	  if	  the	  regulator	  has	  considered	  its	  desirability	  and	  perhaps	  even	  given	  hitherto	  specifications.	  In	  any	  case,	  clearly	  these	  situations	  of	  bilateral	  or	  complementary	  (piecemeal)	  permissiveness	  stand	  well	  apart	  from	  the	  seemingly	  piecemeal-­‐regulated	  unilateral	  permissiveness	  that	  is	  actually	  ‘only’	  permissiveness	  implicated	  in	  an	  obligation.	  Concessions	  are	  a	  fine	  example,42	  which	  amount	  to	  a	  permit	  (‘May	  generate	  electricity’)	  within	  a	  command	  (‘Shall	  generate	  electricity’).	  	  	  Finally,	  there	  is	  no	  such	  thing	  as	  piecemeal-­‐unregulated	  permissiveness,	  as	  the	  concept	  of	  a	  subset	  arrangement	  is	  that	  of	  an	  exception	  to	  a	  (super)set.	  The	  exception	  would	  come	  with	  two	  problems:	  1.	  it	  assumes	  (prior)	  existence	  of	  an	  in	  fact	  absent	  general	  obligating	  norm,	  from	  which	  to	  except;	  2.	  it	  is	  exceptional	  only	  to	  the	  extend	  of	  confirming	  an	  already	  existing	  unregulated	  permissiveness,	  but	  this	  confirmation	  implicates	  regulation	  (if	  only	  to	  make	  permissiveness	  explicit	  for	  the	  specific	  (sub)category	  (of	  norm-­‐objects,	  -­‐subjects,	  or	  –conditions).	  	  
Table	  3.	  Aspects	  of	  piecemeal	  (un)regulated	  permissiveness	  	  
Table	  3	  –	  Aspects	  of	  piecemeal	  (un)regulated	  permissiveness	  Piecemeal	  Permissiveness	  
C.	  (regulated)	  or	  	  
D.(unregulated)	   Unilateral	  ‘may	  do’	  or	  ‘may	  not	  do’	   Bilateral	  ‘may	  do’	  and	  ‘may	  not	  do’	  Regulated	  subset	  (C.)	  
Permissiveness	  in	  exception	  to	  
opposing	  obligation	   Explicit	  exception	  -­‐	  permission	  from	  prohibition	  -­‐	  dispensation	  from	  command	  	  
Not	  as	  pure	  form	  -­‐	  exception	  to	  contrary	  obligations?!	  
As	  hybrid	  form	  -­‐	  matched	  with	  bilateral	  unregulated	  permission	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  42	  In	  some	  legal	  systems	  the	  term	  ‘concession’	  is	  reserved	  for	  acts,	  which	  both	  grant	  permission	  and	  command	  to	  perform	  the	  permitted	  activity,	  as	  there	  is	  a	  public	  need	  involved,	  such	  as	  in	  establishing	  public	  service	  networks.	  Often	  these	  concessions	  are	  granted	  in	  competition,	  set-­‐up	  to	  select	  the	  best	  party	  to	  secure	  the	  involved	  public	  work	  or	  service.	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Unregulated	  subset	  (D.)	  
Permission	  following	  absence	  
of	  a	  regulatory	  act	   Impossible	  	  See	  table	  2	   Impossible	  Cannot	  be	  framed	  without	  regulation	  	  
3.3	  –	  Forms	  of	  permissiveness	  -­‐	  regulated	  or	  unregulated43	  The	  above	  elaboration	  underscores	  the	  importance	  of	  the	  underlying	  distinction	  at	  play	  between	  regulated	  normative	  positions	  (A.,	  B.	  and	  C.),	  where	  the	  regulator	  is	  taking	  explicit	  action	  in	  the	  form	  of	  legal	  acts	  with	  legal	  effects	  for	  the	  concerned	  regulatees	  (e.g.	  car-­‐manufacturers,	  telecommunication-­‐providers,	  energy-­‐providers),	  and	  unregulated	  normative	  positions	  (D.),	  where	  the	  regulator	  remains	  ‘silent’.	  While	  obligations	  (A.	  and	  B.)	  can	  only	  exist	  in	  regulated	  form	  (as	  ‘red’	  or	  ‘green’	  channelling	  of	  behaviour),	  permissiveness	  (C.	  and	  D.)	  exists	  either	  in	  regulated	  or	  in	  unregulated	  form	  (as	  ‘amber’	  channelling	  of	  behaviour)	  –	  either	  bilaterally	  or	  unilaterally.	  	  From	  our	  focus	  on	  experimentation,	  in	  terms	  of	  removing	  regulatory	  constraints,	  permissions	  (C.	  and	  D.)	  are	  clearly	  the	  most	  interesting	  options.	  	  Their	  choice,	  however,	  calls	  for	  a	  further	  elaboration	  to	  clarify	  both	  possible	  shades	  of	  being	  unregulated	  and	  the	  possibility	  of	  permissiveness.	  This	  is	  relevant	  not	  only	  as	  a	  matter	  of	  absence	  of	  constraints,44	  but	  also	  as	  regards	  options	  of	  facilitation	  related	  to	  explicit	  or	  even	  implicit	  permission.	  The	  latter,	  of	  course,	  includes	  the	  possibility	  of	  facilitation	  (with	  implied	  permission)	  related	  to	  obligating	  regulation,	  e.g.	  a	  command	  (‘shall	  do	  A’)	  matched	  with	  a	  supporting	  facility	  (e.g.	  a	  subsidy	  to	  enable	  ‘doing	  A’).	  	  
Two	  forms	  of	  unregulated	  permissiveness	  Absence	  of	  regulation	  can	  take	  two	  forms,	  that	  of	  ‘mere	  regulatory	  silence’	  (where	  no	  regulator	  has	  considered	  the	  regulatory	  option),45	  or	  that	  of	  ‘eloquent	  regulatory	  silence’	  (where	  a	  regulator	  has	  taken	  the	  considered	  decision	  not	  to	  regulate).46	  The	  difference	  between	  the	  two	  is	  that,	  whereas	  the	  former	  has	  no	  normative	  content	  at	  all	  (as	  it	  is	  merely	  a	  matter	  of	  absence	  of	  regulation	  –	  permissiveness	  is	  a	  matter	  of	  ‘can’,	  rather	  than	  of	  ‘may)’,	  the	  latter,	  eloquent	  silence,	  does	  not	  hold	  norms	  of	  conduct	  for	  regulatees,	  but	  may,	  as	  a	  matter	  of	  distribution	  of	  legal	  powers,	  pose	  conditions	  to	  norms	  of	  power,47	  such	  as	  restricting	  powers	  of	  lower	  legal	  authorities	  in	  regulating.48	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  43	  The	  distinction	  between	  regulated	  and	  unregulated	  permissions	  goes	  back	  to	  Von	  Wright’s	  distinction	  between	  ‘weak’	  and	  ‘strong’	  permissions;	  see:	  G.H.	  von	  Wright,	  Norm	  and	  Action:	  A	  logical	  enquiry,	  London:	  Routledge	  &	  Kegan	  Paul	  (1963),	  esp.	  pp.	  85	  ff.	  44	  We	  recognize	  that,	  certainly	  in	  piecemeal	  permissions,	  regulated	  permits	  and	  exemptions	  may	  be	  accompanied	  by	  many	  (prohibitive	  and/or	  commanding)	  conditions.	  	  45	  Which	  need	  not	  be	  a	  matter	  of	  ignorance	  in	  a	  pejorative	  way.	  Take	  the	  acts	  of	  cloning	  and	  hacking,	  which	  simply	  were	  not	  in	  the	  ‘regulatory	  picture’	  before	  DNA	  was	  discovered	  and	  computers/internet	  invented.	  See	  also	  Heldeweg	  &	  Ruiter,	  
supra,	  footnote	  16.	  	  	  46	  We	  use	  the	  distinction	  made	  by	  Soeteman.	  A.	  Soeteman,	  Legal	  Gaps,	  Lemma	  in:	  IVR	  Encyclopedia	  of	  Jurisprudence,	  Legal	  
Theory	  and	  Philosophy	  of	  Law,	  http://ivr-­‐enc.info/index.php?title=Legal_gaps	  [Accessed	  August	  19,	  2014],	  but	  we	  replaced	  his	  ‘explicit	  silence’	  by	  (the	  oxymoron	  of)	  ‘eloquent	  silence’.	  A	  choice	  inspired	  by	  Michal	  Ephratt,	  The	  functions	  of	  silence,	  Journal	  of	  Pragmatics	  40	  (2008),	  pp.	  1009-­‐1938,	  where	  it	  is	  presented	  as	  a	  listener-­‐oriented,	  deliberate	  choice	  (p.	  1914)	  of	  a	  means	  of	  communication.	  We	  do,	  however,	  feel	  that	  Soeteman	  over	  extends	  the	  normative	  impact	  of	  eloquent	  silence	  when	  he	  concludes	  that	  these	  may	  also	  purport	  norms	  that	  courts	  should	  consider	  as	  rules	  of	  conduct.	  	  47	  A	  distinction	  made	  by	  Hart,	  between	  primary	  rules	  (of	  conduct)	  and	  secondary	  rules	  (inter	  alia	  of	  power):	  H.L.A.	  Hart,	  
The	  Concept	  of	  Law,	  3rd	  edition,	  Oxford:	  Oxford	  University	  Press	  2012,	  p.	  91-­‐99.	  48	  Different	  views	  exist	  on	  this	  issue,	  such	  as	  the	  more	  stringent	  one	  which	  holds	  that	  even	  eloquent	  silence	  is	  silent	  only	  when	  no	  normative	  message	  ensues	  from	  this	  silence,	  so	  only	  absence	  of	  obligations	  remains.	  We	  hold	  the	  view	  that	  if	  a	  court	  is	  confronted	  with	  eloquent	  silence,	  I	  could	  conclude	  invalidity	  of	  subordinate	  legal	  acts	  (by	  lower	  authorities)	  for	  reason	  of	  no-­‐power,	  but	  in	  terms	  of	  conduct	  it	  cannot	  but	  conclude	  that	  no	  obligations	  apply.	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Three	  forms	  of	  regulated	  permissiveness	  Aside	  from	  these	  two	  variations	  of	  unregulated	  permissiveness,	  there	  are	  three	  variations	  in	  regulated	  permissiveness.	  These	  variations	  display	  that	  the	  underlying	  difference	  between	  unregulated	  and	  regulated	  permissiveness	  lies	  with	  the	  fact	  that	  only	  regulated	  permissiveness	  has	  a	  relational	  dimension,	  derived	  from	  applicable	  rules	  of	  conduct.49	  At	  both	  opposite	  sides	  of	  these	  relations	  we	  find	  various	  types	  of	  rights.	  	  	   In	  a	  most	  sophisticated	  way,	  Hohfeld	  categorised	  these	  types	  of	  relations	  and	  related	  types	  of	  rights.50	  First	  order	  relations	  concern	  given	  legal	  relations	  following	  norms	  of	  conduct	  ,	  whereas	  second	  order	  relations	  concern	  given	  legal	  relations	  following	  norms	  of	  power	  (concerning	  the	  ability	  to	  introduce,	  alter	  or	  terminate	  legal	  relations).	  In	  both	  types	  of	  relations	  there	  is	  a	  party	  as	  ‘right-­‐holder’,	  having	  a	  legal	  advantage	  by	  virtue	  of	  his	  right,	  and	  an	  opposite,	  ‘burdened-­‐party’,	  who	  suffers	  a	  legal	  burden,	  resulting	  from	  the	  right	  holder’s	  ability	  to	  exercise	  his	  right.51	  	  In	  first	  order	  relations	  there	  are	  two	  types	  of	  rights’	  relations:	  rights	  as	  
claims	  of	  the	  right-­‐holder	  against	  a	  duty	  of	  the	  burdened-­‐party	  (e.g.	  a	  claim	  upon	  a	  contract);	  rights	  as	  privileges	  of	  the	  right-­‐holder	  against	  an	  burdened-­‐party	  with	  no-­‐claim	  to	  keep	  the	  right	  holder	  from	  acting	  upon	  his	  privilege	  (e.g.	  a	  privilege	  to	  act	  upon	  a	  permit	  or	  upon	  ownership).	  	  	  In	  second	  order	  relations	  again	  there	  are	  two	  types	  of	  rights’	  relations:	  rights	  as	  power	  of	  the	  right-­‐holder	  to	  introduce	  (etc.)	  first	  (and	  second)	  order	  relations,	  against	  the	  liability	  of	  the	  burdened-­‐party	  (e.g.	  the	  power	  to	  introduce	  obligating	  regulation);	  rights	  as	  immunity	  of	  the	  right-­‐holder	  against	  the	  burdened-­‐party’s	  disability	  to	  introduce	  (etc.)	  first	  (and	  second)	  order	  relations.	  	  
Table	  4.	  Hohfeld’s	  two	  orders	  of	  rights	  relations	  and	  4	  types	  of	  rights	  	  
Table	  3	  -­‐	  Hohfeld’s	  two	  orders	  of	  rights	  relations	  and	  4	  types	  of	  rights	  1st	  order	  ‘given	  legal	  relations’	   Claim	  	  	  	  !	  	  	  	  duty	  Privilege/Liberty	  	  	  	  !	  	  	  	  No-­‐claim	  2nd	  order	  ‘changing	  legal	  relations’	   Power	  	  	  	  !	  	  	  	  Liability	  Immunity	  	  	  	  !	  	  	  	  Disability	  (No-­‐power)	  	  We	  will	  find	  that	  many	  of	  these	  types	  of	  rights	  and	  underlying	  relations	  are	  included	  in	  relational	  variations	  in	  regulated	  permissiveness	  are	  of	  increasing	  ‘strength’:52	  	  1. permissiveness	  as	  ‘tolerance’	  are	  legal	  relations	  in	  which	  the	  regulator	  promises	  not	  to	  interfere	  with	  the	  permitted	  conduct.	  In	  Hohfeldian	  terminology,	  the	  right-­‐holder	  has	  a	  privilege	  to	  (not)	  act	  and	  the	  regulator,	  as	  the	  burdened-­‐party,	  has	  no-­‐claim	  to	  keep	  the	  right-­‐holder	  from	  acting	  or	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  49	  As	  we	  saw	  in	  the	  above,	  eloquent	  regulatory	  silence	  has	  a	  possible	  effect	  on	  ‘others’,	  but	  not	  as	  a	  matter	  of	  rules	  of	  conduct	  and	  only	  as	  regards	  rules	  of	  power	  (constraining	  discretion	  to	  use	  a	  legal	  power).	  	  50	  W.N.	  Hohfeld,	  Fundamental	  Legal	  Conceptions	  as	  Applied	  to	  Judicial	  Reasoning,	  ed.	  By	  W.W.	  Cook,	  Westport:	  Greenwood	  Press,	  1964	  (Yale	  University	  Press	  1919).	  51	  We	  speak	  of	  these	  relations	  as	  between	  one	  party	  at	  the	  one	  side	  of	  the	  relation	  and	  one	  party	  at	  the	  other	  side	  of	  the	  relation,	  but	  of	  course	  both	  positions	  can	  be	  held	  by	  one,	  by	  a	  group	  and	  by	  all.	  Hohfeld	  addressed	  this	  in	  terms	  of	  unital	  and	  paucital	  (one/group:	  ‘in	  personam’)	  and	  multital	  (all:	  ‘in	  rem’)	  relations’.	  Hohfeld,	  op.	  cit.,	  pp.	  712-­‐.	  	  52	  Atienza,	  Manuel,	  and	  J.	  Ruiz	  Manero,	  A	  Theory	  of	  Legal	  Sentences,	  Dordrecht/Boston/London:	  Kluwer	  Academic	  Publishers	  1998,	  p.	  96	  (with	  quotes	  from	  Von	  Wright,	  supra	  footnote	  35,	  p.	  88	  f.).	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refraining.	  An	  example	  of	  ‘tolerance’	  would	  be	  a	  regulator	  allowing	  (passively,	  not	  by	  separate	  legal	  act)	  an	  energy	  grid	  operator	  to	  also	  experiment	  with	  telecommunication	  services	  via	  this	  energy	  grid.	  Permissiveness	  as	  a	  tolerance	  merely	  affects	  the	  relation	  between	  the	  regulator	  and	  the	  regulatee,	  not	  the	  relation	  between	  the	  regulatee	  and	  third	  parties	  (as	  a	  protection	  (by	  the	  regulator)	  against	  actions	  by	  third	  parties	  to	  keep	  the	  right-­‐holder	  from	  exercising	  his	  privilege).	  2. permissiveness	  with	  ‘rights’	  is	  permissiveness	  as	  tolerance	  (see	  above)	  with	  the	  extended	  prohibition	  of	  third	  parties	  to	  hinder	  or	  prevent	  the	  right-­‐holder	  from	  (not)	  acting	  upon	  his	  permissiveness.53	  Somewhat	  confusingly,	  perhaps,	  we	  could	  say	  that	  permissiveness	  as	  a	  right,	  amounts	  to	  a	  claim	  by	  the	  right-­‐holder	  against	  the	  duty	  of	  the	  regulator,	  as	  burdened-­‐party,	  to	  make	  sure	  that	  third	  parties	  do	  not	  interfere	  with	  the	  right-­‐holder’s	  permission.	  An	  example	  of	  permissiveness	  as	  a	  right	  would	  be	  that	  a	  regulator	  will	  take	  actions	  against	  third	  parties	  trying	  to	  make	  it	  impossible	  to	  perform	  a	  permitted	  high-­‐tech	  experiment	  (e.g.	  by	  shutting	  of	  power	  or	  communication)	  or	  that	  protection	  can	  be	  call	  for	  in	  court.	  3. permissiveness	  with	  enabling	  rights	  is	  permissiveness	  with	  rights	  (see	  above)	  together	  with	  a	  command	  upon	  third	  parties	  to	  (apart	  from	  the	  prohibition	  to	  hinder)	  enable	  the	  right-­‐holder	  to	  exercise	  his	  permissiveness.	  Not	  only	  does	  the	  regulator	  promise	  tolerance	  towards	  the	  permission-­‐holder,	  and	  is	  the	  regulator	  obligated	  to	  be	  intolerant	  to	  those	  third	  parties	  that	  are	  hindering	  the	  exercise	  of	  permission,	  but	  the	  regulator	  also	  provides	  the	  permission-­‐holder	  with	  a	  claim	  against	  those	  under	  command	  to	  enable	  the	  permit	  holder.54	  An	  example	  would	  be	  if	  third	  parties	  would	  be	  commanded,	  and	  thus	  be	  under	  duty,	  to	  support	  an	  experimental	  activity	  by	  providing	  necessary	  resources,	  such	  as	  high	  energy-­‐voltages	  or	  special	  telecommunication	  options.	  	  It	  will	  be	  clear	  in	  this	  sequence	  of	  three	  types	  of	  regulated	  permissiveness	  that	  the	  increasing	  ‘strength’	  comes	  with	  inclusions:	  an	  enabling	  permissiveness,	  includes	  permissiveness	  as	  a	  right	  and	  a	  permissiveness	  as	  a	  right,	  includes	  permissiveness	  as	  a	  tolerance.55	  	  When	  we	  compare	  regulated	  permissiveness	  as	  a	  tolerance	  with	  the	  unregulated	  permissiveness	  by	  eloquent	  silence,	  such	  rule	  of	  inclusion	  does	  not	  apply.	  Tolerance	  does	  not	  relate	  to	  a	  limitation	  of	  powers	  of	  lower	  authorities	  (to	  regulate	  the	  matter)	  as	  may	  follow	  from	  eloquent	  silence	  (which	  basically	  creates	  an	  immunity	  of	  right-­‐holders	  against	  which	  these	  authorities	  have	  no-­‐
power).	  Other	  than	  eloquent	  silence,	  toleration	  purports	  a	  rule	  of	  conduct	  which	  relates	  to	  the	  position	  of	  the	  regulator	  itself,	  self-­‐restricting	  its	  own	  permissiveness	  of	  obstructing	  the	  right-­‐holder	  in	  his	  right	  to	  act	  or	  refrain.56	  It	  purports	  a	  no-­‐claim	  (against	  a	  privilege)	  and	  does	  not	  include	  immunity	  (against	  
no-­‐power)	  and	  thus	  eloquent	  silence	  stands	  apart,	  as	  a	  matter	  of	  ‘absence	  of	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  53	  Ibidem.	  54	  Von	  Wright,	  p.	  88;	  Atienza	  and	  Ruiz	  Manero,	  p.	  97	  55	  We	  believe	  that	  the	  case	  can	  be	  made	  that	  enabling	  permissiveness	  does	  not	  necessarily	  need	  to	  encompass	  rights	  permissiveness,	  but	  leave	  this	  point	  aside	  for	  now.	  56	  Not	  to	  be	  confused	  with	  the	  regulators	  right	  (as	  power)	  to	  at	  a	  later	  stage	  introduce	  constraining	  regulation	  on	  the	  issue	  or	  act	  type	  that	  it	  first	  decided	  to	  be	  permissive	  on	  and	  tolerate.	  Creating	  permissiveness	  (as	  tolerance)	  does	  not	  alter	  2nd	  order	  (power)	  relations!	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ought’	  (or	  the	  presence	  of	  mere	  ‘can’),57	  from	  tolerance	  as	  a	  relational	  ‘presence	  of	  ought’	  (in	  the	  form	  of	  a	  tolerated	  privilege	  to	  ‘may	  (not)	  do’	  –	  as	  norm	  of	  conduct).	  	  This	  tells	  us	  that	  unregulated	  (‘weak’;	  type	  D.)	  permissions	  do	  not	  involve	  legal	  relations	  of	  conduct,	  with	  opposing	  positions	  at	  both	  sides,	  that	  can	  be	  expressed	  in	  terms	  of	  Hohfeldian	  rights,	  whereas	  this	  is	  exactly	  what	  is	  the	  case	  in	  regulated	  (‘strong’;	  type	  C.)	  permissions.58	  	  	   Together	  with	  the	  earlier	  discussed	  implicated	  permissions	  (and	  while	  leaving	  aside	  the	  exceptional,	  piecemeal	  permissions),	  we	  may	  now	  list	  several	  distinct	  types	  of	  permissions.	  	  
Table	  5.	  Five	  types	  of	  permissions	  across	  regulated	  and	  unregulated	  realms	  	  
Table	  4	  -­‐	  Five	  types	  of	  permissions	  across	  unregulated	  and	  regulated	  realms	  Unregulated	  (‘weak’;	  type	  D.)	  permissions	   Regulated	  (‘strong’;	  type	  C.)	  permissions	  Mere	  silence	   Eloquent	  Silence	   Tolerance	   Right	   Enabling	   Implicated	  	  Mere	  can:	  ‘Indifference’/’Freedom’	  	  
Promise	  Privilege!No	  claim	   Claim!Duty	  (3rd	  party	  non	  interference)	   Claim!Duty	  	  (3rd	  party	  assistance)	   Privilege	  upon	  duty	  from	  obligation	  -­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐	   Restriction	  upon	  other	  authorities	  
Prohibition	  regulator	   Prohibition	  upon	  3rd	  parties	   Command	  upon	  3rd	  parties	   From	  Prohibition	  or	  Command	  	  	  
3.4	  –	  Facilitation	  by	  Permission	  or	  by	  Command	  Now	  that	  we	  have	  mapped	  the	  possible	  ‘permutations’	  of	  permission,	  relevant	  (also)	  to	  possible	  choices	  of	  legal	  regimes	  for	  experimentation,	  we	  still	  have	  two	  issues,	  raised	  in	  the	  above,	  to	  tackle.	  These	  issues	  relate	  to	  the	  basic	  premise	  that	  
experimentation	  calls	  for	  legal	  regimes	  that	  lift	  constraints	  (to	  create	  a	  greater	  realm	  of	  permissiveness	  –	  to	  foster	  innovative	  entrepreneurship),	  but	  also	  regimes	  that	  facilitate	  experimentation	  (by	  providing	  basic	  legal	  and	  other	  resources).	  So,	  how	  can	  we	  relate	  facilitation	  to	  permissiveness	  and	  how	  can	  facilitation	  follow	  from	  command?59	  This	  will	  be	  dealt	  with	  next.	  In	  subparagraph	  2.5	  we	  will	  further	  define	  and	  delineate	  the	  meaning	  of	  experiment.	  	  
Permissiveness	  with	  Facilitation	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  57	  A	  term	  often	  attributed	  to	  Immanuel	  Kant.	  See:	  Stern,	  Robert,	  Does	  Ought	  Imply	  Can?	  And	  did	  Kant	  think	  it	  does?	  
Utilitas	  (2004),	  16:1,	  pp	  42-­‐61.	  Stern	  emphasizes	  that	  blameworthiness	  is	  key	  to	  this	  implication	  (actor	  before	  act:	  ‘blame	  implies	  can’),	  given	  that	  the	  negation	  ‘cannot	  implies	  ought	  not’	  (as	  in	  P~a):	  it	  is	  wrong	  to	  blame	  someone	  for	  what	  he	  or	  she	  is	  incapable	  of	  changing	  (e.g.	  for	  not	  being	  taller,	  not	  lengthening	  time	  of	  daylight).	  58	  Which	  goes	  against	  Joseph	  Raz’	  scepticism	  on	  the	  distinction	  between	  strong	  and	  weak	  permissions:	  Joseph	  Raz,	  
Practical	  Reason	  and	  Norms,	  OUP	  (1999),	  p.	  88-­‐.	  Note	  that	  strong	  permissions	  are	  weak	  permissions	  but	  not	  vice	  versa	  –	  as	  regulated	  permissions	  exist	  without	  opposing	  obligations,	  weak	  permission	  exists	  due	  to	  such	  absent	  obligations,	  but	  a	  weak	  permission	  cannot	  in	  itself	  be	  strong,	  as	  this	  requires	  regulatory	  form.	  59	  Prohibition	  can	  foster	  innovation	  (see:	  Heldeweg,	  supra,	  footnote	  5),	  by	  compelling	  regulatees	  to	  move	  away	  from	  ‘outdated	  practices’	  and,	  through	  innovation,	  move	  to	  alternative	  activities.	  In	  terms	  of	  experimentation	  we	  consider	  the	  benefits	  of	  prohibition	  to	  be	  of	  accessory	  importance	  only:	  setting	  limits,	  a	  norm	  to	  be	  excepted	  from,	  obligating	  others	  to	  tolerate.	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Relating	  facilitation	  to	  permissiveness	  was	  already	  included	  in	  the	  above	  in	  the	  ‘strongest’	  conceptualisation	  of	  permissiveness:	  ‘enabling’.	  The	  focus	  was	  on	  3rd	  parties	  being	  obligated,	  by	  command,	  to	  assist	  the	  right-­‐holder,	  with	  the	  regulator	  being	  in	  the	  position	  of	  the	  ‘burdened	  party’,	  being	  under	  duty	  to	  secure	  3rd	  party	  assistance.	  It	  goes	  almost	  without	  saying	  that	  this	  concept	  can	  be	  elaborated	  upon,	  at	  least	  in	  two	  directions:	  (a.)	  the	  possibility	  of	  assistance	  by	  regulators	  themselves;	  (b.)	  the	  types	  of	  facilitation	  either	  by	  3rd	  parties	  or	  regulators.	  	   The	  abovementioned	  explicitly	  regulated	  forms	  of	  permissiveness	  did	  not	  place	  the	  regulator	  in	  the	  position	  of	  direct	  facilitator.	  At	  most	  the	  regulator	  was	  indirectly	  facilitating,	  through	  commanding	  3rd	  parties	  to	  assist	  the	  right-­‐holder.	  This	  was	  presented	  as	  a	  claim-­‐duty	  relationship	  between	  the	  right-­‐holder	  and	  the	  third	  parties	  involved.	  The	  position	  of	  the	  regulator	  would	  be	  one	  of	  issuing	  the	  command	  and	  perhaps	  also	  of	  securing	  that	  violation	  of	  this	  command	  would	  be	  sanctioned.60	  Of	  course	  the	  regulator	  could	  include	  other,	  subordinate,	  regulators	  in	  the	  category	  of	  third	  parties,	  compelling	  them	  to	  facilitate	  (e.g.	  by	  providing	  information,	  expert	  advice,	  subsidies	  and	  grants	  –	  which	  would	  also	  require	  proper	  legal	  powers).	  There	  is	  no	  reason	  why	  a	  permitting	  regulator	  would	  not	  itself	  also	  provide	  facilitation,	  by	  similar	  means,	  thus	  creating	  a	  duty-­‐claim	  relation	  between	  itself	  and	  the	  right-­‐holder,	  complementary	  to	  the	  already	  existing	  privilege-­‐no-­‐claim	  relation	  (following	  from	  the	  promise	  of	  toleration).	  It	  is	  a	  matter	  of	  legal	  dogmatism	  whether	  such	  facilitation	  would	  be	  included	  in	  the	  same	  legislative	  or	  administrative	  act	  as	  that	  of	  granting	  permissiveness,	  or	  whether	  facilitation	  is	  provided	  by	  a	  separate	  act.61	  	  
Legal	  facilitation	  (as	  such)	  This	  is	  not	  the	  place	  to	  explore	  and	  systematize	  all	  possible	  types	  of	  legal	  facilitation,	  but	  a	  basic	  understanding	  is	  necessary.	  	  In	  negative	  terms,	  legal	  facilitation	  is	  not	  about	  merely	  lifting	  constraints	  to	  (not)	  acting,	  circumventing	  or	  liberating	  from	  prohibitions	  or	  commands	  directed	  at	  the	  relevant	  acts.	  Facilitation	  reaches	  beyond	  ‘freedom	  from’.	  In	  a	  
positive	  sense	  it	  amounts	  to	  ‘freedom	  to’,	  in	  the	  sense	  of	  making	  resources	  available,	  so	  that	  permitted	  acts,	  whether	  unregulated	  or	  regulated,	  not	  only	  ‘may	  (not)	  be’	  performed,	  but	  also	  can	  be	  performed	  or	  refrained	  from,62	  because	  the	  necessary	  resources	  (other	  than	  ‘may	  (not)’	  are	  made	  available)	  –	  all	  of	  which	  towards	  enhancing	  innovative	  entrepreneurship.	  	  In	  the	  above	  we	  listed	  resources	  such	  as	  legal	  powers,	  legal	  monopolies	  (e.g.	  concessions,	  (intellectual)	  property	  rights),	  public	  procurement,	  public	  rights	  of	  use,	  to	  information,	  expertise,	  space,	  people,	  subsidies	  and	  grants.	  We	  do,	  however,	  need	  to	  be	  more	  accurate	  considering	  the	  distinction	  we	  make	  between	  legal	  permission	  and	  legal	  facilitation	  (through	  the	  above	  terns	  ‘may’	  and	  ‘can’).	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  60	  This	  is	  a	  matter	  of	  secondary	  norms	  (of	  adjudication	  –	  and	  sanctioning),	  whereas	  the	  Duty-­‐Claim	  and	  Privilege-­‐No-­‐claim	  relations	  are	  about	  primary	  norms	  (of	  conduct).	  61	  Existing	  legal	  systems	  (i.e.	  legal	  orders)	  have	  many	  and	  varying	  categorisations	  of	  types	  of	  legislative	  and	  administrative	  legal	  acts,	  as	  single	  or	  as	  bundles	  of	  legal	  relations.	  	  62	  The	  ability	  to	  ‘refrain	  from’	  will	  often	  be	  a	  mere	  matter	  of	  ‘not	  doing’,	  but	  conditions	  may	  require	  the	  use	  of	  resources	  to	  avoid	  a	  natural	  course	  …	  or	  avoid	  undesirable	  consequences	  from	  not	  acting.	  PM.	  	  
	   17	  
To	  be	  granted	  a	  permit	  so	  that	  available	  resources	  may	  be	  used,	  or	  indeed	  to	  be	  granted	  an	  exemption	  from	  fair	  competition	  rules	  (with	  specification	  to	  the	  use	  of	  an	  infrastructure,	  as	  resource,	  perhaps	  as	  a	  monopoly	  of	  use),	  are	  ‘merely’	  about	  permissiveness	  to	  ‘unleash’	  already	  available	  resources	  or	  those	  resources	  that	  lie	  within	  the	  ambit	  of	  already	  available	  legal	  power	  to	  be	  acquired.	  Lifting	  constraints,	  perhaps	  as	  a	  piecemeal	  exception	  to	  a	  prohibition	  of	  command,	  
allows	  a	  regulatee	  to	  use	  resources	  that	  otherwise	  could	  not	  be	  used	  (optimally).	  Although	  this	  ‘freedom	  from’	  constraints	  may	  be	  regarded	  as	  crucial	  step	  towards	  any	  undertaking	  of	  innovative	  entrepreneurship,	  to	  ‘may	  (not)	  do’	  still	  begs	  the	  question	  if	  the	  regulatee	  ‘can	  (not)	  do’,	  because	  the	  necessary	  resources	  may	  be	  absent	  or	  may	  lie	  outside	  the	  regulatee’s	  legal	  power	  of	  acquisition.	  	   Legal	  facilitation	  is	  about	  enabling	  through	  legally	  securing	  resources	  towards	  ‘can	  (not)	  do’,	  and	  does	  so	  in	  a	  twofold	  way.	  	  1. facilitation	  by	  allocation	  of	  legal	  powers.	  This	  involves	  bestowment	  as	  such	  of	  powers	  onto	  one	  or	  more	  regulatees,	  so	  that	  they	  may	  engage	  in	  performing	  
legal	  acts,	  which	  create	  rights	  and	  obligations	  (nested	  in	  prohibitions,	  commands	  and	  permissions),	  necessary	  to	  make	  resources	  available.	  Such	  legal	  acts	  may	  be	  multilateral	  and	  unilateral	  legal	  undertakings,	  as	  with	  contracting	  and	  managing	  (intellectual)	  property,	  but	  we	  take	  them	  to	  also	  include	  procedural	  powers,	  to	  take	  legal	  action	  against	  others.	  Allocation	  should	  also	  involve	  a	  reflection	  on	  whether	  powers	  to	  decide	  about	  access	  to,	  	  and	  use	  or	  alienation	  of	  resources,	  is	  organised	  in	  an	  efficient	  and	  effective	  way	  –	  regardless	  of	  whether	  powers	  or	  empowered	  parties	  are	  public	  or	  private.	  The	  underlying	  concern	  is	  to	  avoid	  transaction	  costs	  as	  a	  result	  of	  an	  unnecessary	  (or	  at	  least	  inefficient)	  dispersion	  of	  powers,	  but	  also	  through	  a	  lacking	  alignment	  of	  public	  objectives	  (causing	  risks	  of	  undesirable	  ‘veto-­‐decisions’	  –	  a	  possible	  ‘Tragedy	  of	  Anti-­‐commons’).63	  2. facilitation	  by	  creation	  of	  legal	  obligations	  onto	  burdened	  parties,	  through	  legal	  acts	  by	  the	  regulator,	  which	  create	  duties	  of	  these	  parties	  against	  claims	  of	  the	  facilitated	  party.	  A	  first	  category	  would	  consist	  of	  legal	  acts	  that	  create	  a	  claim	  against	  the,	  or	  a	  (subordinate)	  regulator	  (e.g.	  to	  get	  subsidies	  or	  grants,	  to	  get	  or	  use	  facilities,	  advice,	  information).	  A	  second	  category	  would	  consist	  of	  legal	  act	  creating	  obligations	  of	  others,	  as	  duties	  to	  assist	  by	  performance	  or	  by	  refraining	  from	  some	  action,	  thus	  making	  a	  resource	  available	  to	  the	  regulatee	  (e.g.	  allowing	  access	  or	  use,	  giving	  advice	  or	  information,	  performing	  tasks).	  	  A	  third	  category	  would	  consist	  of	  creating	  possibilities	  for	  undertaking	  entrepreneurial	  innovation	  involving	  legal	  obligations	  that	  enable	  possibilities	  for	  deployment	  of	  necessary	  resources,	  either	  as	  a	  matter	  of	  public	  utilities	  (e.g.	  buildings,	  roads,	  bridges,	  infrastructures),	  as	  a	  necessary	  backbone	  to	  some	  or	  any	  entrepreneurial	  initiative	  (although	  these	  utilities	  in	  themselves	  may	  not	  be	  innovative),64	  or	  as	  a	  matter	  of	  (public)	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  63	  M.	  Heller,	  The	  Tragedy	  of	  the	  Anti-­‐commons:	  Property	  in	  the	  Transition	  from	  Marx	  to	  Markets,	  Harvard	  Law	  Review	  111,	  No.	  3	  (1998),	  pp.	  621-­‐688.	  Whether	  it	  is	  about	  private	  law	  (property)	  rules	  or	  rules	  of	  public	  law	  (administrative)	  powers,	  the	  issue	  is	  how	  to	  avoid	  inefficiency	  due	  to	  fragmentation	  of	  veto-­‐powers,	  leading	  to	  underuse	  of	  resources.	  This	  is	  a	  general	  concern,	  but	  may	  be	  particularly	  relevant	  to	  cases	  of	  experimentation	  64	  A	  facilitation	  that,	  generally,	  does	  not	  create	  a	  duty-­‐claim	  relation	  between	  government	  and	  those	  many	  beneficiaries,	  but	  will	  involve	  public	  legal	  acts	  and	  legal	  acts	  concerning	  implementation,	  and	  future	  use,	  which	  do	  come	  with	  duty-­‐claim	  and	  perhaps	  also	  privilege	  (of	  use)-­‐no-­‐claim	  relations.	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procurement	  (the	  facilitation	  being	  an	  opportunity	  to	  engage	  in	  a	  government	  tender	  and	  possibly	  ‘win	  the	  bid’	  for	  a	  contract	  or	  concession)	  with	  a	  set-­‐up	  that	  (explicitly)	  calls	  for	  innovative	  entrepreneurship	  (and/or	  innovative	  results).	  	  	  
Table	  6.	  Legal	  Permission	  and	  Legal	  Facilitation	  -­‐	  May	  &	  Can	  	  
Table	  5.	  Legal	  permission	  and	  Legal	  Facilitation	  -­‐	  May	  &	  Can	  May	   Weak	   Non-­‐legal	  can;	  possibly	  as	  ‘eloquent	  regulatory	  silence	  Strong	   Permission	  (with	  tolerance,	  rights	  enabling)	  Can	   Competence	   Power	  of	  regulatee	  to	  perform	  legal	  acts	  Obligations	   Regulators	  legal	  acts	  creating	  obligations	  that	  facilitate	  	  	   Again,	  sometimes	  facilitation	  can	  be	  joined-­‐up	  with	  permission,	  perhaps	  even	  in	  one	  legal	  act,	  depending	  on	  legal	  system	  dogmatism	  (and	  on	  the	  distribution	  and	  delineation	  of	  powers).	  Applicability	  of	  the	  legality	  and	  
speciality	  principles,65	  generally	  leads	  to	  a	  specificity	  of	  powers	  and	  consequently	  to	  administration	  by	  specialized	  legal	  acts.66	  As	  a	  matter	  of	  the	  aforementioned	  ‘Tragedy	  of	  Anti-­‐commons’,	  creative	  legislators	  may	  find	  ways	  to	  cluster	  these	  administrative	  powers	  into	  bundles	  of	  legal	  rules,	  as	  legal	  regimes,	  perhaps	  even	  as	  legal	  institutions	  (e.g.	  ownership,	  which	  comprises	  of	  various	  legal	  relations	  and	  legal	  act	  types	  at	  the	  same	  time).67	  Whether	  connected	  or	  separate	  from	  creating	  permissiveness,	  facilitation	  will	  often	  involve	  a	  command	  being	  given	  to	  perform	  a	  particular	  act	  (as	  a	  matter	  of	  ‘shall	  do	  A’).	  The	  above	  examples	  of	  a	  regulator’s	  legal	  act	  by	  which	  it	  commands	  itself,	  a	  subordinate	  regulator	  or	  a	  private	  regulatee	  to	  provide	  monetary,	  informational,	  expert	  and	  other	  resources,	  are	  forms	  of	  commanding	  legal	  facilitation.	  Such	  command	  may	  well	  result	  in	  a	  duty-­‐claim	  relation,	  when	  the	  duty	  to	  perform	  is	  as	  explicit	  that	  the	  right-­‐holder	  can	  enforce	  the	  command	  by	  claim.	  Again,	  prohibition	  as	  facilitation	  is	  a	  less	  obvious	  construct.	  Prohibition	  creates	  an	  obligation	  to	  refrain	  from	  a	  particular	  act	  (‘A’),	  which	  may	  either	  amount	  to	  a	  duty	  (‘shall	  not	  do	  A’)	  against	  a	  claim	  of	  a	  right-­‐holder	  (to	  not	  be	  hindered	  by	  the	  burdened-­‐party	  ‘doing	  A’),	  or	  it	  creates	  a	  privilege	  of	  the	  right-­‐holder,	  against	  the	  absence	  of	  a	  no-­‐claim	  position	  of	  the	  burdened-­‐party,	  as	  the	  prohibition	  places	  the	  latter	  outside	  a	  position	  of	  making	  a	  claim.	  Both	  forms	  of	  prohibitions	  effectively	  amount	  to	  implicated,	  unilateral	  permissiveness	  (of	  access	  to	  or	  use	  of	  resources),	  rather	  than	  to	  facilitation.	  	  
3.5	  –	  Legal	  Powers	  To	  bring	  about	  permissive	  norms	  or	  norms	  that	  underpin	  facilitation,	  legal	  powers	  are	  necessary,	  embedded	  in	  power-­‐conferring	  legal	  norms.	  Norms	  of	  powers	  should	  not	  be	  confused	  with	  permissive	  norms.	  Permissions	  are	  not	  about	  introducing,	  altering	  or	  terminating	  legal	  norms,	  but	  ‘merely’	  about	  the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  65	  Also	  known,	  by	  the	  French	  legal	  terminology,	  as	  ‘detournement	  de	  pouvoir’:	  powers	  shall	  not	  be	  used	  for	  other	  purposes	  than	  following	  its	  objective.	  66	  If	  only	  because	  specialized	  legal	  powers	  are	  allocated	  to	  specialized	  public	  offices,	  with	  specific	  interests.	  67	  A	  legal	  regime	  is	  understood	  here	  as	  a	  coherent	  set	  of	  legal	  rules.	  Coherence	  may	  be	  about	  a	  particular	  societal	  interest	  or	  issue	  (e.g.	  energy	  provision,	  proper	  telecommunication),	  or	  about	  a	  legal	  institution	  (e.g.	  marriage,	  contract,	  ownership,	  state).	  See	  MacCormick	  and	  Ruiter	  PM.	  For	  the	  concept(ulization)	  of	  and	  bundling	  of	  (Hohfeldian)	  legal	  relations	  within	  ‘ownership’,	  see:	  Jeremy	  Waldron,	  What	  Is	  Private	  Property?,	  Oxford	  Journal	  for	  Legal	  Studies,	  Vol.	  5,	  No.	  3	  (1985),	  pp.	  313-­‐349.	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(non-­‐)performance	  of	  brute	  operative	  acts.	  Further,	  norms	  of	  powers	  are	  subaltern	  to	  commands	  nor	  contradictory	  to	  prohibitions	  (although	  the	  doctrinal	  perspective	  that	  some	  powers,	  especially	  unilateral	  powers,	  exists	  only	  when	  explicitly	  granted,	  may	  be	  understood	  as	  ‘forbidden,	  unless’	  –	  similar	  to	  piecemeal	  permissions).	  Finally,	  some	  powers	  are	  everything	  but	  noncommittal,	  as	  upon	  fulfilment	  of	  set	  conditions,	  they	  obligate	  the	  empowered	  party	  to	  perform	  a	  particular	  legal	  act	  and/or	  in	  a	  particular	  way.	  More	  generally	  norms	  of	  power	  come	  with	  their	  own	  norm-­‐conditions	  (as	  even	  the	  sovereign	  powers	  of	  parliaments	  have	  their	  limits),	  which	  have	  more	  objective	  (even	  numerical)	  or	  more	  subjective	  (e.g.	  ‘to	  advance	  innovation’)	  descriptions,	  whilst	  the	  norm-­‐object	  may	  be	  a	  mandatory	  or	  a	  discretionary	  power,	  dependent	  on	  whether	  the	  empowered	  regulator	  has	  a	  say	  in	  whether	  to	  apply	  and/or	  how	  to	  apply	  the	  power.	  	   The	  power	  conditions	  regarding	  the	  introduction	  of	  permissive	  and/or	  facilitative	  rules	  for	  experimentation	  could	  on	  the	  one	  hand	  be	  expected	  to	  be	  ‘more	  subjective’	  as	  passing	  judgment	  on	  the	  promise	  of	  such	  an	  experiment	  calls	  for	  a	  difficult	  assessment,	  the	  legal	  impact	  of	  singling	  an	  experimental	  activity	  out	  in	  terms	  of	  permissiveness	  or	  facilitation	  that	  others	  do	  not	  enjoy,	  will	  call	  for	  ‘more	  objective’	  criteria.	  Upon	  fulfilment	  of	  conditions	  one	  may	  similarly	  expect	  a	  mixed	  picture	  as	  regards	  the	  norm-­‐object	  of	  performing	  a	  legal	  act	  allowing	  permissive	  and/or	  facilitative	  benefits,	  again	  because	  on	  the	  one	  hand	  the	  innovative	  nature	  of	  experimental	  activities	  will	  call	  for	  an	  ad	  hoc	  weighing	  of	  interests,	  by	  a	  ‘more	  discretionary’	  power.	  Meanwhile,	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  norm-­‐subjects	  will	  need	  some	  (in	  advance)	  certainty	  as	  regards	  the	  chances	  and	  kinds	  of	  exceptional	  benefits,	  whereas	  third	  parties	  will	  need	  some	  safeguards	  that	  such	  benefits	  are	  proportional	  to	  the	  public	  interest	  involved	  and	  their	  private	  equality,	  which	  a	  ‘more	  mandatory’	  power	  may	  provide.	  	  	  	   The	  norm-­‐objects	  (and	  matching	  norm-­‐operators)	  of	  powers	  regarding	  innovative	  entrepreneurship	  have	  been	  discussed	  in	  the	  above.	  They	  do	  not	  relate	  to	  leaving	  matters	  unregulated	  (as	  ‘weak	  permissions’),	  or	  only	  in	  the	  sense	  that	  this,	  and	  especially	  eloquent	  silence	  presupposes	  the	  existence	  of	  power	  that	  could	  have	  been	  deployed	  towards	  obligations	  or	  (regulated)	  permissiveness.	  Furthermore,	  it	  may	  be	  argued	  that	  if	  a	  power	  exists	  but	  the	  relevant	  power-­‐holder	  remains	  eloquently	  silent	  on	  the	  issue,	  this	  can	  be	  taken	  to	  mean	  that	  existing	  lower	  regulators	  are	  considered	  not	  to	  be	  at	  liberty	  (i.e.	  not	  to	  have	  power	  –	  given	  unwritten	  conditions	  of	  power	  in	  a	  hierarchical	  relationship	  between	  regulators)	  to	  make	  their	  own	  arrangements.68	  Otherwise,	  powers	  relate	  to	  regulating	  permissiveness	  with	  toleration,	  with	  rights	  or,	  in	  a	  facilitatory	  twist,	  with	  enabling	  provisions,	  and	  furthermore,	  whether	  or	  not	  connected	  to	  permissiveness	  but	  surely	  with	  a	  commanding	  force,	  facilitations	  by	  norms	  of	  conduct	  or	  norms	  of	  power.	  In	  all	  cases,	  permissive	  or	  facilitative,	  powers	  will	  differ	  in	  whether	  they	  have	  a	  general	  or	  a	  piecemeal	  scope	  of	  application.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  68	  But	  of	  course	  it	  may	  be	  that	  the	  superior	  regulator	  deliberately	  wants	  to	  let	  subordinate	  regulators	  make	  their	  own	  arrangements	  if	  they	  see	  fit…	  so	  eloquent	  indications	  (as	  a	  positive	  or	  negative	  tilt	  towards	  use	  of	  lower	  powers)	  are	  clearly	  in	  place	  (and/or	  inter-­‐regulator	  communications).	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  Especially	  as	  regards	  piecemeal	  permissiveness	  or	  facilitation,	  clearly	  the	  positioning	  of	  relevant	  powers	  is	  of	  great	  interest.	  From	  the	  typology	  in	  the	  above	  it	  became	  clear	  that	  we	  need	  to	  carefully	  distinguish	  between	  ‘embedded	  powers’,	  that	  are	  part	  of	  a	  rule	  that	  holds	  a	  general	  obligating	  norm,	  and	  ‘announce’	  the	  possibility	  of	  separate	  legal	  acts	  (for	  individual	  ‘subjects	  in	  cases’,	  or	  for	  general	  categories	  of	  ‘subjects	  in	  cases’).	  Aside	  from	  these	  there	  is	  the	  possibility	  of	  piecemeal	  permissiveness	  or	  facilitation	  on	  the	  same	  legal	  power	  basis	  (whether	  applied	  ex	  officio	  or	  upon	  request).	  Not	  only	  does	  this	  allow	  for	  alteration	  or	  termination	  of	  an	  existing	  norm,	  but	  also	  for	  repetition	  regarding	  new	  situations	  or	  cases,	  either	  is	  with	  upon	  request	  issuing	  of	  permits	  or	  subsidies,	  or	  with	  ex	  officio	  new,	  specified	  rules	  for	  subset	  ‘subjects	  in	  cases’,	  that	  have	  priority	  over	  the	  preceding	  norm	  as	  ‘lex	  specialis’	  and/or	  as	  ‘lex	  posterior’.69	  This	  includes	  the	  possibility	  of	  introducing	  general	  rules	  for	  exceptional	  measures,	  usually	  with	  a	  temporary	  scope,	  that	  may	  be	  relevant	  for	  several	  sectors	  and	  so	  may	  cross	  through	  existing	  norms	  within	  these	  sectors,	  making	  exceptions	  where	  this	  is	  deemed	  necessary	  or	  most	  desirable.	  In	  the	  Netherlands	  the	  Crisis	  and	  Recovery	  Act	  does	  exactly	  this	  –	  not	  only	  for	  experimentation,	  but	  especially	  as	  an	  urgent	  response	  to	  the	  present	  economic	  crisis.	  In	  theory	  one	  can	  image	  that	  a	  regulator	  with	  superior	  legal	  powers	  can	  interfere	  by	  providing	  overriding	  exceptions	  to	  existing	  lower	  rules	  –	  a	  case	  of	  applying	  the	  ‘lex	  superior’	  principle.70	  However,	  in	  practice	  and	  for	  reasons	  of	  legal	  certainty	  this	  mostly	  leads	  to	  an	  overhaul	  in	  which	  lower	  rules	  are	  terminated	  and	  a	  new	  set	  of	  norms	  is	  introduced	  at	  a	  higher	  regulator	  level,	  perhaps	  with	  some	  delegated	  powers	  for	  the	  subordinate	  regulator.	  	  
	  
	  
4.	  Concerning	  Experimentation	  We	  now	  turn	  to	  the	  delineation	  of	  our	  field	  of	  application.	  Already	  in	  our	  introduction,	  we	  alluded	  to	  our	  ‘innovative	  entrepreneurship’	  scope	  in	  terms	  of	  a	  cumulative,	  three-­‐step	  focus:	  	  1. of	  exceptional	  regimes,	  as	  a	  case-­‐related	  and	  temporary	  deviation	  from	  normal	  regulatory	  regimes;	  2. dedicated	  to	  arrange	  for	  the	  possibility	  of	  performing	  an	  experiment	  (type),	  as	  an	  intentionally	  organised	  isolated	  case,	  situation,	  event	  or	  first	  and	  vulnerable	  stage	  of	  a	  successive	  novel	  but	  normalized	  activity	  (which	  according	  to	  1.	  would	  be	  subject	  to	  a	  new	  and	  ‘normal	  regime’)	  3. purported	  to	  hold	  the	  promise	  of	  a	  disruptive	  innovation.	  In	  the	  next	  subparagraphs	  (4.1-­‐3)	  we	  will	  consecutively	  discuss	  each	  of	  these	  elements	  of	  focus.	  	  
4.1	  –	  Exceptionality	  The	  first	  element	  (i.e.	  exceptional	  regimes)	  shifts	  our	  attention	  from	  general	  ways	  of	  how	  regulation	  can	  foster	  innovation,	  such	  as	  by	  proper	  property	  and	  contract	  law,	  legal	  certainty	  (especially,	  but	  not	  only,	  concerning	  acts	  of	  government)	  and	  proper	  working	  of	  (financial)	  markets.	  These	  are	  most	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  69	  In	  case	  of	  clashes	  between	  norms,	  the	  more	  recent	  norm	  on	  the	  same	  matter	  has	  priority	  over	  the	  earlier	  norm:	  ‘Lex	  
posterior	  derogat	  legi	  priori.’	  70	  ‘Lex	  superior	  derogat	  legi	  inferiori’.	  In	  case	  of	  conflict	  in	  application,	  the	  hierarchically	  higher	  regulator/norm	  prevails	  over	  the	  lower	  (which	  is	  set	  aside).	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relevant,	  in	  fact	  crucial,	  but	  we	  are	  looking	  at	  legal	  arrangements	  with	  a	  special	  focus,	  one	  of	  an	  exceptional	  dedication	  of	  rules	  to	  address	  experimentation	  with	  purported	  disruptive	  innovative	  impact	  (more	  on	  which	  in	  the	  below).	  	  While	  on	  the	  subject	  of	  piecemeal	  permissiveness	  (in	  par.	  3.2),	  we	  already	  provide	  some	  insight	  in	  the	  logic	  of	  ‘exceptional	  norms’.	  In	  doing	  so	  we	  applied	  	  relevant	  internal	  norm-­‐components,	  as	  parameters	  that	  determine	  the	  subset	  to	  which	  a	  regulatory	  exception	  is	  applicable.	  Our	  simple	  point	  of	  departure	  is	  that	  of:	  a	  norm-­‐authority	  (i.e.	  the	  competent	  regulator)	  addressing	  a	  set	  of	  norm-­‐subjects	  (i.e.	  a	  (class	  of)	  regulatee(s)),	  mostly	  upon	  fulfilment	  of	  a	  norm-­‐condition	  (i.e.	  a	  requirement	  that	  limits	  applicability	  of	  the	  norm(-­‐operator)	  to	  particular	  cases),71	  regarding	  a	  norm-­‐object	  (i.e.	  an	  act-­‐type,	  ‘A’,	  that	  these	  regulatees	  can	  perform	  or	  refrain	  from),	  being	  connected	  to	  a	  norm-­‐operator	  (i.e.	  a	  channelling	  by	  ought:	  obligating	  or	  permitting)72	  Brought	  together,	  the	  conjunction	  of	  these	  components	  is	  a	  normative	  sentence	  as	  may	  be	  expressed	  by	  a	  rule	  –	  summarized	  in	  table	  7.73	  	  
Table	  7.	  Conjunction	  of	  five	  basic	  components	  of	  prescriptive	  norms	  	  
Table	  6.	  Conjunction	  five	  basic	  components	  of	  prescriptive	  norms	  	  Nauth	  [(Nsubj	  x	  Ncond)(Nobj	  x	  Noper)]	  	  (Nobj	  x	  Noper)=	  ‘normative	  positions’	  (i.e.	  	  a	  command,	  or	  prohibition,	  or	  permission	  or	  dispensation	  –	  see	  Table	  1;	  par	  2.2)	  	  	  
Three	  types	  of	  exceptional	  arrangements	  Setting	  aside,	  for	  now,	  the	  option	  of	  exceptions	  to	  unregulated	  permissiveness,	  leaves	  us	  with	  the	  possibilities	  of	  exceptions	  made	  to	  a	  given,	  regulated	  ‘normative	  position’,	  of	  a	  norm-­‐operator	  applicable	  to	  a	  particular	  norm-­‐object	  (Nobj	  x	  Noper),	  applicable	  to	  given	  norm-­‐subjects	  and	  under	  given	  (absence	  of)	  norm-­‐conditions	  (Nsubj	  x	  Ncond).	  This	  is	  the	  ‘normal	  norm’,	  to	  which	  exceptions	  can	  be	  made	  in	  various	  arrangements:	  1. by	  limiting	  the	  applicability	  of	  the	  normal	  norm,	  by	  adding	  norm-­‐conditions,	  possibly	  in	  conjunction	  with	  subsets	  of	  norm-­‐subjects,	  thus	  creating	  exceptional	  subsets	  to	  the	  ‘normal	  norm’	  in	  terms	  of	  applicability.	  To	  those	  subsets	  the	  ‘normal	  norm’	  does	  not	  apply	  (fully)	  and	  as	  such	  they	  remain	  or,	  if	  excepted	  later	  in	  time,	  they	  become	  unregulated;	  cancelling	  a	  command,	  a	  prohibition	  or	  a	  regulated	  form	  of	  permissiveness	  purported	  in	  the	  ‘normal	  norm’.	  In	  essence	  there	  are	  three	  varieties	  of	  such	  ‘exceptional	  freedom’:	  (a)	  some	  norm-­‐subjects	  are	  excepted,	  (b)	  some	  cases	  are	  excepted,	  or	  (c)	  some	  subjects	  are	  excepted	  in	  some	  cases.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  71	  A	  situation,	  as	  a	  static	  state	  of	  affairs	  being	  the	  case,	  or	  an	  event,	  as	  a	  dynamic	  state	  of	  something	  happening	  (involving	  change;	  e.g.	  the	  sun	  setting,	  a	  demonstration);	  with	  possible	  specifications	  in	  time	  and/or	  place.	  72	  Of	  course,	  norm-­‐components	  apply	  only	  to	  situations	  of	  regulation;	  (eloquent)	  regulatory	  silence	  exists	  only	  as	  a	  ‘mere	  can’	  (see	  par.	  2.3).	  73	  For	  readers	  not	  acquainted	  with	  legal	  theory,	  see,	  inter	  alia,	  G.H.	  von	  Wright,	  Norm	  and	  Action.	  A	  Logical	  Enquiry,	  1963,	  Gifford	  Lectures	  1958-­‐1960,	  St.	  Andrews,	  online	  version:	  http://www.giffordlectures.org/Browse.asp?PubID=TPNORM&Cover=TRUE	  (Accessed	  13-­‐10-­‐2014).	  See	  especially	  Ch.	  V,	  no.	  1-­‐	  11.	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2. by	  changing	  the	  normative	  position	  in	  a	  regulated	  way,	  for	  an	  excepted	  category	  of	  subjects	  and/or	  of	  conditions.	  Not	  an	  exception	  which	  cancels	  regulation,	  but	  ‘exceptional	  reregulation’,	  either	  from	  permissiveness	  to	  obligation,	  from	  one	  to	  another	  permissiveness	  or	  obligation,	  or	  from	  a	  unilateral	  to	  bilateral	  permissiveness	  or	  obligation.	  The	  exceptions	  (a),	  (b)	  and	  (c)	  apply	  as	  possible	  delineations	  of	  such	  subset	  exceptions.	  So,	  in	  all	  we	  have	  six	  possible	  types	  of	  exceptional	  norms,	  three	  of	  which	  as	  an	  (no.	  1)	  unregulated	  subset,	  and	  three	  as	  a	  (no.	  2.)	  reregulated	  subset	  –	  regardless	  of	  whether	  the	  subset	  concerns	  one,	  few,	  some,	  many,	  most	  or	  all-­‐but-­‐one	  norm-­‐subjects;	  which	  seems	  relevant	  when	  the	  exception	  in	  practice	  functions	  as	  the	  ‘real	  rule’	  (more	  on	  which	  later).	  As	  discussed	  earlier,	  these	  (six	  types	  of)	  exceptional	  norms	  can	  be	  included	  in	  the	  same	  rule	  or	  regulation	  as	  the	  ‘normal’	  or	  regular	  norm	  (e.g.	  as	  a	  separate	  section	  or	  chapter,	  or	  as	  a	  legal	  power	  to	  be	  arranged	  by	  dedicated	  delegated	  regulation),	  or	  they	  can	  be	  exceptional	  norms	  by	  separate,	  perhaps	  more	  specialized	  legal	  acts.74	  	   Can	  something	  that	  is	  unregulated(ly	  permitted)	  also	  be	  regulated	  by	  exception?	  From	  the	  imaginary	  point	  of	  departure	  of	  a	  ‘clean	  slate’,	  of	  there	  not	  being	  regulation	  of	  any	  kind	  for	  anyone	  regarding	  a	  particular	  act-­‐type,	  we	  can	  picture	  the	  introduction	  of	  four	  types	  of	  regulation,	  by	  varying	  of	  norm-­‐subjects	  (simply	  from	  ‘all	  to	  some(one)’)	  and/or	  of	  norm-­‐conditions	  (from	  ‘none	  to	  some	  
cases’).	  Four	  options	  ensue	  from	  this	  mix:	  	  a. regulation	  for	  all	  in	  any	  case	  (e.g.	  all	  energy	  companies	  have	  to	  adhere	  to	  a	  maximum	  price	  for	  consumer	  kW);	  b. regulation	  for	  all	  in	  some	  cases	  (e.g.	  all	  energy	  companies	  must	  provide	  free	  electricity	  in	  case	  of	  national	  emergency);	  c. regulation	  for	  some	  in	  any	  case	  (e.g.	  as	  in	  a.	  but	  only	  commanding	  state-­‐owned	  energy	  companies);	  d. regulation	  for	  some	  in	  some	  cases	  (e.g.	  as	  in	  b,	  but	  only	  for	  state-­‐owned	  electricity	  companies).	  	  	   Clearly	  the	  first	  category	  (a.	  -­‐	  ‘all	  in	  any’)	  does	  not	  constitute	  an	  exception,	  unless	  we	  care	  to	  regard	  any	  introduction	  in	  unregulated	  territory,	  as	  regards	  some	  possible	  norm-­‐object	  x	  -­‐operator	  (such	  as	  the	  delivery	  of	  electricity),	  as	  exceptional.75	  The	  same	  logic	  applies	  to	  all	  three	  others	  (b-­‐d.),	  unless	  we	  reason	  from	  the	  idea	  that,	  given	  a	  possible	  norm-­‐object	  x	  –operator,	  they	  hold	  latent	  exceptions	  as	  they	  do	  not	  fulfill	  their	  full	  potential	  (as	  in	  a.),	  so	  :	  (b.)	  all	  in	  some	  –	  excepting	  from	  any	  (e.g.	  only	  in	  cases	  of	  national	  emergency);	  (c.)	  some	  in	  any	  –	  excepting	  from	  all	  	  (e.g.	  only	  for	  state-­‐owned	  companies);	  (d)	  some	  in	  some	  –	  excepting	  from	  all	  and	  any	  (e.g.	  only	  for	  state-­‐owned	  companies	  and	  only	  in	  cases	  of	  national	  emergency).	  	  Our	  proposition	  is	  to	  not	  regard	  these	  latent	  exceptions	  to	  a	  potential	  full	  scope	  of	  application	  as	  real	  exceptions,	  except	  for	  when	  the	  arrangement	  in	  question	  is	  one	  of	  a	  temporary	  nature,	  limiting	  the	  duration	  of	  the	  norm	  being	  in	  force.	  In	  doing	  so,	  we	  may	  also	  include	  a.	  (all	  in	  any),	  with	  the	  same	  temporal	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  74	  In	  the	  latter	  case	  the	  abovementioned	  ‘lex	  specialis	  derogat	  lege	  generali’	  principle	  of	  priority	  of	  application)	  applies.	  75	  If	  not	  then	  we	  have	  no	  rule	  or	  norm	  of	  reference,	  from	  which	  to	  look	  for	  or	  make	  exceptions.	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condition.	  When	  this	  temporal	  norm-­‐condition	  applies,76	  it	  may	  be	  said	  that	  indeed	  absence	  of	  regulation	  is,	  as	  a	  matter	  of	  eloquent	  silence,	  considered	  the	  ‘normal	  (absent)	  norm’,	  and	  that	  indeed	  the	  temporary	  norm	  is	  considered	  an	  arrangement	  by	  exception	  to	  that:	  an	  exceptional	  unregulatedness.	  So,	  to	  the	  two	  above	  arrangements	  we	  may	  add	  a	  third	  exceptional	  arrangement:	  3. by	  introducing	  a	  normative	  position	  in	  a	  regulated	  way,	  for	  an	  excepted	  period	  of	  time,	  as	  specified	  in	  a	  temporal	  norm-­‐condition,	  against	  the	  backdrop	  of	  eloquent	  regulatory	  silence	  on	  the	  act-­‐type	  concerned.77	  	  	  Meanwhile,	  the	  temporary	  rule	  need	  not	  hold	  a	  prohibition	  or	  command.	  From	  the	  above	  we	  know	  that	  a	  transformation	  from	  unregulated	  ‘weak	  permissiveness’	  to	  regulated	  ‘strong	  permissiveness’	  may	  come	  with	  benefits	  relevant	  to	  the	  right-­‐holder	  (and	  with	  obligating	  consequences	  for	  others)	  –	  possibly	  with	  facilitation	  (perhaps	  relevant	  to	  experimentation).	  Such	  a	  transformation	  may	  also	  be	  relevant	  to	  change	  an	  existing	  bilateral	  permission	  into	  one	  of	  a	  implicated	  unilateral	  kind	  (see	  par.	  3.2,	  no.	  1),	  combined	  with	  the	  obligation	  to	  perform	  (for	  instance	  the	  permitted	  experiment,	  which	  shall	  be	  performed	  following	  a	  command	  upon	  the	  right-­‐holder).	  	   Of	  course	  temporal	  norm-­‐conditions	  may	  also	  play	  a	  role	  in	  the	  above	  no.	  1.	  and	  2.	  exceptional	  regimes.	  To	  be	  ‘free	  by	  exception’	  or	  under	  a	  regime	  of	  ‘exceptional	  reregulation’,	  may	  well	  be	  a	  temporary	  state.	  This	  could	  be	  most	  relevant	  to	  situations	  where	  the	  exceptional	  norm	  is	  meant	  to	  only	  be	  applicable	  to	  persons	  doing	  experiments	  and/or	  to	  activities	  in	  experimental	  cases.78	  	  	  It	  is	  not	  only	  a	  technical	  matter	  if	  regulating	  by	  temporary	  exception	  (in	  forms	  1-­‐2-­‐3)	  is	  arranged	  by	  (internal)	  norm-­‐condition	  (concerning	  applicability	  of	  the	  norm),	  or	  as	  a	  matter	  of	  the	  (external)	  validity	  of	  the	  norm	  itself.	  In	  the	  former	  case,	  upon	  expiration	  the	  rule	  itself	  remains	  in	  force	  but	  the	  exceptional	  norm	  is	  no	  longer	  applicable	  (or	  binding)	  –	  which	  comes	  with	  a	  return	  to	  some	  sort	  of	  obligation.	  In	  the	  latter	  case,	  upon	  expiration,	  the	  rule	  that	  holds	  the	  norm	  becomes	  invalid	  as	  a	  whole	  –	  may	  come	  with	  a	  return	  to	  an	  unregulated	  state	  of	  permissive	  affairs,	  unless	  the	  exceptional	  norm	  was	  part	  of	  a	  separate	  legal	  act	  superseding	  a	  general	  obligating	  rule,	  which	  now	  regains	  its	  full	  application.	  	  
Two	  forms	  of	  temporary	  exceptions	  A	  temporal	  norm-­‐condition	  can	  come	  in	  two	  forms;	  one	  ‘negative,	  one	  ‘positive’.	  To	  the	  ‘positive’	  the	  so-­‐called	  ‘sunset-­‐clause’,	  as	  part	  of	  legal	  rule,	  stipulates	  that	  this	  rule,	  or	  a	  norm	  included	  in	  it,	  shall	  cease	  to	  have	  legal	  effect	  from	  a	  particular	  date.	  This	  provides	  an	  upfront	  notice	  by	  which	  regulatees	  know	  when	  the	  (existing;	  ‘positive’)	  norm	  included	  in	  the	  regulation	  will	  expire.	  An	  example	  would	  be	  a	  special,	  facilitative	  arrangement	  temporarily	  providing	  subsidies	  for	  experimental	  activities.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  76	  Keep	  in	  mind	  that	  there	  are	  various	  temporal	  conditions,	  such	  as	  ‘from	  t=x’;	  until	  t=y;	  (always/never)	  when	  t=x;	  (always/never)	  between	  t=x	  and	  t=y.	  	  77	  Of	  course,	  a	  temporal	  norm-­‐condition	  can	  also	  apply	  to	  forms	  1.	  and	  2.	  In	  the	  above,	  but	  only	  in	  from	  3.	  do	  we	  consider	  this	  the	  only	  way	  of	  ‘being	  exceptional’.	  We	  assume	  that	  any	  decision	  to	  regulate	  temporarily	  implies	  that	  the	  regulator	  has	  considered	  that	  outside	  this	  time-­‐slot	  there	  is	  no	  regulation,	  so	  this	  regulator	  silence	  is	  eloquent.	  	  78	  As	  we	  will,	  however,	  argue	  in	  the	  below,	  temporariness	  is	  one	  of	  the	  key	  elements	  of	  experimentation	  (and	  more	  than	  being	  free	  to	  do	  as	  one	  pleases).	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To	  the	  ‘negative’,	  the	  abovementioned	  term	  ‘regulatory	  holiday’	  applies.	  An	  exemption	  from	  existing	  competition	  rules	  is	  a	  good	  example.79	  Whereas	  a	  sunset	  clause	  limits	  the	  period	  of	  time	  during	  which	  certain	  regulation	  will	  be	  in	  force	  (as	  a	  ‘positive’	  temporary	  applicability),	  a	  regulatory	  holiday	  limits	  the	  period	  of	  time	  during	  which	  certain	  constraining	  standards	  will	  not	  be	  in	  force	  (as	  a	  ‘negative’	  temporary	  suspension).	  	  	   Clearly,	  a	  regulatory	  holiday	  is	  only	  possible	  given	  a	  regulated	  state	  of	  affairs;80	  hence	  only	  as	  an	  exceptional	  regime	  of	  arrangement	  1.	  and	  not	  of	  2	  and	  3.	  As	  regards	  form	  2.,	  to	  speak	  of	  a	  regulatory	  holiday	  if	  ‘exceptional	  reregulation’	  would	  follow	  from	  relaxing	  (some)	  existing	  obligations,	  while	  retaining	  some	  or	  introducing	  some	  other	  constraints.	  All	  of	  this	  may	  well	  be	  perceived	  as	  relaxation,	  but	  perhaps	  not	  as	  a	  fully-­‐fledged	  regulatory	  holiday,	  but	  rather	  as	  a	  ‘regulatory	  summer’.	  Nonetheless,	  such	  a	  summer	  would	  be	  characterised	  not	  only	  by	  at	  least	  some	  specific,	  exceptional	  obligations,	  but	  also	  by	  their	  temporary	  nature	  (after	  which	  the	  previous	  state	  of	  normative	  affairs	  relives):	  typically	  a	  matter	  of	  a	  sunset-­‐clause.	  As	  regards	  form	  3.,	  to	  suspend	  from	  regulatory	  obligations	  cannot	  apply	  to	  an	  unregulated	  state	  of	  affairs.	  	  Clearly	  then,	  the	  regulatory	  holiday	  only	  fits	  form	  1.	  (i.e.	  freedom	  by	  
exception).	  Forms	  2.	  (i.e.	  exceptional	  reregulation)	  and	  3.	  (i.e.	  exceptional	  
unregulatedness)	  only	  fit	  with	  the	  sunset-­‐clause.	  The	  sunset-­‐clause	  arrangement	  includes	  the	  possibility	  of	  (temporary)	  obligations,	  but	  also	  that	  of	  (temporary)	  regulated	  permissiveness.	  Regulatory	  holidays	  amount	  to	  a	  return	  to	  unregulatedness,81	  although,	  of	  course,	  in	  practice	  other	  norms	  regarding	  the	  same	  act-­‐type	  may	  still	  remain	  in	  existence.8283	  	  
Table	  8.	  Exceptional	  regulation	  	  
Table	  7.	  Exceptional	  regulation	  Form	   Elaboration	   Temporal?	   Exceptional?	  1.	  Exceptional	  freedom	   (a.)	  some	  norm-­‐subjects	  are	  excepted,	  (b.)	  some	  (norm-­‐conditional)	  cases	  are	  
excepted,	  or	  	  
(c.)	  some	  subjects	  are	  excepted	  in	  
some	  (norm-­‐conditional)	  case(s)	  
Possible	  condition;	  only	  as	  regulatory	  
holiday	  
As	  bilateral	  permissiveness	  	  	  
2.	  Exceptional	  reregulation	   a-­‐d;	  as	  in	  1.	  (perhaps	  a	  ‘regulatory	  summer’)	   Possible	  condition;	  only	  as	  sunset	  clause	   As	  obligation	  and/or	  possible	  facilitation	  3.	  Exceptional	  unregulatedness	   (a.)	  all	  in	  any;	  (b.)	  all	  in	  some;	  (c.)	  some	  in	  all;	  (d.)	  some	  in	  some	  (backdrop	  of	  eloquent	  silence)	   Only/necessary	  condition,	  but	  only	  as	  sunset	   As	  unilateral	  and/or	  possible	  facilitation	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  79	  As	  within	  the	  context	  of	  network	  industries	  a	  regulatory	  holiday	  to	  the	  effect	  that	  owners	  of	  infrastructures	  are	  temporarily	  free	  from	  the	  obligation	  to	  allow	  competitors	  access	  to	  their	  infrastructure	  (i.e.	  a	  freedom	  from	  service-­‐based	  competition).	  This	  is	  also	  known	  as:	  ‘competition	  holiday’	  or	  ‘terme	  de	  grace’.	  	  80	  See	  the	  definition	  by	  Monti,	  in	  par.	  2.1:	  ‘suspension	  from	  regulatory	  obligations’.	  81	  We	  do	  not	  believe	  that	  it	  makes	  sense	  to	  separate	  between	  a	  ‘silent	  regulatory	  holiday’	  and	  an	  ‘eloquent	  regulatory	  holiday’.	  A	  silent	  regulatory	  holiday	  is	  merely	  a	  state	  of	  unregulatedness	  resulting	  from	  the	  fact	  that	  a	  regulator	  has	  not	  (even)	  considered	  regulation.	  A	  return	  to	  unregulatedness	  is	  always	  eloquent.	  82	  It	  is	  possible	  that	  one	  and	  the	  same	  act-­‐type	  is	  norm-­‐object	  in	  different	  coinciding	  norms,	  related	  subalternly.	  For	  example:	  norm	  A,	  that	  permits	  energy	  companies	  to	  supply	  electricity	  to	  any	  consumer,	  coinciding	  with	  norm	  B,	  which	  commands	  the	  same	  companies	  to,	  in	  case	  of	  emergency,	  supply	  public	  services	  with	  electricity.	  Should	  norm	  B	  be	  revoked	  (temporarily	  or	  otherwise),	  then	  norm	  A	  can	  stay	  in	  force.	  83	  Of	  course,	  more	  complex	  temporal	  arrangements	  than	  the	  one	  discussed	  here	  are	  possible,	  such	  as	  making	  exceptions	  only	  during	  certain	  times	  (for	  instance	  for	  experiments	  only	  when	  average	  electricity-­‐use	  is	  low,	  e.g.	  during	  night-­‐time).	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clause	  	  
Exceptional	  exceptions?	  In	  piecemeal	  arrangements	  exceptions	  may	  apply	  to	  a	  subset	  of	  ‘one,	  a	  few,	  some,	  many,	  most,	  or	  all-­‐but-­‐one’.	  What	  theoretically	  should	  be	  understood	  as	  a	  formal	  exception	  to	  a	  ‘normal	  norm’	  (‘all	  for	  any’	  or	  ‘some	  for	  some’),	  could	  in	  practice	  function	  substantially	  as	  the	  ‘real	  rule’,	  with	  permissiveness	  perhaps	  being	  applicable	  to	  the	  subset	  of	  ‘all	  but	  one’,	  in	  actual	  fact	  and	  paradoxically,	  of	  ‘all’.	  This	  is	  especially	  noticeable	  in	  the	  above	  exception	  forms	  1.	  and	  2.	  (i.e.	  ‘exceptional	  freedom’	  and	  ‘exceptional	  reregulation’).	  In	  practice	  it	  is	  not	  unusual	  to	  have	  a	  general	  norm	  designed	  only	  to	  allow	  (very)	  many	  exceptional,	  piecemeal	  regimes,	  whether	  on	  an	  individual	  basis	  (such	  as	  building	  permits),	  or	  for	  a	  substantial	  class	  (such	  as	  general	  rules	  for	  environmental	  establishments,	  excepting	  from	  a	  general	  prohibition	  to	  operate).	  	  The	  general	  rule,	  to	  which	  many	  exceptions	  are	  or	  may	  be	  made,	  is	  not	  so	  much	  a	  substantive	  norm,	  but	  mostly	  a	  formal	  norm.	  As	  a	  ‘rule	  of	  closure’,	  it	  is	  the	  necessary	  regulatory	  device	  to	  create	  a	  regime	  for	  (generally	  more	  flexible)	  piecemeal	  regulations.84	  One	  may	  argue	  that	  behind	  such	  a	  rule	  of	  closure	  there	  is	  always	  a	  more	  general	  rule,	  by	  regulated	  norm	  or	  by	  norm	  of	  eloquent	  regulatory	  silence,	  which	  provides	  the	  substantive	  normative	  backdrop	  to	  the	  rule	  of	  closure.	  The	  norm	  of	  closure	  merely	  serves	  as	  a	  device	  to	  allow	  justifiable	  exceptions	  to	  the	  general	  (un)regulated	  norm,	  such	  as	  to	  ensure,	  by	  piecemeal	  regulation	  (or	  ‘control	  of	  use’),	  effective,	  efficient	  and/or	  equal	  access	  to	  or	  use	  of	  certain	  resources,	  or	  to	  protect	  (other)	  public	  interests.85	  Clearly,	  such	  a	  rule	  of	  closure	  stands	  out	  from	  a	  substantive	  general	  norm	  that	  is	  substantively	  meant	  to	  only	  come	  with	  few	  exceptions,	  such	  as	  with	  fundamental	  rights	  (e.g.	  the	  right	  to	  demonstrate	  may	  be	  constrained	  but	  only	  when	  there	  is,	  for	  example,	  a	  serious	  threat	  of	  considerable	  public	  unrest	  and/or	  violence),	  but	  also	  with	  certain	  prohibitions,	  such	  as	  to	  kill	  other	  human	  beings.86	  	   So,	  exceptional	  subsets	  may	  be	  a	  ‘normal’	  device	  for	  delegated	  regulation	  by	  exception,	  whilst	  our	  and	  our	  interest	  lies	  only	  with	  a	  subset	  of	  exceptional	  regulation:	  exceptional	  regulation	  for	  experimental	  purposes,	  with	  a	  potential	  of	  disruptive	  innovation.87	  	  
4.2	  –	  Experimentality	  The	  second	  element	  narrows	  the	  focus	  in	  terms	  of	  dedication	  to	  an	  experimental	  activity.	  The	  Oxford	  Dictionary	  defines	  the	  noun	  ‘experiment’	  as:	  ‘A	  course	  of	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  84	  Flexible	  as	  a	  matter	  of	  a	  lower	  authority	  being	  able	  to	  more	  quickly	  than	  the	  original	  regulator	  being	  able	  to	  make	  adjustments	  (so	  the	  norm	  of	  conduct	  will	  come	  with	  a	  norm	  of	  delegated	  power),	  and/or	  as	  a	  matter	  of	  dealing	  with	  individual	  cases.	  	  	  85	  Such	  as	  in	  human	  rights,	  compare	  Article	  1	  of	  the	  first	  protocol	  to	  the	  ECRM	  and	  Article	  17	  of	  the	  EU	  Charter	  of	  Fundamental	  Rights	  (on	  the	  right	  to	  property),	  and	  the	  acknowledgement	  of	  the	  unwritten	  right	  to	  build,	  derived	  from	  the	  right	  to	  property,	  as	  expressed	  in	  ECHR	  25	  October	  1989,	  Allan	  Jacobsson	  v.	  Sweden,	  appl.	  No.	  10842/84.	  Furthermore,	  the	  Explanatory	  Memorandum	  to	  a	  statute	  or	  regulation	  introducing	  a	  rule	  of	  closure	  may	  provide	  an	  eloquent	  regulatory	  expression	  of	  a	  silent	  underlying	  norm.	  For	  the	  term	  ‘control	  of	  use’,	  see	  inter	  alia:	  ECHR	  18	  February	  1991,	  Fredin	  v.	  Sweden,	  appl.	  No.	  12033/86	  and	  ECHR	  29	  November	  1991,	  Pine	  Valley	  Development	  Ltd.	  v.	  Ireland,	  appl.	  No.	  12742/87.	  86	  This	  may,	  by	  exception	  be	  allowed	  in	  legitimate	  combat	  or	  in	  self-­‐defence	  to	  an	  unlawful	  life-­‐threatening	  attack	  by	  someone	  else	  –	  in	  most	  cases	  these	  exceptions	  are	  not	  visible	  as	  the	  applied	  legislative	  technique	  is	  to	  only	  prohibit	  manslaughter	  (‘murder’),	  which	  is	  intrinsically	  only	  about	  unlawful	  killing	  of	  other	  human	  beings.	  	  87	  We	  also	  stated	  that	  we	  would	  focus	  on	  facilitation,	  but	  for	  now	  we	  will	  not	  exclude	  the	  above	  ‘exceptional	  freedom’	  option	  from	  the	  analysis.	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action	  tentatively	  adopted	  without	  being	  sure	  of	  the	  outcome’;	  given	  the	  Latin	  roots	  of	  ‘experimentum’,	  from	  ‘experiri’	  (to	  try).88	  	  The	  ‘course	  of	  action’,	  suggests	  an	  action	  or	  activities	  with	  some	  measure	  of	  ‘organisation’,	  with	  the	  intent	  of	  some	  result	  or	  effect	  (i.e.	  a	  causally	  related	  change).	  Uncertainty	  about	  whether	  the	  action	  will	  indeed	  bring	  the	  intended	  effects,	  places	  experimental	  action	  outside	  action	  following	  a	  proven,	  repetitively	  applied	  method,	  procedure	  or	  technology,	  with	  predictable	  results.	  	  Thus,	  beyond	  (calculable)	  risk,	  there	  is	  (considerable)	  uncertainty	  about	  how	  and	  or	  if	  the	  experimental	  activity	  will	  yield	  certain	  hypothesized	  and	  perhaps	  desired,	  effects.	  Perhaps	  there	  will	  be	  no	  effects,	  other	  effects	  or	  whatever	  effects	  in	  an	  unexpected	  way.	  	   Given	  such	  uncertainty,	  to	  perform	  the	  experiment	  must	  be	  for	  reason	  of	  some	  compelling	  consideration	  to,	  despite	  costs	  and	  considerable	  chance	  at	  results	  that	  where	  not	  hypothesized	  and/or	  desired,	  push	  ahead.	  Whatever	  variety	  of	  specific	  public	  and/or	  private	  motives	  is	  at	  play,	  more	  basically	  experiments	  are	  performed	  to	  acquire	  relevant	  knowledge.89	  In	  that	  sense	  only	  a	  non-­‐informative	  experiment	  is	  a	  failing	  experiment,	  otherwise,	  any	  outcome	  (that	  is	  telling)	  will	  do	  –	  although,	  again,	  we	  recognise	  that	  some	  information	  will	  fit	  better	  with	  certain	  hopes	  than	  other	  (especially	  when	  business,	  economic,	  or	  reputational	  interests	  are	  at	  stake).	  Furthermore,	  the	  desired	  information	  is	  generally	  of	  a	  ‘deterministic’	  nature.	  About	  what	  effects	  are	  caused	  how	  by	  what	  actions,	  thus	  surmounting	  existing	  uncertainty,	  if	  only	  with	  stochastic	  knowledge	  (moving	  from	  uncertainty	  to	  probability	  as	  a	  calculable	  risk).	  This	  relates	  to	  the	  Oxford	  Dictionary	  definition	  of	  the	  verb	  ‘experiment’:	  ‘Perform	  a	  scientific	  procedure,	  (...)	  to	  
determine	  something.’	  Without	  suggesting	  that	  elaborate	  or	  sophisticated	  methods	  of	  scientific	  research	  need	  necessarily	  be	  applied	  to	  speak	  of	  experimentation,	  some	  measure	  of	  a	  well-­‐considered	  course	  of	  action,	  some	  recordable	  method	  of	  action,	  which	  can	  be	  explained	  to	  others	  (so	  to	  allow	  for	  repetition),	  needs	  to	  be	  involved	  to	  speak	  of	  a	  true	  experiment.	  The	  ‘(…)’	  element	  deleted	  in	  the	  latter	  quote	  defining	  the	  verb	  experiment	  reads,	  ‘especially	  in	  a	  
laboratory’.	  This	  fits	  with	  the	  above	  element	  of	  creating	  an	  exceptional	  (regulatory)	  arrangement,	  to	  create	  an	  exceptional	  setting	  (similar	  to	  ‘in	  vitro’	  as	  opposed	  to	  ‘in	  vivo’	  or	  ‘in	  situ’)	  to	  perform	  a	  course	  of	  action	  as	  a	  controlled,	  practical	  test,	  to	  establish	  (i.e.	  determine)	  an	  empirical	  fact,	  state	  of	  affairs,	  process	  or	  causal	  relationship,	  against	  the	  backdrop	  of	  a	  well-­‐reasoned	  expectation,	  hypothesis,	  theory	  or	  model	  –	  i.e.	  to	  support	  or	  disprove,	  or	  to	  test	  these.90	  An	  experimental	  situation	  is	  one	  different	  from	  normal	  or	  random,	  contingent	  circumstances,	  because	  a	  specific	  setting	  is	  needed	  to	  optimize	  conditions	  for	  proper	  fact	  or	  truth	  finding	  (as	  empirical	  determination),	  in	  avoidance	  of	  disturbing	  factors,	  and	  to	  enhance	  desired	  manipulation	  (when	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  88	  See:	  	  http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/english/experiment	  [Accessed	  02-­‐09-­‐2014].	  89	  We	  understand	  that	  experimentation	  may	  also	  relate	  to	  building	  trust	  with	  stakeholders,	  but	  regard	  this	  as	  an	  ancillary	  motive	  at	  best.	  90	  To	  relate	  to	  the	  exceptional	  or	  artificial	  setting	  of	  a	  laboratory	  also	  associates	  with	  ‘labour’	  and	  with	  being	  oppressed,	  at	  risk	  or	  in	  danger	  (perhaps	  of	  those	  experimenting,	  or	  merely	  the	  experiment	  going	  wrong),	  as	  the	  Latin	  ‘Laborare’	  points	  at	  both	  meanings.	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varying	  certain	  variables),	  accurate	  observation	  and	  safe	  and	  decent	  procedures	  also	  considering	  third	  party	  interests.91	  	  	  
Regulating	  experiments	  It	  is	  exactly	  this	  specific	  setting	  that	  may	  call	  for	  exceptional	  regulation	  and	  would	  then	  fall	  within	  our	  scope	  of	  interest.	  To	  allow	  such	  regulatory	  exception,	  would	  mean	  that	  the	  trade-­‐off	  between	  public	  interests	  that	  lie	  behind	  existing	  regulation	  (or	  eloquent	  silence),	  and	  consideration	  for	  private	  interest	  impacts,	  need	  to	  be	  reconsidered	  in	  the	  light	  of	  the	  public	  interest	  behind	  doing,	  allowing	  and	  perhaps	  facilitating	  the	  experiment.	  As	  a	  simple	  example:	  to	  allow	  a	  regulatory	  holiday	  to	  experiment	  on	  a	  monopolistic-­‐basis	  with	  certain	  uses	  of	  telecom	  or	  energy-­‐networks,	  would	  mean	  that	  the	  public	  interest	  behind	  competition	  law	  restrictions	  (i.e.	  of	  securing	  fair	  trade)	  is	  to	  give	  way	  to	  the	  public	  interest	  behind	  doing	  the	  experiment	  –	  as	  a	  matter	  of	  an	  exceptional	  trade-­‐off	  applied	  ad	  hoc.	  The	  information	  that	  the	  experiment	  is	  expected	  to	  yield	  should	  be	  of	  a	  public	  interest	  significance	  which	  legitimizes	  that	  such	  an	  exception	  is	  made	  to	  general	  (or	  normal)	  rules.	  Such	  public	  interests	  in	  the	  experiment	  may	  be	  very	  general,	  such	  as	  in	  the	  interest	  of	  science	  at	  large,	  but	  also	  of	  a	  more	  specific	  nature,	  concerning	  (expected)	  general-­‐purpose	  technologies	  (e.g.	  ICT,	  Nano;	  with	  expected	  benefit	  to	  overall	  economic	  growth	  and	  general	  wellbeing)	  or	  to	  improve	  specific	  public	  utilities	  and	  services	  (e.g.	  transport,	  communication,	  energy	  efficiency,	  drinking	  water,	  defense).92	  	  	   The	  Dutch	  General	  Guidelines	  for	  Rulemaking93	  holds	  some	  provisions,	  in	  Articles	  10a	  and	  10b,	  about	  experimenting	  in	  rulemaking,	  in	  relation	  to	  which	  an	  experiment	  is	  defined	  as:	  “..	  the	  empirical	  determination	  (from	  controlled	  
experience)	  whether	  a	  particular	  instrument	  can	  contribute	  to	  solving	  a	  societal	  
problem.94	  Again	  we	  see	  (in	  a	  context	  that	  we	  will	  discuss	  further	  in	  the	  below),	  references	  to	  both	  the	  empirical	  determination	  and	  to	  the	  need	  for	  a	  distinct	  societal	  interest,	  which	  may	  motivate	  government	  (as	  a	  matter	  of	  public	  interest)	  to	  make	  exception	  to	  existing	  rules.	  As	  shows	  from	  our	  further	  focus,	  on	  experiments	  with	  a	  ‘promise	  of	  disruptive	  innovation’	  (to	  be	  discussed	  next),	  we	  wish	  to	  limit	  our	  scope	  to	  those	  experiments	  that	  are	  particularly	  compelling,	  not	  merely	  as	  a	  matter	  of	  societal	  interest,	  but	  as	  a	  matter	  of	  	  a,	  so	  to	  speak,	  promise	  of	  a	  disruptive	  or	  ‘game-­‐changing’	  outcome,	  which	  legitimizes	  experimentation	  due	  to	  its	  serious	  character	  and	  expectation	  of	  changing	  the	  ways	  in	  technological	  and/or	  governance	  realms,	  with	  societal	  benefits	  (or	  to	  avoid	  societal	  disadvantage).	  What	  complicates	  things	  is,	  that	  in	  the	  above	  we	  discussed	  experiments	  as	  demanding	  exceptional	  regulation,	  and	  now	  we	  find	  that	  regulation	  itself	  may	  also	  be	  the	  object	  of	  experimentation,	  with	  the	  aforementioned	  guidelines	  being	  meta-­‐rules	  to	  rules	  that	  may	  allow	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  91	  Safe	  relates	  to	  some	  experiments	  possibly	  involving	  danger;	  decent	  is	  about	  ethical	  dimensions,	  as	  in	  experimenting	  with	  people	  as	  objects	  of	  study.	  92	  Again,	  such	  exceptional	  arrangements	  relate	  to	  piecemeal	  or	  subset	  provisions,	  but	  these	  need	  not	  merely	  be	  by	  individual	  act	  (‘allowing	  one	  person	  or	  closed	  group	  to	  by	  exception	  do	  one	  thing’),	  as	  a	  general	  rule	  could	  also	  allow	  a	  particular	  range	  of	  norm-­‐subjects	  to,	  under	  certain	  conditions,	  do	  things	  that	  are	  otherwise	  prohibited	  –	  such	  as	  cooperating	  within	  the	  remit	  of	  Article	  101(3)	  TFEU.	  93	  A	  Circular	  (not	  as	  legally	  binding	  regulation)	  by	  the	  Prime-­‐Minister	  (‘Aanwijzingen	  voor	  regelgeving’)	  issued	  by	  Official	  Journal	  (Staatscourant	  1992,	  230	  –	  most	  recently	  amended	  2011,	  6602).	  94	  This	  is	  our	  own	  translation	  from:	  “Bij	  een	  experiment	  gaat	  het	  om	  het	  proefondervindelijk	  vaststellen	  of	  een	  bepaald	  
instrument	  een	  bijdrage	  kan	  leveren	  aan	  het	  oplossen	  van	  een	  maatschappelijk	  probleem”,	  which	  is	  a	  definition	  in	  the	  Explanatory	  Memorandum	  to	  Article	  10b	  of	  the	  Guidelines.	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experimenting	  with	  rules.	  This	  is	  not	  something	  essentially	  different	  to	  our	  general	  ambition	  of	  mapping	  legal	  design	  guidelines	  for	  exceptional	  legal	  rules	  concerning	  experiments,	  but	  may	  easily	  confuse.	  	  
Table	  9.	  Logic	  of	  guidelines	  for	  exceptional	  regulation	  for	  experimentation	  	  
Logic	  of	  this	  paper’s	  objective	  legal	  design	  guidelines	  	   Exceptional	  legal	  rules	  concerning	  experiments	   Performance	  of	  experiments	  As	  guidelines	  for	  	  rule-­‐making	  ⇨	   Especially	  making	  rules	  that	  allow	  experimentation	  ⇨	   Performance	  of	  experiments	  under	  exceptional	  rules	  for	  experimentation	  	   In	  this	  vein	  we	  need	  to	  reconsider	  the	  distinction	  made	  in	  the	  introduction	  (par.	  1.),	  between	  technological	  exploration,	  with	  the	  issue	  of	  experiments	  concerning	  general	  risk	  (burden/benefit)	  acceptance,	  and	  that	  of	  
governance-­‐based	  exploitation	  (with	  the	  issue	  of	  experiments	  concerning	  institutional	  fit).	  We	  already	  pointed	  out	  that	  the	  distinction	  between	  exploration	  and	  exploitation	  would	  (in	  some	  cases)	  not	  be	  a	  strict	  one	  and	  that	  we	  focus	  on	  application	  (also	  in	  avoidance	  of	  the	  connotation	  that	  exploitation	  is	  about	  commercial	  use	  of	  new	  inventions).	  What	  we	  should	  add	  is	  that	  the	  blurring	  of	  distinctions	  works	  both	  across	  technological	  innovation	  and	  across	  innovation	  of	  governance.	  	  Clearly,	  technological	  innovation	  is	  not	  merely	  a	  matter	  of	  exploration,	  as	  many	  technological	  issues	  of	  application	  to,	  for	  example,	  production	  processes,	  products	  and	  services,	  need	  to	  be	  solved	  in	  the	  context	  of	  such	  usage	  (commercially	  or	  otherwise):	  at	  the	  point	  where	  attempts	  are	  made	  to	  test	  and/or	  implement	  and	  thus	  valorize	  technological	  breakthroughs	  (e.g.	  early	  projects	  with	  cell	  phones).	  	  Similarly,	  governance	  innovation	  may	  initially	  be	  a	  matter	  of	  exploration	  in	  theoretical	  design	  of	  new	  environments,	  processes,	  organizational	  forms	  and	  rules,	  to	  only	  then	  perform	  a	  test	  and/or	  implementation	  to	  see	  if	  and	  how	  such	  designs	  can	  work	  or	  be	  made	  to	  work	  (e.g.	  tradable	  public	  rights	  experiments,	  meta-­‐oversight	  mechanisms,	  regulatory	  negotiations)	  as	  a	  matter	  of	  application.	  Interestingly,	  the	  latter	  may	  also	  include	  testing	  regulation,	  as	  experimental	  regulation.	  This,	  however,	  should	  be	  separated	  from	  regulation	  that	  is	  not	  the	  
object	  of	  experimentation	  but	  a	  condition	  to	  properly	  performing	  experiments	  concerning	  innovation	  of	  technology	  or	  of	  governance	  possible	  (or	  supporting	  these),	  either	  in	  the	  stage	  of	  exploration	  or	  of	  exploitation/application.	  	  Although	  the	  terminology	  of	  ‘fundamental’	  versus	  applied’	  science	  also	  comes	  with	  blurring,	  and	  cannot	  be	  regarded	  as	  providing	  taxonomic	  categories,	  we	  have	  chosen	  to	  apply	  this	  terminology	  as	  it	  helps	  to	  better	  understand	  the	  complexity	  that	  we	  have	  encountered.	  From	  heron	  out	  we	  take	  ‘applied	  science’	  to	  be	  about	  finding	  or	  developing	  specific	  problem-­‐solving	  functionalities	  (i.e.	  with	  focused	  and	  expected	  societal	  relevance;	  public	  or	  private	  –	  most	  typically	  as	  ‘knowing-­‐for-­‐use’,	  as	  in	  ‘applications’)	  and	  ‘fundamental	  science’	  to	  be	  about	  increasing	  general	  and	  systemic	  knowledge	  about	  natural,	  social	  or	  other	  phenomena	  (with	  unfocused	  and	  uncertain	  societal	  relevance,	  of	  whatever	  kind	  –	  most	  typically	  as	  ‘knowing-­‐for-­‐knowing’,	  as	  in	  ‘curiosity’).	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Table	  10.	  Mixing	  exploration	  and	  exploitation	  	  	  Mixing	  exploration	  and	  exploitation	  in	  technological	  and	  governance	  innovation	  ⇩	  	  Innovation	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  ⇨	   Exploration	  (‘new	  knowledge’)	   Exploitation/application	  (‘new	  uses’)	  Technological	  	  	  	  (‘hi-­‐tech’)	   1.	  fundamental	  nat.science	  research	  experiments	   2.	  applied	  nat.science	  	  R&D	  experimental	  projects	  Governance	  	  	  	  (‘smart	  governance’)	   3.	  fundamental	  soc.science	  research	  experiments	  	   4.	  applied	  soc.science	  experimental	  implementation	  Setting	  &	  improving	  conditions	  ⇨	   Regulating	  experimentation	  in	  1-­‐4	  	  	   Altogether	  our	  focus	  is	  about	  technology	  driven	  innovation	  (especially	  in	  networks),	  which	  concerns	  both	  the	  innovation	  of	  technology	  (both	  in	  exploration	  and	  in	  exploitation)	  and	  the	  innovation	  of	  governance	  (again,	  both	  in	  exploration	  and	  in	  exploitation)	  while	  responding	  to	  exploring	  and	  exploiting	  new	  technological	  possibilities.	  In	  the	  course	  of	  this,	  ‘regulating	  experimentation’	  may,	  broadly	  speaking,	  be	  about	  (while	  relating	  to	  the	  numbers	  in	  the	  above	  table),	  creating	  optimal	  conditions	  through:	  	  -­‐ 1.	  regulating	  natural	  science	  research	  facilities	  and	  programs;	  	  -­‐ 2.	  regulating	  projects	  to	  allow	  technological	  fine-­‐tuning	  (e.g.	  business	  and	  other	  R&D);	  	  -­‐ 3.	  regulating	  social	  science	  research	  facilities	  and	  programs	  relating	  to	  emerging	  technologies;	  	  -­‐ 4.	  regulating	  projects	  to	  allow	  smart	  governance	  experiments	  on	  implementing	  emerging	  technologies.	  	  	   The	  latter	  case	  (4.)	  may	  involve	  regulating	  ‘experimental	  regulation’,	  so	  to	  create	  conditions	  for	  experimenting	  with	  new	  regulation.	  This	  would	  be	  part	  of	  our	  object	  of	  study	  only	  if	  somehow	  related	  to	  innovation	  of	  technology.	  As	  such,	  the	  challenge	  of	  regulating	  experimentation	  is	  about	  setting	  optimal	  experimental	  conditions	  for	  all	  four	  cases	  (1.	  to	  4.),	  with	  this	  contribution	  being	  about	  3.,	  to	  provide	  a	  theoretical	  basis	  for	  applied	  work	  in	  4.,	  that	  provides	  regulation	  for	  experimentation	  in,	  again,	  1.	  to	  4..	  	  With	  our	  focus	  on	  natural	  science	  advancement	  and	  its	  uptake	  in	  (daily)	  practice,	  we	  emphasize	  empirical	  determination	  in	  experiments.	  Given	  our	  legal	  take,	  it	  is	  important	  to	  add	  that	  theoretical	  work	  in	  social	  science,	  also	  concerns	  normative	  aspects,	  which	  begin	  with	  normative	  theories	  (such	  as	  in	  this	  paragraph)	  and	  normative	  designs	  and	  finally	  normative	  artifacts	  (such	  as	  in	  paragraph	  7	  and	  8),	  which	  may	  then	  also	  be	  studied	  empirically	  on	  their	  functioning	  in	  practice.95	  	   We	  have	  narrowed	  our	  focus	  from	  mere	  exceptional	  regulation,	  to	  exceptional	  regulation	  concerning	  experimentation.	  This	  added	  focus	  on	  experimentation	  has	  emphasized	  (1.)	  the	  element	  of	  uncertainty	  of	  knowledge	  (about	  what	  works	  how	  empirically),	  (2.)	  the	  need	  to	  create	  a	  special/protected	  experimental	  setting	  (concerning	  suitable	  and	  safe	  conditions	  of	  experimentation),	  and	  (3)	  the	  need	  for	  a	  public	  interest	  in	  these	  experiments	  if	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  95	  Heldeweg	  &	  Ruiter,	  supra,	  footnote	  16.	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they	  call	  for	  regulatory	  exceptions	  (legitimizing	  an	  exceptional	  regulatory	  trade-­‐off).	  	  	   Broadly	  speaking	  we	  see	  two	  types	  of	  uncertainty	  (1.):	  uncertainty	  about	  technological	  possibilities	  as	  a	  matter	  of	  natural	  science	  (giving	  cause	  to	  experimentation)	  and	  uncertainty	  about	  governance	  response	  to	  technological	  change	  as	  a	  matter	  of	  social	  science	  (giving	  cause	  to	  experimentation).96	  Combining	  the	  two	  yields	  4	  situations	  (see	  A-­‐D	  in	  the	  below	  table	  11.)	  of	  causal	  states	  of	  affairs	  combining	  (un)certainties	  on	  technological	  possibilities	  and	  on	  governance	  response.	  	  
Table	  11.	  (Un)certain	  possibility	  and	  responses’	  relations	  between	  technology	  and	  
governance	  	  
4	  (un)certain	  possibility	  and	  responses’	  relations	  of	  technology	  and	  governance	  Technological	  Possibility	  ⇨	   Certain	   Uncertain	  ⇩	  	  Governance	  Response	  Certain	   (A.)	  	  Tp	  +	  	  ⇨	  	  Gr	  +	   (B.)	  	  Tp	  +	  	  ⇨	  	  Gr	  –	  Uncertain	   (C.)	  	  Tp	  –	  ⇨	  	  Gr	  +	   (D.)	  	  Tp	  –	  	  ⇨	  	  Gr	  –	  Tp=	  Technological	  possibility	   Gr	  =	  Governance	  response	  	  Clearly,	  the	  combination	  under	  A	  in	  the	  above	  table	  is	  irrelevant	  to	  our	  study,	  as	  it	  does	  not	  call	  for	  any	  experimentation	  because	  all	  possibilities	  and	  responses	  are	  clear	  (e.g.	  bike	  riding).97	  Certainly	  combination	  D	  seems	  to	  have	  a	  high	  potential	  of	  disruptiveness	  as	  uncertainty	  reigns	  in	  both	  domains	  (i.e.	  ‘bilaterally’):	  we	  do	  not	  know	  (exactly)	  what	  new	  technological	  possibilities	  to	  expect,	  nor	  do	  we	  know	  (exactly)	  how	  (e.g.	  teleportation).	  Type	  B.	  and	  C.	  are	  in-­‐between	  ‘unilateral	  uncertainty’	  settings	  both	  with	  possible	  relevance:	  B.	  is	  still	  about	  a	  technology-­‐driven	  issue,	  where	  only	  social	  science	  uncertainties	  remain	  (which	  possibly	  do	  call	  for	  experiments	  –	  e.g.	  use	  of	  drones	  and	  fire-­‐works);	  C.	  is	  perhaps	  somewhat	  paradoxical,	  as	  not	  knowing	  what	  new	  technology	  to	  expect,	  already	  it	  seems	  sufficiently	  clear	  what	  (if	  any)	  governance	  impacts	  will	  ensue	  (e.g.	  human	  reproductive	  cloning	  and	  its	  non-­‐acceptance).	  In	  a	  less	  exotic	  way,	  however,	  there	  may	  also	  in	  C.	  be	  a	  call	  for	  regulatory	  optimization	  of	  conditions	  for	  technological	  experiments;	  a	  call	  that	  may	  be	  answered	  to	  positively	  when	  some	  public	  interest	  merit	  is	  involved.	  	  	  Uncertainty	  (in	  either	  or	  both	  domains;	  situations	  B.-­‐C.-­‐D.)	  should	  not	  stand	  in	  the	  way	  of	  being	  able	  to	  assess	  if	  a	  public	  interest	  is	  involved.	  We	  propose	  to	  assume	  strength	  of	  possibility	  through	  magnitude	  of	  effects.	  Similar	  to	  the	  precautionary	  principle,	  where	  a	  serious	  possibility	  (i.e.	  chance)	  of	  serious	  harm	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  96	  We	  will	  not	  separate	  here	  the	  situation	  of	  governance	  as	  regards	  the	  mere	  fear	  of	  technological	  change,	  but	  it	  is	  well	  possible	  that	  in	  creating	  trust	  governments	  seek	  new	  modes	  of	  governance,	  with	  which	  they	  first	  experiment.	  This	  is	  interesting	  only	  if	  sufficiently	  clearly	  related	  to	  particular	  technological	  advancement.	  Furthermore	  Governance	  response	  may	  be	  of	  a	  twofold	  kind:	  a.	  spontaneous	  effects	  (or	  absence	  of	  these)	  when	  a	  new	  technological	  possibility	  does	  arise;	  b.	  regulated	  effects	  If	  any)	  when	  a	  new	  technological	  possibility	  does	  arise	  (and	  conduct	  is	  to	  be	  influenced	  either	  for	  reasons	  of	  risks	  or	  of	  opportunities	  –	  or	  perhaps	  both).	  For	  now	  we	  will	  not	  elaborate	  on	  this	  difference.	  97	  We	  recognize	  that	  with	  every	  product,	  service	  	  or	  process	  there	  is	  a	  change	  of	  renewed	  technological	  and	  societal	  ‘volatility’	  in	  possibilities	  and	  appreciation	  of	  related	  activities)	  –	  this	  and	  the	  following	  are	  no	  more	  that	  ‘here-­‐and-­‐now’	  examples.	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(i.e.	  effects)	  entitles	  constraining	  action,	  here	  a	  serious	  possibility	  of	  serious	  harm	  or	  benefit	  (as	  both	  may	  trigger	  experimentation),	  seems	  a	  sensible	  requirement.	  So	  alike	  ‘precaution’	  seriousness	  of	  harm	  or	  benefit	  (i.e.	  the	  magnitude	  of	  effects)	  is	  leading	  in	  responsiveness.	  	  Before	  further	  addressing	  the	  public	  interest	  element,	  let	  us	  first	  look	  at	  the	  element	  of	  an	  experimental	  setting	  (2.)	  as	  this	  adds	  a	  vital	  general	  characteristic	  to	  the	  focus	  on	  exceptionality:	  temporariness.	  In	  the	  above	  we	  already	  pointed	  at	  temporariness	  as	  being	  a	  possible	  (and	  as	  regards	  exceptions	  to	  eloquent	  silence,	  a	  necessary)	  characteristic	  of	  exceptional	  regulation.	  In	  experimentation	  the	  temporal	  aspect	  becomes	  an	  imperative	  characteristic	  as	  recordings	  of	  findings	  (in	  the	  determination	  of	  facts	  or	  events)	  call	  for	  pauses,	  stops	  or	  time-­‐slots	  amounting	  to	  ‘t=x’	  or	  ‘t+x’	  moments	  in	  time.	  These	  are	  crucial	  ‘stops’	  to	  allow	  for	  the	  results,	  following	  a	  certain	  period	  of	  experimentation,	  to	  be	  monitored	  and	  evaluated,	  and	  to	  draw	  conclusions	  as	  regard	  possible	  consequences	  for	  continuation.	  This	  is	  not	  to	  say	  that	  regulation	  that	  provides	  conditions	  for	  performing	  experiments	  is	  itself	  necessarily	  temporary	  regulation	  (although	  this	  is	  certainly	  possible),	  but	  that	  the	  scope	  of	  its	  application	  (in	  terms	  of	  norm-­‐objects	  or	  norm-­‐conditions)	  is	  explicitly	  or	  implicitly	  limited	  in	  time.98	  	  	  It	  is	  the	  element	  of	  public	  interest	  (3.)	  that	  calls	  for	  one	  more	  step	  in	  narrowing	  our	  focus,	  as	  we	  do	  not	  want	  to	  include	  experimentation	  which	  may	  have	  some	  public	  interest	  merit,	  but:	  (a.)	  can	  be	  performed	  within	  existing	  rules	  (though	  perhaps	  not	  optimally	  or	  at	  higher	  cost),	  and	  (b.)	  is	  not	  expected	  to	  have	  a	  major	  influence	  on	  patterns	  of	  social	  interactions	  (and	  so	  does	  not	  come	  with	  or	  call	  for	  major	  social	  change	  and	  adaptation,	  such	  as	  in	  formal	  and	  informal	  rules).	  When	  both	  of	  these	  situations	  are	  the	  case	  we	  speak	  of	  sustainable	  innovation,	  without	  need	  for	  changes	  in	  existing	  rules	  (informal	  or	  formal),	  but	  our	  interest	  lies	  with	  the	  ‘game-­‐changing’	  disruptive	  pathways.	  	  
4.3	  –	  Disruptiveness	  Our	  third	  focal	  element	  leads	  our	  regulatory	  scope	  to	  the	  potential	  (as	  serious	  possibility	  or	  promise)	  of	  a	  disruptive	  innovation,	  given	  that	  we	  are	  interested	  only	  in	  experimentation	  (with	  public	  interest	  merit)	  that	  is	  ‘disruptive’	  to	  the	  extent	  that:	  99	  a. it	  cannot	  be	  successfully	  performed	  within	  existing	  rules.	  This	  is	  about	  the	  
temporary	  disruptiveness	  of	  performing	  the	  experiment,	  as	  for	  reasons	  of	  technological	  and/or	  social/governance	  requirements	  it	  requires	  contextual	  changes	  that	  normally	  do	  not	  exist	  (as	  facilitation;	  e.g.	  ‘disproportional’	  financial	  investments)	  or	  are	  not	  allowed	  (as	  permissiveness;	  ‘disproportional’	  (distribution	  of)	  risks	  and	  benefits);	  b. it	  is	  expected	  to	  have	  a	  major	  influence	  on	  patterns	  of	  social	  interactions	  (as	  a	  matter	  of	  major	  social	  change	  and	  adaptation,	  as	  in	  forma	  land	  informal	  rules).	  This	  is	  about	  the	  possible	  disruptive	  structural	  outcomes	  of	  the	  experiments,	  and	  relates	  to	  technological	  and/or	  societal/governance	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  98	  See	  our	  earlier	  remark	  on	  this	  in	  par.	  4.1	  (first	  related	  to	  ‘Exceptional	  unregulatedness’,	  then	  also	  to	  other	  arrangements),	  also	  see	  the	  remarks	  in	  the	  immediately	  above	  section.	  99	  The	  term	  ‘disruptive’	  is	  taken	  from	  a	  Business	  Administration	  background,	  but	  applied	  more	  broadly	  here.	  See,	  inter	  
alia,	  Bower,	  Joseph	  L.	  and	  Christensen,	  Clayton	  M.,	  Disruptive	  Technologies:	  Catching	  the	  Wave,	  Harvard	  Business	  Review	  73,	  no.	  1	  (January-­‐February	  1995),	  pp.	  43-­‐53.	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ramifications	  along	  similar	  lines	  of	  disproportionality	  as	  under	  a.,	  but	  now	  as	  a	  matter	  of	  accommodating	  or	  channelling	  these	  outcomes.	  While	  using	  proportionality	  as	  an	  expression	  of	  a	  deviation	  from	  existing	  proportions	  that	  apply	  to	  experimentation	  and	  day-­‐to-­‐day	  activities	  in	  technological	  and	  governance	  realms,	  what	  is	  key	  to	  our	  interest	  is	  that	  regulators	  need	  to	  determine	  if	  to	  allow	  and	  perhaps	  even	  facilitate	  the	  disruption	  of	  an	  unusual	  experiment	  (a.	  -­‐	  one	  that	  cannot	  take	  place	  under	  existing	  rules)	  is	  in	  proportion	  to	  the	  societal	  interest	  that	  is	  involved	  in	  being	  able	  to	  properly	  decide	  about	  making	  changes	  in	  future	  day-­‐to-­‐day	  business	  of	  technological	  and	  governance	  activities	  (b.	  –	  when	  the	  experiments	  present	  knowledge	  that	  displays	  a	  compelling	  reason	  of	  societal	  interest	  –	  e.g.	  growth	  of	  welfare	  and	  wellbeing	  –	  to	  make	  such	  changes);	  as	  ‘innovation’	  is	  believed	  to	  be	  a	  ‘change	  for	  the	  better’,100	  or	  a	  move	  away	  from	  a	  more	  dismal	  alternative	  if	  nothing	  is	  done.	  	  	   It	  should	  be	  kept	  in	  mind	  that	  both	  of	  these	  disruptive	  dimensions	  (a.	  and	  b.)	  may	  apply	  to	  temporary	  technological	  experimentation	  and	  its	  structural	  consequences	  and/or	  to	  temporary	  governance	  experimentation	  and	  its	  structural	  consequences.	  As	  we	  leave	  temporary	  disruptive	  experimentation	  out	  of	  our	  picture,	  as	  it	  is	  a	  given	  point	  of	  departure	  in	  our	  study,	  we	  may	  distinguish	  four	  innovation	  narratives	  combining	  technology	  and	  governance	  perspective	  in	  terms	  of	  whether	  structural	  changes	  are	  expected	  to	  be	  of	  a	  sustainable	  or	  a	  disruptive	  nature,	  while	  our	  interest	  lies	  only	  with	  structural	  disruption	  through:	  (1.)	  unilateral	  technological	  innovation	  (only);	  (2.)	  bilateral	  technological	  and	  governance	  innovation;	  (3.)	  unilateral	  governance	  innovation	  (only).	  The	  latter	  would	  fit	  our	  focus	  only	  if	  the	  particular	  type	  of	  governance	  innovation	  ensues	  from	  a	  technological	  innovation,	  albeit	  not	  a	  technologically	  disruptive	  one	  (i.e.	  a	  sustained	  innovation,	  of	  a	  radical	  kind).101	  What	  this	  means	  is	  that	  out	  of	  the	  four	  abovementioned	  ‘technological	  possibilities	  and	  governance	  response’-­‐situations,	  situations	  B-­‐C-­‐D	  in	  Table	  11.	  (of	  bilateral	  or	  unilateral	  uncertainty),	  would	  go	  through	  a	  ‘disruptiveness	  filter’,	  selecting	  only	  those	  cases	  where	  given	  uncertainty	  is	  combined	  with	  the	  (perhaps	  precautionary)	  expectation	  of	  structural	  disruption	  (in	  consequences	  that	  are	  drawn	  from	  the	  information	  taken	  from	  temporary	  disruptive	  technological	  and/or	  governance	  experiments).	  	  
Table	  12.	  Disruptiveness….	  	  
Disruptiveness	  in	  possibility	  and	  responses’	  relations	  of	  technology	  and	  governance	  Technological	  Possibility	  	  ⇨	   Sustained	  innovation	  
Si	  
Disruptive	  innovation	  
Di	  ⇩	  	  Governance	  Response	  Sustained	  innovation	  -­‐	  Si	   (A.)	  	  Tp	  Si	  	  ⇨	  	  Gr	  Si	   (B.)	  	  Tp	  Di+	  	  ⇨	  	  Gr	  Si	  Disruptive	  innovation	  -­‐	  Di	   (C.)	  	  Tp	  Si	  ⇨	  	  Gr	  Di	   (D.)	  	  Tp	  Di	  	  ⇨	  	  Gr	  Di	  A-­‐D	  as	  expectation	  awaiting	  proof	  through	  temporary	  disruptive	  experimentation	  (if	  so	  desired)	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  100	  See	  L.C.P.	  Broos,	  Publieksvriendelijk	  versnellen	  van	  innovatie	  in	  netwerksectoren,	  Een	  exploratie	  van	  wetstechnische	  
mogelijkheden	  ter	  bevordering	  van	  innovatie	  in	  de	  telecomsector,	  met	  behoud	  van	  de	  bescherming	  van	  publieke	  belangen,	  NGInfra	  PhD	  Series	  on	  Infrastructures,	  no.	  67,	  University	  of	  Twente.,	  p.	  9-­‐11	  (with	  many	  references).	  101	  Evolutionary	  technological	  innovations	  by	  definition	  do	  not	  cause	  social	  disruption;	  hence	  do	  not	  call	  for	  social	  experimentation.	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Tp=	  Technological	  possibility	   Gr	  =	  Governance	  response	  	   Only	  cases	  B-­‐C-­‐D	  (of	  bilateral	  or	  unilateral	  disruptive	  potential;	  as	  also	  pointed	  out	  as	  1.,	  2.,	  and	  3.	  in	  the	  text	  above	  the	  table)	  may	  fit	  our	  focus	  (A.	  has	  no	  disruptive	  potential),	  but	  again,	  they	  are	  relevant	  only	  if	  (a.)	  experiments	  with	  
temporary	  exceptional	  disruptiveness	  are	  indeed	  considered	  necessary,	  and	  if	  (b.)	  the	  potential	  structural	  disruptive	  innovations	  that	  the	  outcomes	  of	  related	  experiments	  may	  bring	  or	  demonstrate,	  are	  relevant	  to	  the	  public	  interest	  agenda	  in	  terms	  of	  possible	  future	  developments	  that,	  if	  their	  potential	  proves	  real,	  need	  to	  be	  promoted	  or	  avoided,	  thus	  legitimizing	  exceptional	  regulation	  (deviating	  from	  existing	  public	  interest	  trade-­‐offs)	  to	  make	  experimentation	  possible.	  	   From	  this	  it	  follows	  that	  our	  primary	  focus	  is	  on	  (temporary)	  experimentation	  given	  a	  potential	  of	  (structural)	  disruptive	  innovation.	  	  	  When	  disruption	  is	  expected	  to	  be	  bilateral	  (D.	  –	  ‘full	  structural	  disruption’),	  then	  the	  case	  is	  clear	  and	  the	  ‘narrative’	  presents	  a	  twofold	  regulatory	  challenge,	  to	  accommodate	  both	  technological	  and	  governance	  experimentation.	  	  When	  the	  expectation	  is	  limited	  to	  unilateral	  disruptive	  technological	  innovation	  (B.	  –	  ‘mere	  structural	  technology	  disruption’),	  regulatory	  governance	  repercussions	  lie	  only	  in	  securing	  a	  temporary	  experimental	  setting.	  As	  we	  said	  in	  the	  introduction,	  we	  want	  to	  focus	  here	  on	  application,	  there	  are	  no	  relevant	  structural	  governance	  concerns,	  so	  we	  will	  not	  consider	  this	  option	  any	  further	  (here).	  When	  the	  expectation	  is	  limited	  to	  unilateral	  disruptive	  innovation	  in	  
governance	  (C.	  –	  ‘mere	  structural	  governance	  disruption’),	  regulatory	  governance	  repercussions	  lie	  only	  in	  securing	  a	  temporary	  experimental	  setting	  –	  but	  only	  in	  as	  much	  as	  this	  experimentation	  is	  necessary	  due	  to	  no	  more	  than	  sustained	  technological	  innovation	  (else	  this	  case	  would	  fit	  under	  D.).	  Of	  course	  there	  may	  be	  experimental	  regimes	  for	  reasons	  following	  ‘mere’	  political,	  economic,	  social	  or	  cultural	  reasons,	  but	  our	  scope	  lies	  with	  fostering	  technological	  innovation.	  When	  the	  afore	  sustained	  technological	  innovations	  create	  the	  expectancy	  that	  innovations	  of	  governance	  will	  ensue	  or	  are	  necessary,	  and	  that	  experiments	  in	  governance	  are	  necessary	  to	  properly	  channel	  this	  innovation,	  then	  they	  are	  likely	  to	  be	  of	  a	  presumed	  radical	  kind	  as	  otherwise	  such	  experimentation	  is	  probably	  not	  considered	  necessary.102	  	  	  	  	  Ultimately,	  the	  structural	  uni-­‐	  or	  bilateral	  disruptive	  innovation	  does	  have	  to	  carry	  in	  itself	  some	  public	  interest	  relevance	  in:	  	  1. a	  need	  to	  know	  about	  technological	  or	  governance	  innovations	  of	  an	  expected	  disruptive	  kind,	  which	  cannot	  be	  fulfilled	  without	  controlled	  disruption	  by	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  102	  On	  that	  latter	  point,	  it	  will	  be	  clear	  that	  we	  exclude	  cases	  of	  experimentation,	  even	  if	  bilateral,	  concerning	  expected	  radical	  sustained	  innovation,	  as	  we	  want	  to	  draw	  the	  line	  delineating	  the	  separation	  between	  ‘real	  experiments’,	  that	  call	  for	  and	  may	  lead	  to	  disruption	  as	  ‘game-­‐changers’,	  and	  ‘quasi-­‐experiments’	  within	  the	  realm	  of	  known	  risks	  and	  performable	  within	  existing	  patterns	  of	  scientific	  or	  governance	  interaction.	  Nonetheless	  we	  need	  to	  keep	  in	  mind	  that	  it	  may	  well	  be	  a	  thin	  line	  between	  expecting	  radical	  sustainable	  and	  disruptive	  innovations.	  Thus	  it	  will	  be	  a	  matter	  of	  risk-­‐averseness	  or	  risk-­‐seeking	  attitude	  (‘precautionariness)	  whether	  expectation	  yields	  an	  ex	  ante	  broad	  or	  a	  narrow	  spectrum	  of	  experimental	  settings.	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exceptional	  rule	  to	  allow	  an	  experiment	  that	  is	  impossible	  under	  normal	  rules;	  2. a	  ‘need	  to	  know’	  that	  may	  ensue	  from	  the	  potential	  advantage	  that	  disruptive	  consequences	  may	  bring	  to	  securing	  (in	  the	  wake	  of	  certain	  threats)	  or	  the	  (improved)	  realisation	  of	  public	  interests,	  based	  upon	  the	  (certain)	  information	  that	  the	  experiment	  is	  expected	  to	  provide.	  	  	   So,	  while	  firstly	  focusing	  on	  exceptional	  regulation,	  we	  secondly	  focused	  on	  such	  regulation	  where	  uncertain	  results	  and	  responses	  call	  for	  experimentation,	  to	  now,	  thirdly,	  focus	  on	  such	  latter	  regulation	  where	  the	  outcomes	  of	  experimentation	  have	  the	  potential	  of	  providing	  certainty	  about	  an	  (ex	  ante	  of	  experimentation)	  uncertain	  future	  given	  the	  expected	  potential	  of	  structurally	  disruptive	  technological	  and/or	  governance	  innovation.	  	  Ultimately,	  regulating	  for	  temporary	  experimentation103	  is	  about	  considering	  the	  need	  of	  a	  temporary	  exceptional	  change	  of	  institutional	  rules	  (of	  the	  game	  -­‐	  concerning	  crucial	  transactions	  or	  balancing	  benefits/opportunities	  and	  burdens/risks	  and	  opportunities)	  relevant	  to	  enable	  the	  performance	  of	  experiments,	  of	  which	  the	  outcome	  is	  expected	  to	  disruptively	  cause	  structural	  innovation	  in	  technological	  and/or	  in	  governance	  realms,	  relevant	  as	  a	  matter	  of	  public	  interest	  and	  of	  with	  governance	  innovation	  may	  lead	  to	  a	  structural	  change	  of	  rules	  following	  the	  outcomes	  of	  the	  experiment.	  	  	  	  
5.	  Concerning	  Networks	  	  	  In	  par.	  1	  we	  presented	  our	  focus	  of	  interest	  also	  by	  referring	  to	  the	  relevance	  of	  network	  sector	  characteristics:	  	  “…	  fourthly,	  a	  focus	  on	  infrastructure	  based	  services,	  especially	  in	  the	  liberalized	  
energy	  and	  telecommunication	  sectors,	  which	  implies	  that	  we	  take	  into	  account	  
specific	  network	  characteristics	  concerning	  both	  technological	  innovation,	  
economic	  transactions	  and	  regulation.	  	  
Given	  that	  this	  paper	  reflects	  work	  in	  progress,	  it	  does	  not	  include	  a	  further	  
elaboration	  of	  specific	  aspects	  that	  come	  with	  experimentation	  in	  networks.	  In	  as	  
much	  as	  experimentation	  and	  competition	  can	  sometimes	  clash,	  clearly	  the	  
tendency	  of	  networks	  towards	  natural	  monopolies	  is	  a	  factor	  to	  count	  with.”	  	  A	  further	  elaboration	  on	  specific	  characteristics	  of	  experimenting	  in	  the	  context	  of	  networks	  will	  be	  added	  later,	  in	  some	  alternative	  outlet	  of	  the	  main	  ‘message’	  included	  in	  this	  paper.	  	  
6.	  Concerning	  Legal	  Design	  for	  Practice	  	  After	  all	  these	  general	  theoretical	  explorations,	  inescapably	  abstract	  by	  nature,	  it	  is	  time	  to	  look	  at	  practice.	  We	  use	  some	  examples	  from	  Dutch	  Law,	  simply	  as	  we	  have	  to	  begin	  somewhere	  and	  we	  know	  most	  about	  examples	  in	  that	  national	  domain.	  One	  cases	  concern	  Telecommunication	  Law,	  with	  a	  specific	  regime	  for	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  103	  As	  stated	  in	  the	  above,	  we	  consider	  temporariness	  as	  one	  of	  the	  key	  characteristics	  of	  experimentation	  and	  although	  rules	  on	  performing	  experiments	  may	  have	  an	  indefinite	  character,	  the	  instances	  of	  experimentation	  are	  those	  of	  a	  temporary	  occurrence	  –	  which,	  of	  course,	  go	  beyond	  mere	  freedom	  seeking	  innovation	  by	  random	  ‘trial	  and	  error’.	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experimentation	  with	  use	  of	  radio-­‐frequencies	  and	  one	  unregulated	  regime	  for	  experimentation	  with	  equipment,	  and	  that	  of	  regimes	  for	  experiments	  in	  the	  energy-­‐sectors	  of	  gas	  and	  electricity,	  concerning	  experimentation	  towards	  technological	  and	  governance	  innovations,	  although	  not	  yet	  fully	  in	  force	  and	  already	  about	  to	  be	  succeed	  by	  a	  new	  statutory	  regime.	  These	  cases	  are	  presented	  to	  provide	  a	  first	  map	  of	  actual	  exceptional	  experimental	  arrangements	  and	  an	  initial	  test	  of	  applying	  notions	  from	  the	  above	  theoretical	  framework	  with	  the	  objective	  of	  improving	  the	  framework	  –	  should	  it	  not	  fail	  completely	  –	  and	  foster	  its	  use	  in	  ex	  ante	  design	  of	  experimental	  regimes	  and	  ex	  post	  evaluation	  of	  existing	  regimes	  (also	  as	  a	  backbone	  to	  empirical	  assessments	  and	  input).	  	  	  	  
7.	  Example	  no.	  1:	  Experimenting	  in	  Telecommunication	  	  As	  examples	  to	  the	  framework	  set	  out	  in	  the	  above,	  we	  first	  look	  (in	  par.	  7.1	  –	  and	  more	  elaborately)	  at	  two	  regulations	  to	  create	  arrangements	  for	  experimenting	  with	  the	  use	  of	  radio-­‐frequencies,	  one	  past	  and	  one	  present,	  and	  then	  (in	  par.	  7.2	  –	  and	  more	  concisely)	  at	  an	  unregulated	  permissive	  regime	  as	  regards	  the	  use	  of	  telecommunication	  equipment	  outside	  of	  commercial	  usage.	  	  	  	  
7.1	  –	  Experimentation	  in	  the	  Telecommunications	  Act	  –	  an	  exception	  retracted	  and	  
replaced	  	  Supporting	  innovation	  is	  one	  of	  the	  statutory	  tasks	  of	  the	  Dutch	  National	  Regulatory	  Authority	  (NRA)	  in	  Telecommunication	  affairs,104	  in	  order	  to	  achieve	  the	  European	  policy	  objectives	  (in	  particular	  promoting	  competition)	  as	  set	  out	  in	  Article	  8	  of	  the	  Framework	  directive.105	  At	  the	  introduction	  of	  the	  Telecommunications	  Act	  (TA)	  in	  1998	  the	  explanatory	  memorandum	  already	  stressed	  the	  importance	  of	  enabling	  ‘contra	  legem’	  experimentation	  to	  foster	  innovation.106	  It	  stated	  that	  telecommunication	  technologies	  develop	  at	  high	  speed	  and	  that	  telecom	  providers	  need	  pilot	  experiences	  to	  justify	  high	  investments	  in	  networks	  and	  services.	  This	  regulatory	  view	  was	  implemented	  in	  paragraph	  1	  of	  the	  experimentation	  clause	  18.1	  TA:	  	  
“Rules	  may	  be	  set	  by	  or	  pursuant	  to	  a	  Crown	  Decree	  in	  order	  to	  investigate	  
whether	  certain	  developments	  can	  contribute	  significantly	  to	  achieving	  the	  
objectives	  of	  the	  present	  Act.	  Said	  rules	  may	  deviate	  from	  what	  is	  provided	  
by	  or	  pursuant	  to	  the	  present	  Act.”	  
	  By	  delegating	  the	  legal	  power	  to	  deviate	  from	  the	  Telecommunications	  Act	  in	  order	  to	  investigate	  potentially	  significant	  (perhaps	  disruptive)	  innovations	  to	  the	  Minister,	  flexibility	  was	  created	  to	  quickly	  respond	  to	  technological	  developments.	  107	  At	  the	  same	  time,	  procedural	  safeguards	  were	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  104	  Article	  1.3	  sub	  1a	  Telecommunications	  Act.	  105	  Directive	  No.	  2002/21/EC.	  106	  Kamerstukken	  II	  1996/97,	  25	  533,	  nr.	  3.	  107	  Paragraph	  6	  of	  Article	  18.1	  even	  contains	  ‘sub-­‐delegating’	  by	  stating	  that	  the	  rules	  within	  the	  meaning	  of	  paragraph	  1	  may	  assign	  tasks	  and	  powers	  to	  the	  NRA.	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built-­‐in	  to	  prevent	  disadvantages	  of	  the	  experiments	  for	  third	  parties	  by	  organizing	  broad	  participation	  in	  the	  making	  of	  the	  ‘deviant’	  rules	  (paragraph	  2)	  and	  enabling	  such	  third	  parties	  to	  submit	  comments	  within	  four	  weeks	  after	  publication	  of	  the	  draft	  Crown	  Decree	  (paragraph	  3):	  	  
“The	  persons	  or	  parties	  most	  concerned	  as	  regards	  the	  matters	  dealt	  with	  in	  
the	  Crown	  Decree	  shall	  be	  involved	  in	  preparation	  of	  said	  rules.	  (…).”	  
“The	  draft	  of	  rules	  set	  pursuant	  to	  the	  provisions	  of	  paragraph	  1	  shall	  be	  
announced	  in	  the	  Government	  Gazette.	  Any	  person	  shall	  be	  given	  the	  
opportunity	  to	  submit	  comments	  on	  said	  draft	  to	  Our	  Minister,	  in	  writing,	  
within	  a	  period	  of	  at	  least	  four	  weeks	  set	  in	  such	  announcement.”	  
	  Furthermore,	  measures	  have	  been	  taken	  to	  prevent	  deviant	  rules	  to	  diminish	  legal	  certainty	  by	  prevailing	  too	  long.	  Paragraph	  4	  limits	  the	  lifecycle	  of	  such	  rules	  and	  ensures	  that	  these	  rules	  can	  be	  terminated	  any	  time:	  	  
“Said	  rules	  shall	  expire	  no	  more	  than	  two	  years	  after	  having	  entered	  into	  
force.	  A	  Crown	  Decree	  as	  specified	  paragraph	  1	  may	  be	  withdrawn	  by	  Royal	  
Decree	  at	  a	  point	  set	  in	  such	  decree	  that	  lies	  within	  the	  period	  within	  the	  
meaning	  of	  the	  first	  sentence.”	  	   Finally,	  to	  achieve	  a	  smooth	  and	  quick	  transition	  from	  the	  temporary	  regime	  to	  a	  new	  regular	  regime,	  paragraph	  5	  desires	  the	  Minister	  to	  act	  resolutely	  –	  if	  desirable	  –	  by	  initiating	  a	  new	  regime	  within	  a	  limited	  period:	  	  
“Our	  Minister	  shall	  ensure	  replacement	  of	  said	  rules	  should	  he	  consider	  that	  
a	  definitive	  provision	  is	  desirable.	  If	  said	  replacement	  requires	  an	  statute	  
(i.e.	  formal	  legislation)	  to	  be	  passed,	  a	  legislative	  proposal	  shall	  be	  
submitted	  to	  Parliament	  (i.e.	  ‘Staten-­‐Generaal’)	  within	  two	  years	  of	  the	  
rules	  entering	  into	  force.	  If	  said	  replacement	  requires	  a	  Crown	  Decree,	  a	  
proposal	  for	  such	  Decree	  shall	  be	  submitted	  (…)	  within	  two	  years	  of	  the	  
rules	  entering	  into	  force.”	  	   This	  strict	  requirement	  to	  replace	  exploration	  enabling	  temporary	  rules	  by	  ‘normal’	  rules	  enabling	  exploitation	  of	  innovation	  is	  easy	  to	  understand	  against	  the	  background	  of	  trying	  to	  breach	  the	  “Dutch	  paradox”,	  i.e.	  the	  phenomenon	  of	  arduous	  commercialization	  of	  new	  knowledge	  by	  Dutch	  businesses.108	  	   All	  in	  all,	  this	  experimental	  regime	  may	  be	  regarded	  as	  an	  example	  of	  how	  to	  regulate	  experimental	  permissiveness	  and	  is	  most	  relevant	  to	  our	  study	  as	  it	  concerns	  regulatory	  relaxation	  /	  facilitation	  by	  defining	  a	  (legal)	  exceptional	  regime	  with	  a	  focus	  on	  (temporary)	  experiments	  in	  infrastructure-­‐based	  services.	  Clearly,	  the	  regime’s	  aim	  is	  to	  enable	  experiments	  with	  an	  emerging	  or	  new	  technology	  and	  not	  in	  the	  first	  place	  innovating	  governance	  –	  technological	  innovation	  is	  the	  driver	  behind	  experimentation.	  Nevertheless	  a	  need	  to	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  108	  Described,	  inter	  alia,	  by	  the	  Netherlands	  Scientific	  Council	  for	  Government	  Policy	  (WRR:	  Innovatie	  vernieuwd.	  Opening	  
in	  viervoud,	  Amsterdam:	  Amsterdam	  University	  Press	  2008,	  p.	  27)	  and	  the	  Dutch	  Ministry	  of	  Economic	  Affairs	  (Analysis	  of	  
the	  Dutch	  innovation	  position.	  Part	  II	  of	  Innovation	  letter,	  Den	  Haag:	  Ministerie	  van	  EZ	  2004,	  p.	  15).	  Also	  see	  footnote	  12.	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innovate	  ‘normal’	  rules	  can	  arise	  from	  the	  lessons	  learned	  during	  the	  experiment	  (‘uncertain	  governance	  response’),	  indicating	  potential	  disruptiveness	  of	  the	  technologies	  investigated	  and	  a	  need	  to	  also	  experiment	  with	  new	  governance	  approaches.	  Given	  the	  very	  general	  characteristics	  of	  this	  exceptional	  regime	  –	  it	  merely	  enables	  the	  set-­‐up	  of	  such	  a	  regime	  by	  additional	  (contra	  legem)	  rules	  –	  it’s	  not	  possible	  to	  classify	  this	  regime	  as	  Unilateral	  or	  Bilateral.	  Moreover,	  these	  derivative	  rules	  may	  have	  a	  general	  character	  (for	  example	  Dispensation	  to	  all	  Voice-­‐over-­‐IP-­‐providers	  from	  the	  obligation	  to	  enable	  accessibility	  of	  emergency	  calls)	  and	  may	  include	  Piecemeal	  exceptions	  (for	  example	  the	  NRA	  issuing	  an	  individual	  permit	  to	  use	  certain	  spectrum	  frequencies	  for	  certain	  applications	  contrary	  to	  the	  national	  frequency	  plan).	  	  To	  more	  precisely	  determine	  the	  nature	  of	  this	  exceptional	  regime,	  we	  should	  look	  at	  the	  Crown	  Decree	  grounded	  in	  Article	  18.1	  TA.	  Unfortunately,	  both	  for	  this	  study	  and	  perhaps	  for	  the	  innovativeness	  of	  the	  Dutch	  telecommunication	  industry,	  such	  a	  Crown	  Decree	  was	  never	  enacted.	  Instead,	  in	  2013	  article	  18.1	  was	  retracted,109	  and	  replaced	  by	  a	  new	  article	  3.12	  TA:	  	  “1.	  Upon	  request,	  our	  Minister	  can	  issue	  a	  permit	  for	  undertaking	  
experiments	  with	  a	  maximum	  duration	  of	  1	  year.	  Articles	  3.13,	  par.	  2,	  and	  
3.18,	  par.	  1,	  under	  a.	  are	  not	  applicable	  to	  these	  permits.	  	  
2.	  Permits	  as	  described	  in	  par.	  1	  will	  be	  issued	  in	  order	  of	  entry.	  	  
3.	  Out	  Minister	  can	  attach	  provisions	  and	  reservations	  to	  the	  permit.”	  	   The	  non-­‐applicability	  of	  Article	  3.13	  paragraph	  2	  TA	  creates	  an	  exception	  to	  the	  general	  rule	  that	  frequency	  permits	  are	  only	  issued	  in	  accordance	  with	  the	  National	  Frequency	  Plan	  (NFP).	  The	  general	  norm-­‐condition	  to	  granting	  regular	  frequency	  permits	  –	  only	  when	  not	  in	  conflict	  with	  NFP	  –	  does	  not	  apply	  to	  granting	  frequency	  permits	  of	  an	  experimental	  nature.	  The	  non-­‐applicability	  of	  Article	  3.18	  paragraph	  1	  sub	  a	  TA	  creates	  an	  exception	  to	  the	  obligation	  of	  the	  Minister	  to	  refuse	  frequency	  permits	  in	  as	  much	  as	  they	  are	  not	  in	  accordance	  with	  the	  NFP	  –	  which	  is	  a	  specification	  of	  the	  norm-­‐object,	  which	  holds	  the	  substantive	  mandatory	  element	  that	  in	  granting	  permits,	  elements	  of	  a	  permit	  request	  that	  are	  not	  in	  keeping	  with	  the	  NFP	  cannot	  be	  included.	  So,	  to	  cut	  a	  long	  story	  short,	  the	  NFP	  can	  temporary	  be	  ignored	  in	  order	  to	  allow	  experiments	  that	  otherwise	  could	  not	  be	  undertaken.	  The	  second	  paragraph	  announces	  a	  ‘first	  come	  first	  serve’	  principle	  regarding	  experimental	  frequencies,	  and	  the	  third	  paragraph	  entitles	  the	  Minister	  to	  impose	  additional	  conditions	  to	  such	  experimental	  permits,	  such	  as	  technical	  restrictions	  and	  reporting	  obligations	  regarding	  the	  progress	  and	  results	  of	  the	  experiments.110	  In	  keeping	  with	  this	  third	  paragraph,	  the	  Radio-­‐communications	  Agency111	  published	  its	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  109	  Unfortunately,	  the	  explanatory	  memorandum	  accompanying	  this	  amendment	  (Kamerstukken	  II,	  2007/2008,	  31	  412,	  nr.	  3)	  does	  not	  make	  clear	  why	  the	  old	  experimentation	  regime	  was	  never	  used,	  except	  for	  the	  statement	  that	  there’s	  no	  need	  any	  more	  to	  conserve	  the	  old	  article	  now	  that	  a	  new	  article	  is	  introduced...	  Nevertheless	  the	  explanatory	  memorandum	  again	  stresses	  that	  the	  new	  experimentation	  clause	  3.12	  is	  essential	  as	  a	  legal	  basis	  for	  experimentation	  in	  order	  to	  develop	  innovative	  telecommunication	  services.	  110	  Kamerstukken	  II,	  2007/2008,	  31	  412,	  nr.	  3,	  page	  21.	  111	  The	  ‘Agentschap	  Telecom’,	  an	  Agency	  of	  the	  Ministry	  of	  Economic	  affairs,	  agriculture	  and	  innovation,	  responsible	  for	  obtaining	  and	  allocating	  frequency	  space	  and	  monitoring	  its	  use.	  (http://www.agentschaptelecom.nl/radiocommunications-­‐agency).	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‘implementation	  policy’,112	  providing	  fifteen	  pages	  of	  detailed	  information	  on	  requesting	  and	  conditioning	  these	  experimental	  licenses	  and	  on	  associated	  costs.	  Important	  elements	  in	  this	  policy	  are:	  
-­‐ that	  experiments	  will	  be	  allowed	  as	  much	  as	  legally	  possible;	  
-­‐ that	  experiments	  may	  not	  cause	  harmful	  interference;	  
-­‐ that	  experiments	  should	  have	  a	  certain	  probability	  of	  success,	  as	  frequencies	  are	  scarce;	  
-­‐ that	  (geographical)	  scale	  and	  duration	  of	  the	  requested	  license	  should	  be	  in	  accordance	  with	  the	  characteristics	  of	  the	  intended	  experiment,	  (again)	  as	  frequencies	  are	  scarce.113	  It	  is	  obvious	  that	  this	  new	  experimental	  regime	  has	  a	  more	  concrete	  and	  also	  a	  more	  narrow	  focus.	  More	  narrow,	  as	  the	  types	  of	  possible	  regulatory	  relaxations	  are	  limited	  to	  the	  issuing	  of	  permits	  for	  experimental	  frequency	  usage	  (while	  the	  old	  experimentation	  clause	  allowed	  any	  undefined	  type	  of	  ‘deviant	  rules’	  as	  long	  as	  they	  promised	  to	  facilitate	  innovative	  developments).	  More	  concrete,	  as	  the	  rules	  on	  this	  specific	  exception	  type	  can	  be	  implemented	  without	  additional	  regulation	  by	  Crown	  Decree.	  For	  the	  purpose	  of	  this	  study,	  this	  level	  of	  concreteness	  is	  perhaps	  the	  most	  relevant	  aspect,114	  as	  it	  enables	  us	  to	  look	  at	  ‘on	  the	  ground’	  characteristics	  of	  this	  exceptional	  regime.	  Alike	  the	  former	  exceptional	  regime,	  the	  new	  regime	  is	  relevant	  for	  our	  study	  as	  it	  concerns	  regulatory	  relaxation	  /	  facilitation	  by	  defining	  a	  (legal)	  exceptional	  regime	  with	  a	  focus	  on	  (temporary)	  experiments	  in	  infrastructure	  based	  services.	  Interestingly,	  the	  regime	  focuses	  on	  applied	  innovation	  other	  than	  exploitation	  with	  commercial	  intent,	  as	  it	  only	  allows	  experiments	  (during	  no	  more	  than	  one	  year	  and)	  that	  are	  not	  for	  commercial	  usage.115	  Furthermore,	  it	  does	  not	  provide	  a	  mechanism	  for	  possibly	  transferring	  the	  newly	  acquired	  knowledge,	  resulting	  from	  the	  experiment,	  into	  adjustment	  of	  existing	  regular	  rules,116	  so	  to	  enable	  commercial	  exploitation.	  This	  does	  not	  exclude	  this	  from	  happening,	  but	  no	  arrangement	  was	  made	  to	  foster	  such	  uptake.	  	   The	  regime	  contains	  a	  temporary	  exception	  during	  which	  regulated	  permissiveness	  applies.	  In	  the	  perspective	  of	  norm-­‐subjects	  or	  regulatees	  (i.e.	  service	  providers)	  this	  amounts	  to	  a	  broader	  scope	  for	  Permissions	  (C1).	  For	  the	  Minister	  as	  norm-­‐authority,	  Article	  3.12	  paragraph	  1	  TA	  concerns	  an	  expansion	  of	  his	  power	  to	  grant	  frequency	  permits.	  It	  adds	  a	  category	  of	  ‘permits	  for	  experimentation’.	  The	  usual	  norm-­‐condition	  of	  Article	  3.13	  paragraph	  2	  TA,	  applicable	  to	  granting	  non-­‐experimental	  permits	  (i.e.	  the	  Minister	  shall	  not	  issue	  a	  license	  contrary	  to	  the	  NFP)	  and	  the	  usual	  limitation	  of	  non-­‐experimental	  grants	  of	  Article	  3.13	  paragraph	  1	  under	  a	  TA	  (i.e.	  the	  permit	  can	  only	  be	  granted	  in	  as	  much	  as	  in	  keeping	  with	  the	  NFP)	  are	  excluded	  (Article	  3.12	  paragraph	  1	  in	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  112	  Agentschap	  Telecom,	  ‘Uitvoeringsbeleid	  Experimenteervergunningen.	  Ruimte	  voor	  innovatie’	  versie	  0.2	  d.d.	  4-­‐4-­‐2013	  (http://www.agentschaptelecom.nl/sites/default/files/uitvoeringsbeleid-­‐experimenteervergunningen.pdf	  (Accessed	  05-­‐10-­‐2014).	  113	  See	  previous	  footnote,	  pages	  7-­‐8.	  114	  Although,	  from	  a	  perspective	  of	  enhancing	  innovation,	  the	  aspect	  of	  narrowing	  has	  relevance	  in	  the	  sense	  of	  excluding	  experimental	  options.	  115	  Kamerstukken	  II,	  2007/2008,	  31	  412,	  nr.	  3,	  page	  21.	  116	  For	  example	  a	  duty	  to	  change	  the	  frequency	  plan	  accordingly	  within	  a	  limited	  period	  of	  time	  if	  such	  a	  change	  turns	  out	  to	  be	  desirable.	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fine	  TA:	  the	  Minister	  may	  issue	  a	  permit	  contrary	  to	  the	  NFP	  and	  its	  scope	  may	  be	  in	  conflict	  with	  the	  NFP).	  	  	  From	  the	  perspective	  of	  a	  provider	  requesting	  an	  experimental	  license,	  the	  narrowing	  of	  norm-­‐conditions	  and	  the	  broadening	  of	  the	  norm-­‐object	  as	  regards	  permits	  for	  experimentation	  compared	  to	  regular	  frequency	  permits,	  opens	  up	  a	  perspective	  of	  potential	  piecemeal	  permissions	  (C1.	  –	  as	  ‘exceptional	  
reregulation’)117	  –	  against	  the	  backdrop	  of	  the	  existing	  prohibition	  (B.	  –	  you	  shall	  not	  use	  frequencies	  without	  ministerial	  permission)	  of	  frequency	  use	  with	  more	  limited	  exceptions	  for	  frequency	  permits.	  A	  potential	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  a	  shift	  from	  	  a	  Prohibition	  (the	  afore	  B.)	  to	  a	  ‘piecemeal’	  Permission	  (‘with	  toleration	  and,	  according	  to	  general	  Dutch	  Law	  doctrine,	  ‘with	  rights’;	  the	  afore	  C1.).118	  	  The	  statutory	  power	  of	  the	  Minister	  to	  grant	  permission	  to	  experiment	  is	  mostly	  of	  a	  discretionary	  nature,	  as	  Article	  3.12	  paragraph	  only	  broadly	  describes	  the	  norm-­‐object	  in	  that	  the	  Minister	  can	  attach	  reservations	  and	  provisions	  to	  the	  permit	  and	  there	  is	  no	  obligation	  of	  granting	  the	  permit	  upon	  fulfillment	  of	  power-­‐conditions	  –	  but	  some	  general	  provisions	  to	  permits,	  such	  as	  regarding	  the	  use	  of	  reservations	  (in	  Article	  3.14	  TA)	  and	  financial	  charges	  (in	  Article	  3.15	  TA)	  remain	  in	  place.	  These	  limitations	  are	  matched	  with	  subjective	  norm-­‐conditions,	  to	  the	  extend	  that	  there	  are	  no	  specific	  hypothetical	  requirements	  to	  the	  existence	  of	  the	  power	  to	  grant	  these	  permits	  –	  with	  the	  implicated	  specific	  exception	  that	  a	  request	  has	  to	  be	  about	  experimental	  use	  of	  frequencies	  (but	  a	  definition	  of	  experimentation	  does	  not	  exist),119	  the	  explicit	  specific	  procedural	  exception	  of	  the	  ‘first	  in,	  first	  served’	  principle	  (in	  Article	  3.12	  paragraph	  2	  TA)	  and	  the	  remaining	  (not	  excluded)	  general	  norm-­‐conditions	  in	  Article	  3.18	  TA	  (such	  as	  effective	  use	  of	  frequency	  space).120	  	  	  
7.2	  –	  Unregulated	  experimentation	  with	  telecommunications	  equipment	  	   We	  conclude	  this	  paragraph	  on	  telecommunication	  law	  examples	  with	  another	  ‘principle’	  in	  the	  Dutch	  telecommunications	  regime	  that	  contains	  a	  (less	  explicit)	  element	  of	  regulating	  experiments.	  Article	  10.1	  paragraph	  1	  TA	  contains	  a	  beautiful	  example	  of	  implicated	  unregulated	  permissiveness:	  	  
“Equipment	  that	  does	  not	  comply	  with	  the	  rules	  pursuant	  to	  Article	  10.3(a),	  
(b),	  (c),	  and	  (e)	  shall	  not	  be	  marketed	  or	  traded.”	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  117	  Considering	  that	  the	  Minister	  may	  attach	  conditions	  of	  use	  to	  the	  experimental	  permit	  –	  see	  Article	  3.12	  paragraph	  3	  TA	  –	  so	  no	  ‘exceptional	  freedom’(and	  given	  the	  general	  prohibition	  to	  use	  frequencies	  without	  permit:	  no	  ‘exceptional	  unregulatedness’).	  118	  Third	  parties	  cannot	  start	  a	  liability	  case	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  tort	  as	  a	  matter	  of	  infringement	  of	  legal	  duties	  (i.e.	  adherence	  to	  the	  prohibition)	  as	  there	  is	  permission.	  There	  may	  be	  room	  for	  such	  a	  claim	  based	  upon	  infringement	  of	  third	  party	  interests,	  but	  as	  a	  rule	  this	  action	  cannot	  lead	  to	  an	  injunction	  to	  cessation	  of	  the	  frequency	  use	  and	  will	  thus	  be	  limited	  to	  some	  compensation.	  	  119	  The	  ‘Implementation	  Policy’	  of	  the	  Radio-­‐communications	  Agency	  does	  offer	  some	  elements	  of	  description,	  but	  ontological	  characteristics	  clearly	  mix	  with	  legal	  and	  policy	  considerations	  relevant	  to	  granting	  a	  permit.	  See	  par.	  3.2	  (p.	  7-­‐9).	  The	  same	  Policy	  points	  (in	  par.	  1.2,	  on	  p.	  4)	  at	  the	  two	  key	  objectives	  behind	  allowing	  experiments:	  enhancing	  innovation	  and	  fostering	  economic	  progress.	  120	  ‘Largely’	  is	  used	  in	  reference	  to	  the	  fact	  that	  there	  is	  a	  procedural	  requirement	  of	  deciding	  on	  requests	  on	  a	  ‘first	  in,	  first	  served	  basis’.	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Article	  10.3	  TA	  contains	  all	  kinds	  of	  conformity	  requirements	  with	  which	  telecommunications	  equipment	  must	  comply.	  The	  interesting	  part	  of	  clause	  10.1	  paragraph	  1	  TA	  is	  the	  unwritten	  part,	  i.e.	  the	  rule	  applying	  to	  equipment	  being	  developed	  and	  used	  for	  telecommunication	  experiments,	  by	  then	  not	  being	  marketed	  or	  traded.	  One	  might	  conclude	  that	  such	  equipment	  does	  not	  have	  to	  (but	  may)	  comply	  with	  the	  10.3	  TA	  requirements.	  Neither	  Article	  10.1	  TA	  nor	  the	  explanatory	  memorandum	  makes	  clear	  whether	  this	  Bilateral	  permissiveness	  exists	  by	  means	  of	  absence	  of	  regulation.	  This	  suggests	  mere	  regulatory	  silence,	  as	  perhaps	  the	  option	  of	  regulating	  the	  scenario	  of	  developing	  and	  using	  equipment	  for	  experimentation	  purposes,	  not	  being	  marketed	  or	  traded	  (i.e.	  application	  other	  than	  as	  commercial	  exploitation)	  simply	  has	  not	  been	  considered,	  but	  it	  may	  (yet)	  be	  that	  it	  does	  concern	  a	  conscious	  decision	  to	  not	  regulate	  this	  scenario	  –	  as	  a	  matter	  of	  eloquent	  silence.	  	  The	  recent	  version	  of	  the	  ‘Implementation	  Policy’	  of	  the	  Radio-­‐communications	  Agency	  explicitly	  confirms	  the	  interpretation	  suggested	  above:121	  	  
“(…)	  an	  experiment	  can	  involve	  the	  use	  of	  equipment	  that	  is	  not	  yet	  
commercially	  traded.	  (…)	  In	  that	  case	  such	  equipment	  need	  not	  (yet)	  comply	  
with	  provisions	  listed	  in	  chapter	  10	  TA	  and	  pursuant	  regulations.”	  	   Does	  this	  governmental	  interpretation	  strengthen	  the	  confidence	  that	  this	  permissiveness	  is	  of	  the	  ‘eloquent’	  type?	  Or	  should	  this	  ‘executive	  interpretation’	  (issued	  by	  an	  executive	  power	  instead	  of	  by	  the	  actual	  norm-­‐authority,	  the	  formal	  legislator)	  be	  regarded	  as	  a	  shift	  from	  unregulated	  permissiveness	  to	  regulated	  permissiveness	  (i.e.	  C2	  -­‐	  Dispensation),	  as	  the	  uttering	  in	  the	  Implementation	  Policy	  does	  constitute	  a	  legal	  norm	  (albeit	  one	  of	  a	  policy-­‐guideline)?122	  And	  if	  not,	  does	  the	  unregulated	  permission	  (implicitly)	  limit	  the	  use	  of	  existing	  legal	  powers	  of	  lower	  public	  office	  to	  introduce	  obligating	  regulation?	  Article	  10.1	  TA	  could,	  in	  its	  current	  shape	  and	  interpretation,	  be	  favorable	  to	  experimentation	  and,	  on	  the	  longer	  term,	  to	  innovation,	  but	  legal	  certainty	  could	  be	  improved	  by	  explicitly	  addressing	  eloquent	  silence,	  for	  example	  in	  an	  explanatory	  memorandum.123	  Further	  and	  finally,	  the	  type	  of	  permissiveness	  may	  be	  relevant	  to	  experimentation,	  the	  element	  of	  temporariness	  does	  not	  apply,	  at	  least	  not	  in	  regulatory	  terms.	  Thus	  the	  experiments	  may,	  as	  brute	  facts,	  be	  temporary	  events,	  but	  strictly	  speaking	  the	  absence	  of	  a	  constraining	  legal	  arrangement	  places	  this	  example	  outside	  of	  our	  scope	  –	  but	  sufficiently	  relevant	  to	  present.	  	  	  
8.	  Example	  no.	  2:	  Experimenting	  in	  Gas	  &	  Electricity	  	  As	  regards	  our	  examples	  from	  the	  energy	  sector	  we	  focus	  on	  existing	  and	  future	  arrangements,	  in	  as	  much	  as	  these	  are	  clear,	  for	  experimentation	  with	  gas	  and	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  121	  Agentschap	  Telecom,	  ‘Uitvoeringsbeleid	  Experimenteervergunningen.	  Ruimte	  voor	  innovatie’	  versie	  0.2	  d.d.	  4-­‐4-­‐2013	  (see	  footnote	  112),	  pages	  6-­‐7.	  122	  According	  to	  the	  Dutch	  General	  Administrative	  Law	  Code	  (Awb)	  policy-­‐guidelines	  are	  obligating	  legal	  norms,	  which	  place	  the	  first	  party	  regulator/regulatee	  under	  Command	  to	  adhere	  to	  the	  guidelines	  it	  has	  enacted	  and	  promulgated:	  Article	  4:84	  ab	  initio	  Awb.	  123	  Although,	  in	  that	  way,	  it	  may	  become	  ‘a	  bit	  noisy’.	  It	  remains	  a	  thin	  line	  to	  delineate	  mere	  silence	  from	  eloquent	  silence	  (What	  ‘signs’	  do	  we	  consider	  relevant?),	  but	  also	  eloquent	  silence	  from	  regulation	  (When	  does	  a	  clear	  statement	  in	  an	  Explanatory	  Memorandum	  beget	  the	  force	  of	  a	  regulated	  norm?).	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electricity.	  The	  first	  part	  of	  our	  analysis	  (in	  par.	  8.1)	  concerns	  an	  integrated	  analysis	  of	  statutory	  arrangements	  that	  enable	  the	  making	  of	  legal	  arrangements	  for	  such	  experimentation	  in	  present.	  The	  second	  part	  (par.	  8.2)	  concerns	  some	  specificities	  of	  a	  draft	  Crown	  decree	  that	  presents	  such	  a	  legal	  arrangement,	  albeit	  only	  for	  the	  electricity	  sector.	  As	  a	  third	  part	  we	  very	  briefly	  point	  at	  an	  example	  of	  legal	  arrangements	  to	  subsidize	  innovation	  through	  ‘beauty	  contests’.	  	  
8.1	  Experimentation	  under	  the	  Electricity	  and	  Gas	  Act	  –	  general	  scope	  	  Presently	  a	  proposal	  is	  on	  the	  table	  for	  an	  integrated	  Electricity	  and	  Gas	  Act	  (hereafter	  EGA),	  replacing	  the	  existing	  separate	  Electricity	  Act	  and	  natural	  Gas	  Act.	  The	  proposal	  comes	  with	  a	  (new)	  Article	  11.1	  EGA	  concerning	  a	  delegated	  power	  (to	  central	  government:	  the	  ‘Crown’)	  to	  by	  Crown	  Decree	  provide	  an	  exceptional	  legal	  arrangement	  for	  undertaking	  experiments.	  The	  text	  of	  the	  proposal	  provides	  a	  more	  encompassing	  basis	  for	  experimentation	  than	  the	  current	  provisions	  in	  Article	  7a	  of	  the	  Electricity	  Act	  and	  Article	  1i	  of	  the	  Gas	  Act,	  so	  we	  have	  chosen	  to	  take	  this	  proposal	  as	  our	  point	  of	  reference.	  The	  Crown	  Decrees	  necessary	  for	  ‘activating’	  the	  existing	  provisions	  is	  expected	  to	  enter	  into	  force	  in	  2015,	  and	  will	  most	  likely	  also	  fit	  the	  provisions	  of	  the	  integrated	  act.	  	  	   The	  Explanatory	  Memorandum	  to	  EGA	  states124	  that	  developments	  in	  the	  energy	  system	  are	  difficult	  to	  predict	  and	  that	  by	  and	  large	  practice	  will,	  within	  the	  broad	  boundaries	  of	  energy	  policy,	  determine	  the	  future.	  Changes	  in	  legislation	  and	  regulation	  are	  considered	  necessary	  to	  accommodate	  future	  developments	  that	  at	  some	  point	  will	  establish	  themselves	  in	  practice,	  such	  as	  developments	  in	  energy-­‐storage	  and	  demand-­‐side	  management.	  For	  that	  reason	  it	  is	  indispensible	  to	  gain	  experience	  with	  such	  new	  developments,	  such	  as	  with	  the	  use	  of	  flexible	  tariffs	  and	  demand-­‐side	  management	  support.	  Hence	  a	  broadly	  formulated	  provision	  for	  experimentation	  is	  proposed,	  so	  that	  lessons	  can	  be	  learned	  by	  innovations	  in	  practice	  –	  to	  later	  properly	  adjust	  legislation	  and	  regulation	  to	  these	  innovations.	  The	  Memorandum	  pays	  special	  attention	  to	  local	  energy	  initiatives	  and	  experiments.	  It	  signals	  that	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  stakeholder	  consultations	  it	  is	  believed	  that	  many	  innovations	  can	  take	  place	  under	  existing	  rules,	  but	  some,	  especially	  when	  related	  to	  the	  present	  model	  of	  the	  energy-­‐market	  (e.g.	  in	  relation	  to	  ‘prosumers’	  and	  local	  smart	  grids)	  do	  require	  that	  legislative	  changes	  are	  made,	  and	  to	  that	  end	  a	  broadly	  formulated	  provision	  for	  experimentation	  is	  deemed	  most	  desirable.125	  	   Paragraph	  1	  of	  Chapter	  11	  of	  EGA	  is	  called	  ‘Experimental	  space	  and	  exemptions’	  (‘Experimenteerruimte	  en	  ontheffingen’)	  and	  Article	  11.1	  is	  named	  ‘Delegation	  experimentation	  Crown	  Decree’	  (‘Delegatie	  experimenteer	  AMvB’).	  While	  respecting	  EU-­‐legislation	  and	  regulations,	  the	  first	  paragraph	  of	  this	  Article	  allows	  for	  deviating	  from	  the	  provisions	  of	  EGA	  or	  of	  delegated	  acts	  based	  upon	  it,	  where	  it	  concerns:	  (a)	  an	  experiment	  in	  the	  area	  of	  renewable	  energy,	  energy-­‐economies	  or	  an	  efficient	  use	  of	  the	  energy	  system,	  or	  (b)	  an	  experiment	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  124	  See	  General	  Part,	  section	  I.2.	  125	  Supra,	  section	  I.3	  and	  also	  the	  reference	  in	  I.4	  to	  Chapter	  11	  of	  EGA.	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undertaken	  with	  the	  objective	  of	  acquiring	  practical	  knowledge	  about	  new	  ‘market	  models’	  or	  new	  systems	  of	  regulating	  energy	  tariffs.	  	  In	  this	  typology	  we	  readily	  recognise	  a	  difference	  with	  respect	  to	  experiments	  in	  applied	  technology	  and	  applied	  modes	  of	  governance,	  which	  in	  practice	  may	  be	  undertaken	  separately	  but	  also	  jointly.	  As	  said	  in	  the	  above,	  the	  proposed	  scope	  is	  indeed	  somewhat	  broader	  than	  the	  previous	  arrangements,	  which	  were	  limited	  to	  support	  decentralized	  production,	  transport	  and	  delivery	  of	  gas	  or	  electricity	  decentrally	  generated	  in	  installations	  using	  renewable	  resources	  (also	  see	  par.	  7.2).	  On	  the	  basis	  of	  this	  paragraph	  it	  is	  not	  yet	  possible	  to	  tell	  if	  deviations	  will	  only	  be	  of	  a	  permissive	  nature	  or	  whether	  they	  will	  also	  involve	  facilitation	  –	  which	  would	  then	  have	  to	  come	  through	  separate	  regulatory	  channels.	  Clearly	  though,	  exception	  is	  made	  in	  terms	  of	  deviating	  from	  existing	  obligating	  rules,	  so	  not	  an	  as	  arrangement	  of	  ‘exceptional	  
unregulateness’	  (see	  par.	  4.1),	  brought	  about	  by	  a	  separate	  legal	  act	  by	  a	  subordinate	  authority	  (i.e.	  the	  Crown,	  which	  is,	  according	  to	  Constitutional	  Law,	  positioned	  immediately	  below	  the	  Formal	  Legislator).126	  Presumably	  permissiveness	  will	  be	  of	  a	  bilateral	  kind	  in	  that	  users	  or	  managers	  of	  the	  energy	  system	  to	  whom	  the	  deviations	  apply	  are	  not	  under	  command	  to	  undertake	  experiments.	  	  	  Paragraph	  2	  goes	  on	  to	  state	  that	  by	  Crown	  Decree	  or	  regulations	  based	  thereupon,	  further	  rules	  will	  be	  provided	  that	  are	  applicable	  to	  the	  allowed	  experiments.	  These	  rules	  will	  at	  least	  concern	  the	  following	  issues:	  a. the	  exact	  deviations	  from	  EGA	  (or	  rules	  based	  upon	  EGA)	  which	  will	  be	  allowed;	  b. the	  categories	  of	  users	  or	  managers	  of	  the	  energy	  system	  to	  which	  these	  deviations	  will	  apply	  and	  the	  volume	  of	  these	  categories;	  c. the	  maximum	  duration	  of	  these	  deviations;	  d. the	  number	  or	  the	  kinds	  of	  situations	  for	  which	  a	  deviation	  is	  allowed;	  e. the	  way	  in	  which	  an	  assessment	  is	  made	  as	  to	  whether	  a	  deviation	  has	  served	  its	  objective	  and	  whether	  the	  duration	  of	  the	  deviation	  should	  be	  prolonged.	  Again	  we	  recognize	  elements	  from	  the	  above	  analysis	  in	  terms	  of	  a	  piecemeal	  exception	  (linked,	  according	  to	  paragraph	  1.)	  to	  experiments,	  with	  specifications	  relating	  to	  a	  particular	  ‘subjects-­‐in	  case’	  scope	  of	  the	  arrangement,	  with	  a	  temporal	  condition	  and,	  as	  experiments	  are	  exceptional	  activities	  that	  we	  hope	  to	  learn	  from,	  a	  clause	  about	  evaluating	  the	  results	  of	  deviations	  for	  the	  sake	  of	  these	  experiments.	  With	  all	  of	  the	  provisions	  ‘a.	  to	  e.’	  it	  is	  clear	  that	  to	  deviate	  (permissively	  or	  through	  facilitation)	  is	  by	  no	  means	  a	  simple	  freedom	  –	  at	  least	  not	  in	  a	  regulatory	  perspective;	  considering	  the	  provisions	  that	  need	  to	  be	  in	  the	  Crown	  Decree.	  To	  what	  extend	  this	  also	  leads	  to	  undesirable	  administrative	  burdens	  or	  regulatory	  hassle	  for	  those	  wanting	  to	  experiment	  remains	  to	  be	  seen.	  Only	  upon	  the	  more	  specific	  provisions	  of	  the	  Crown	  Decree	  will	  it	  become	  clear	  whether	  the	  experimental	  arrangement	  is	  one	  of	  ‘exceptional	  freedom’	  or	  ‘exceptional	  reregulation’	  (again,	  see	  par.	  4.1).	  The	  latter	  seems	  more	  likely	  than	  the	  former,	  considering	  the	  concern	  for	  public	  interests	  as	  expressed	  implicitly	  through	  the	  limitations	  under	  a.-­‐e.;	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  126	  According	  to	  Article	  81	  of	  the	  Dutch	  Constitution,	  Statutes	  (‘Formal	  Legislation’)	  are	  enacted	  jointly	  by	  the	  Crown/Central	  Government	  (‘de	  Regering’)	  and	  both	  chambers	  of	  Parliament	  (de	  ‘Eerste	  Kamer’	  en	  ‘Tweede	  Kamer’van	  de	  ‘Staten-­‐Generaal’).	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   The	  element	  of	  keeping	  tabs	  on	  what	  is	  happening	  is	  also	  reflected	  in	  paragraph	  3	  of	  Article	  11.1	  EGA,	  which	  prescribes	  that	  the	  minister	  of	  energy	  shall	  send	  a	  report	  on	  the	  experiment,	  its	  effects	  and	  efficacy,	  as	  well	  as	  a	  position	  on	  the	  continuations	  of	  the	  activities	  other	  than	  as	  an	  experiment,	  to	  Parliament	  (‘de	  Staten-­‐Generaal’)	  within	  3	  months	  after	  termination	  of	  the	  experiment.	  This	  element	  is	  typical	  of	  ex	  ante	  concerns	  over	  the	  possibility	  that	  experimentation	  will	  produce	  results	  that	  call	  for	  disruptive	  measures	  as	  regards	  existing	  regulations	  concerning	  energy	  generation,	  supply	  and	  use.	  	  Much	  related	  to	  the	  concerns	  that	  Parliament	  may	  have,	  having	  co-­‐legislated	  in	  making	  of	  EGA	  (from	  the	  provisions	  of	  which	  the	  experiments	  deviate),	  is	  the	  final	  provision,	  in	  paragraph	  4	  of	  Article	  11.1	  EGA,	  that	  a	  proposal	  for	  a	  Crown	  Decree	  as	  described	  in	  the	  previous	  paragraph	  1,	  is	  not	  brought	  out	  before	  a	  period	  of	  4	  weeks	  has	  gone	  by	  during	  which	  the	  (draft-­‐)proposal	  could	  be	  inspected	  by	  MP’s.	  	   Clearly,	  the	  co-­‐legislative	  involvement	  of	  Parliament,	  impacts	  on	  the	  discretionary	  power	  of	  the	  Crown	  to	  introduce	  a	  Decree	  by	  which	  deviations	  from	  the	  EGA	  are	  possible.	  Parliament	  favours	  experimentation	  (if	  the	  bill	  does	  become	  a	  statute)	  but	  will	  not	  want	  the	  Crown	  to	  light-­‐heartedly	  allow	  experimentation.	  The	  ability,	  following	  the	  provision	  of	  paragraph	  4,	  to	  ex-­‐ante	  inspect	  the	  draft-­‐proposal	  opens	  the	  possibility	  of	  parliamentary	  debate	  and	  a	  political	  change	  of	  plans.	  To	  require	  an	  ex-­‐post	  report	  on	  experiments	  that	  have	  been	  performed	  under	  the	  Crown	  Decree,	  provides	  an	  extra	  impulse	  to	  political	  reflection	  on	  experimentation.	  Not	  only	  to	  learn	  for	  future	  decisions,	  but	  also	  because	  the	  outcomes	  may	  call	  for	  changes	  in	  policies	  (and	  in	  the	  law)	  or	  for	  an	  extension	  of	  a	  promising	  experiment.	  	  
8.2	  -­‐	  Experimental	  arrangements	  for	  decentralized	  production	  of	  renewable	  energy	  
according	  to	  the	  proposed	  Crown	  Decree	  following	  current	  experimental	  provisions	  	  As	  said,	  Article	  7a	  of	  the	  current	  Electricity	  Act,	  and	  Article	  1i	  of	  the	  current	  Gas	  Act	  provide	  for	  experimental	  arrangements,	  which	  aim	  to	  contribute	  to	  developments	  in	  the	  production,	  the	  transport	  and	  the	  distribution	  of	  locally	  produced	  energy	  or	  electricity	  which	  is	  generated	  in	  an	  installation	  for	  cogeneration.	  Both	  provisions	  stipulate	  that,	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  the	  aforementioned	  Crown	  Decree	  (expected	  to	  enter	  into	  force	  in	  2015),	  a	  deviation	  from	  statutory	  provisions	  is	  possible	  in	  service	  of	  experiments.	  	  According	  to	  the	  accompanying	  Explanatory	  Memorandum	  of	  the	  draft	  Crown	  Decree,127	  these	  exceptional	  arrangements	  are	  intended	  to	  determine	  whether	  these	  experiments	  actually	  lead	  to	  a	  wider	  application	  of	  decentralized	  energy	  production	  or	  cogeneration,	  efficient	  use	  of	  the	  available	  energy	  infrastructure	  and	  more	  user	  involvement	  in	  their	  energy	  supply.	  The	  information	  these	  experiments	  will	  bring,	  will	  be	  used	  to	  consider	  in	  what	  respect	  and	  to	  what	  extent	  structural	  (disruptive)	  changes	  in	  the	  Electricity	  Act	  1998	  and	  the	  Gas	  Act	  could	  be	  realized	  in	  order	  to	  stimulate	  local	  production	  of	  renewable	  electricity	  and	  gas.	  It	  is	  believed,	  still	  according	  to	  the	  Memorandum,	  that	  the	  current	  legislation	  applicable	  to	  large-­‐scale	  forms	  of	  energy	  production	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is	  not	  necessarily	  fit	  to	  regulate	  the	  production	  of	  local	  renewable	  energy.	  For	  at	  this	  moment,	  it	  is	  uncertain	  which	  new	  provisions	  will	  be	  needed,	  so	  experiments	  will	  be	  allowed	  in	  order	  to	  explore	  to	  what	  extent	  cooperations	  and	  associations	  of	  owners	  will	  be	  effective	  in	  producing	  renewable	  energy	  and	  what	  will	  be	  the	  (disruptive)	  effects	  on	  the	  reliability	  of	  electricity	  supply	  and	  transport.128	  	   Ensuing	  the	  results	  of	  an	  Internet	  consultation	  among	  interest	  groups	  and	  experts,	  the	  Dutch	  government	  has	  decided	  to	  currently	  allow	  experiments	  under	  the	  Electricity	  Act	  only;	  the	  said	  interest	  groups	  and	  experts	  did	  not	  propose	  initiatives	  as	  regards	  experiments	  relating	  to	  the	  current	  Gas	  Act.	  	  A	  Crown	  Decree	  has	  now	  been	  drafted,	  and	  it	  is	  expected	  to	  enter	  into	  force	  in	  2015.	  Because	  the	  Crown	  believes	  technical	  developments	  make	  it	  increasingly	  more	  attractive	  for	  energy	  consumers	  at	  the	  local	  level	  to	  produce	  (sustainable)	  electricity	  by	  themselves	  and	  mix	  roles	  of	  being	  consumers	  and	  of	  being	  producers	  (into	  ‘prosumers’),	  which	  in	  turn	  is	  believed	  to	  benefit	  the	  achievement	  of	  energy	  objectives	  (through	  greater	  energy	  awareness	  and	  lower	  grid	  losses),	  the	  decision	  was	  taken	  to	  focus	  the	  draft	  Crown	  Decree	  on	  small	  consumers	  in	  particular.	  	  	   The	  aforementioned	  Internet-­‐consultation	  showed	  that	  the	  consulted	  interest	  groups	  and	  experts	  expect	  a	  stimulus	  from	  integral	  business	  operations	  at	  the	  decentralized	  level.	  This	  however,	  is	  prohibited	  under	  the	  current	  Electricity	  Act,	  as	  production	  and	  supply	  on	  the	  one	  hand	  and	  transport	  and	  network	  management	  of	  energy	  on	  the	  other,	  shall	  be	  assigned	  to	  different	  parties.	  Furthermore,	  the	  current	  statutory	  requirement	  of	  a	  license	  for	  energy	  supply	  to	  small-­‐scale	  consumers	  (which	  comes	  with	  many	  regulatory	  provisions	  –	  e.g.	  as	  regards	  rates	  and	  terms	  of	  sale	  –	  under	  control	  of	  the	  Consumer	  and	  Market	  Authority)	  hampers	  the	  uptake	  of	  self-­‐supplying	  local	  energy	  production.	  The	  current	  Electricity	  Act	  also	  blocks	  the	  possibility	  of	  a	  locally	  organized	  tariff	  and	  billing	  system	  for	  recharging	  and	  returning	  costs	  and	  benefits	  related	  to	  the	  local	  electricity	  grid	  –	  a	  constraint	  that	  should	  be	  lifted	  for	  and	  during	  experimentation.	  Finally,	  the	  current	  legislation	  requires	  the	  appointment	  of	  a	  grid	  operator,	  which	  has	  to	  comply	  with	  a	  number	  of	  statutory	  duties.	  	  The	  draft	  Crown	  Decree	  distinguishes	  between	  two	  types	  of	  experimental	  projects:	  a. ‘Small'	  experiments	  with	  respect	  to	  a	  Project-­‐Grid	  ('projectnet'),	  containing	  no	  more	  than	  500	  consumers	  with	  one	  connection	  to	  the	  grid	  of	  a	  grid	  manager.	  Within	  this	  Project-­‐Grid	  integral	  business	  is	  allowed,	  combining	  production,	  supply	  and	  grid	  management.	  However,	  the	  grid	  manager	  has	  to	  ensure	  consumer’s	  free	  choice	  of	  suppliers	  by	  other	  vendors	  to	  provide	  third	  party	  access.	  b. 	  ‘Big'	  experiments:	  projects	  for	  consumers	  mainly	  (80%)	  with	  a	  maximum	  of	  10,000.	  On	  this	  scale,	  it	  is	  believed	  that	  the	  pro’s	  and	  con’s	  of	  a	  local	  energy	  supply	  will	  reveal,	  which	  is	  relevant	  for	  the	  assessment	  of	  desirable	  changes	  of	  the	  current	  Electricity	  legislation.	  The	  volume-­‐scope	  of	  the	  'Big	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experiments'	  has	  been	  determined	  in	  order	  to	  realize	  matching	  of	  supply	  and	  demand	  of	  electricity	  in	  an	  experiment,	  in	  which	  the	  usage	  of	  various	  sustainable	  production	  techniques	  is	  conceivable	  (such	  as	  solar	  PV,	  wind,	  CHP).	  	   The	  experiments,	  in	  ‘small’	  and	  in	  ‘big’	  projects,	  are	  allowed	  only	  when	  embedded	  in	  the	  legal	  form	  of	  a	  ‘cooperation’	  or	  of	  an	  ‘association	  of	  owners’	  –	  as	  permissive	  norm-­‐conditions.	  These	  types	  of	  ‘juridical	  persons’	  enable	  the	  participants	  to	  exercise	  joint	  control	  over	  rates	  and	  conditions,	  as	  a	  result	  of	  which	  controls	  by	  the	  supervisory	  authority	  could	  be	  reduced.	  Article	  2,	  paragraph	  1,	  of	  the	  draft	  Crown	  Decree	  authorizes	  the	  Minister	  of	  Economic	  Affairs	  to	  grant	  an	  exemption	  to	  carry	  out	  a	  project	  that,	  by	  way	  of	  an	  experiment,	  may	  deviate	  from	  the	  provisions	  pursuant	  to	  the	  Electricity	  Act.	  These	  exemptions	  may	  be	  granted	  for	  technical	  provisions	  and	  specific	  rate-­‐systems	  under	  the	  current	  Electricity	  legislation,	  the	  construction	  of	  a	  grid	  by	  a	  regional	  grid	  operator,	  statutory	  provisions	  concerning	  tariffs,	  the	  statutory	  provision	  with	  regards	  to	  the	  supply	  of	  electricity,	  and	  the	  statutory	  prohibition	  for	  anyone	  but	  the	  grid	  operator	  to	  carry	  out	  grid	  management	  tasks.	  The	  draft	  	  Crown	  Decree	  also	  provides	  in	  powers	  to	  include	  further	  provisions	  to	  the	  exemptions	  granted.	  Last	  but	  not	  least,	  Article	  7	  of	  the	  draft	  presents	  25	  (sic!)	  different	  grounds	  for	  the	  rejection	  of	  a	  requested	  exemption.	  In	  all	  it	  is	  clear	  that	  the	  involved	  power	  indeed	  leads	  to	  arrangements	  of	  ‘exceptional	  reregulation’,	  with	  permissive	  tilt,	  to	  make	  experimentation	  attractive	  while	  meanwhile	  avoiding	  ‘misuse’.	  The	  norm-­‐object	  of	  the	  ministerial	  power	  has	  some	  
discretionary	  elements,	  and	  similarly	  the	  power	  norm-­‐conditions	  have	  subjective	  elements.	  Having	  said	  this,	  there	  are	  clearly	  mandatory	  and	  objective	  elements	  involved	  and.	  Last	  but	  not	  least,	  many	  conditions	  that	  allow	  for	  refusing	  permissiveness	  to	  experiment.	  	  	  
8.3	  –	  Facilitative	  arrangements	  for	  decentralized	  experimentation	  in	  renewable	  
energy	  	  	   Without	  going	  into	  details,	  we	  finally	  point	  at	  the	  existence	  of	  legal	  arrangements	  	  provide	  a	  temporary	  possibility	  of	  subsidies	  for	  temporary	  applied	  experimentation	  in	  the	  field	  of	  (inter	  alia)	  renewable	  energy.129	  An	  example	  is	  a	  scheme	  by	  the	  Dutch	  province	  of	  Overijssel,	  which	  has	  invited	  municipalities	  and	  local	  communities	  to	  submit	  proposals	  for	  decentralised	  experiments	  in	  renewable	  energy	  generation,	  storage	  and	  efficient	  use	  (especially	  through	  ‘smart	  grids’).	  The	  scheme	  is	  organised	  as	  a	  ‘beauty	  contest’,	  with	  a	  jury	  of	  experts	  deciding	  which	  proposal	  will	  be	  subsidized.	  The	  winning	  proposals	  get	  a	  subsidy	  to	  implement	  their	  project	  within	  the	  time-­‐frame	  that	  the	  envisaged	  in	  their	  proposal.	  	  	  Not	  only	  does	  this	  example	  fit	  the	  element	  of	  facilitation,	  but	  this	  facilitation	  (as	  a	  matter	  of	  securing	  funds	  for	  undertaking	  the	  experiment)	  is	  presented	  as	  an	  arrangement	  of	  ‘exceptional	  unregulatedness’,	  seeing	  as	  it	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presents	  a	  temporary	  arrangement	  opposite	  to	  no	  structural	  subsidy	  funds	  being	  available	  for	  this	  purpose,	  applicable	  to	  temporary	  activities	  as	  experiments	  which	  aim	  to	  (not	  only	  enhance	  citizen	  involvement	  in	  the	  renewable	  energy	  endeavour	  but	  to	  also)	  provide	  information	  on	  possible	  changes	  in	  existing	  rules	  to	  structurally	  allow	  for	  such	  types	  of	  decentralized	  undertakings.	  Due	  to	  the	  facilitation,	  experiments	  may	  be	  considered	  implicitly	  permitted	  by	  eloquent	  silence.130	  The	  involved	  administrative	  power	  of	  providing	  government	  subsidy	  for	  individual	  projects	  is	  based	  upon	  the	  discretionary	  object	  and	  subjective	  conditionality	  of	  the	  provincial	  power	  of	  introducing	  general	  administrative	  regulations	  –	  which	  comes	  with	  a	  democratic	  mandate.	  The	  administrative	  power	  within	  this	  regulation,	  to	  subsidize	  individual	  projects	  based	  upon	  expert-­‐jury	  advice,	  involves	  a	  norm-­‐object	  and	  norm-­‐conditions	  that	  have	  a	  mixed	  profile	  in	  terms	  of	  being	  discretionary/mandated	  and	  subjective/objective	  –	  which	  is	  sensitive	  given,	  inter	  alia,	  concerns	  over	  distributive	  justice,	  and	  fall	  within	  the	  possibility	  of	  judicial	  review.	  Once	  a	  subsidy	  is	  granted,	  the	  legal	  act	  introduces	  a	  (hypothetical/conditional)	  command	  for	  payment	  by	  the	  public	  office	  concerned	  and	  a	  duty-­‐claim	  relationship	  between	  this	  office	  and	  the	  entity	  that	  is	  rewarded	  the	  subsidy.	  	  	  
9.	  Comparing	  Findings:	  in	  practice	  and	  with	  theory	  Beyond	  examples,	  this	  contribution	  is	  of	  course	  about	  trying	  to	  understand	  general	  characteristics	  and	  typologies	  that	  may	  make	  the	  issue	  of	  regulation	  experimentation	  for	  innovation	  suitable	  for	  legal	  design.	  Through	  design	  general	  lessons	  may	  be	  better	  in	  corporate	  in	  making	  rules	  for	  experimentation	  in	  specific	  (contingent)	  cases.	  	   On	  the	  basis	  of	  the	  theoretical	  framework	  our	  interest	  goes	  out	  to	  how	  existing	  legislative	  and	  regulative	  arrangements	  for	  experimentation	  relate	  to	  the	  following	  aspects.	  a. The	  existence	  of	  clearly	  described	  ‘normative	  positions’(i.e.	  A.,	  B.,	  C(1/2).	  and	  
D.	  (1/2),	  as	  described	  in	  par.	  3.1)	  and,	  if	  the	  option	  exists,	  whether	  these	  are	  regulated	  or	  unregulated.	  
Of	  course	  obligating	  positions	  are	  regulated.	  In	  the	  realm	  of	  experimentation	  
we	  find	  examples	  mostly	  in	  general	  prohibitions	  (A.)	  with	  a	  possibility	  for	  
making	  exceptions	  (see	  b.	  and	  c.).	  General	  command	  related	  to	  experiments	  we	  
did	  not	  find;	  only	  a	  command	  following	  facilitation	  (in	  par.	  8.3).	  With	  relevance	  
to	  experimentation	  we	  found	  only	  one	  example	  of	  unregulated	  permissiveness	  
in	  the	  use	  of	  telecommunication	  equipment	  outside	  of	  commercial	  usage	  (see	  
par.	  7.2;	  without	  temporariness).	  All	  other	  forms	  of	  permissiveness	  (to	  
experiment)	  were	  of	  a	  regulated	  form.	  
	  b. Upon	  permissiveness,	  its	  characterization	  in	  terms	  of	  bilateral	  or	  unilateral	  aspects.	  
The	  examples	  we	  found	  have	  a	  bilateral	  nature,	  generally	  because	  the	  norm-­‐
subjects	  were	  not	  under	  command	  to	  perform	  the	  experiment.	  A	  further	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  130	  Although	  they	  may	  fall	  within	  the	  realm	  of	  unregulated	  permissiveness,	  or	  come	  with	  having	  to	  request	  for	  regulated	  permissiveness,	  dependent	  on	  the	  exact	  nature	  of	  the	  experiment.	  As	  such	  the	  state	  of	  ‘unregulatedness’	  only	  applies	  to	  the	  facilitative	  aspects	  of	  the	  arrangement..	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analysis	  would	  be	  needed	  to	  determine	  if	  some	  cases	  concern	  hybrid	  
bilateralism,	  of	  unilateral	  permission	  paired	  by	  unregulated	  bilateral	  
permission.	  This	  could	  be	  relevant	  in	  relation	  to	  the	  question	  if	  possible	  
tolerations,	  rights	  or	  enabling	  facilities	  also	  related	  to	  the	  complementary	  
permissiveness.	  	  
	  c. As	  regards	  both	  permissiveness	  and	  facilitation,	  their	  characterization	  as	  general	  or	  piecemeal.	  
All	  arrangements	  were	  piecemeal,	  as	  they	  are	  all	  positioned	  as	  exceptional	  
arrangements	  suited	  for	  experimentation.	  The	  one	  exception	  to	  a	  piecemeal	  
scope	  is	  that	  of	  unregulated	  permission	  (as	  eloquent	  silence)	  in	  the	  case	  of	  
equipment	  used	  in	  telecom	  experimentation	  –	  which	  concerned	  a	  non-­‐
temporary	  permission	  (see	  par.	  7.2).	  	  
As	  said,	  we	  did	  not	  find	  examples	  of	  permissiveness	  with	  a	  command	  to	  actually	  
perform	  the	  experiment	  (i.e.	  implicated	  unilateral	  permissiveness).	  In	  general	  
we	  consider	  this	  to	  be	  a	  less	  likely	  variant,	  unless	  facilitation	  is	  also	  included.	  Of	  
course	  it	  is	  possible	  that	  information	  from	  experiments	  is	  considered	  most	  
useful	  in	  view	  of	  possible	  structural	  disruption,	  and	  so	  command,	  even	  without	  
facilitation	  may	  be	  desired,	  but	  it	  remains	  less	  likely	  if	  no	  facilitation	  is	  
simultaneously	  offered	  (possibly	  by	  monopoly	  rights	  to	  exploitation).	  Otherwise,	  
in	  cases	  of	  mere	  (and	  non-­‐urgent)	  experimentation	  the	  possibility	  of	  non-­‐usus	  
through	  non-­‐performance	  does	  not	  bring	  information	  but	  nether	  des	  it	  infringe	  
on	  the	  interests	  of	  third	  parties	  protected	  as	  rights	  under	  existing	  regulation.	  
If	  and	  when	  facilitated	  then	  it	  is	  likely	  that	  permission	  is	  unilaterally	  implicated	  
as	  command	  to	  undertake.	  In	  cases	  of	  subsidies	  sometimes	  contracts	  are	  signed	  
to	  this	  effect,	  or	  the	  there	  is	  a	  clear	  stipulation	  that	  upon	  non-­‐performance	  the	  
subsidy	  is	  withdrawn	  and/or	  reclaimed	  (in	  as	  much	  as	  already	  paid	  out).	  
	  d. When	  exceptional	  arrangements	  exist,	  their	  characterization	  in	  terms	  of	  ‘freedom’,	  ‘reregulation’	  or	  ‘unregulatedness’	  
Clearly	  ‘exceptional	  reregulation’	  is	  dominant.	  The	  mere	  existence	  of	  
regulations	  for	  experimentation	  expresses	  the	  presumption	  of	  disruptiveness	  of	  
the	  experiment	  and	  this	  comes	  with	  sensitivities	  that	  translate	  in	  considerable	  
conditions	  for	  allowing	  deviation	  from	  existing	  rules,	  both	  in	  such	  a	  decision	  in	  
principle	  and	  in	  terms	  of	  the	  provisions	  that	  come	  with	  the	  permission.	  
The	  example	  of	  eloquent	  silence	  in	  the	  case	  of	  equipment	  used	  in	  telecom	  
experimentation	  (par.	  7.2)	  comes	  close	  to	  ‘exceptional	  unregulatedness’,	  but	  
does	  not	  carry	  the	  necessary	  element	  of	  temporariness.	  Further	  elaboration	  is	  
needed	  as	  regards	  the	  qualification	  of	  facilitation	  upon	  energy	  beauty-­‐contests	  
(in	  par.	  8.3)	  as	  ‘exceptional	  unregulatedness’	  –	  this	  label	  certainly	  seems	  apt	  
considering	  the	  facilitative	  aspect,	  but	  may	  not	  fit	  the	  underlying	  
permissiveness.	  	  	  	  
	  e. When	  reference	  is	  made	  to	  exception	  for	  the	  sake	  of	  experimentation,	  the	  nature	  of	  these	  experiments	  in	  terms	  of:	  1. being	  about	  technology	  or	  governance;	  2. whether	  their	  disruptiveness	  is	  a	  relevant	  criterion.	  
To	  begin	  with,	  hardly	  anything	  is	  said	  about	  what	  experiments	  are.	  It	  seems	  as	  
if	  legislators	  and	  regulators	  do	  not	  want	  to	  upfront	  ex-­‐	  or	  include	  undertakings	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that	  they	  wish	  to	  in-­‐	  or	  exclude	  at	  a	  later	  stage.	  The	  more	  discretionary	  nature	  
of	  involved	  norm-­‐objects	  and	  more	  subjective	  norm-­‐conditions	  fit	  with	  this	  
assumption	  –	  while	  it	  is	  meanwhile	  clear	  that	  considerable	  regard	  is	  taken	  to	  
avoid	  unnecessary	  disruptions	  of	  existing	  rules	  of	  the	  game.	  
No	  references	  were	  found	  to	  Guideline	  no.	  10a	  or	  10b	  of	  the	  Dutch	  General	  
Guidelines	  for	  Rulemaking	  (discussed	  in	  par.	  4.2).	  
In	  the	  examples	  found	  usually	  elements	  of	  applied	  technology	  and	  applied	  
governance	  seemed	  to	  come	  and	  go	  together.	  The	  sometimes	  complex	  nature	  of	  
legal	  arrangements	  underpin	  the	  disruptive	  potential	  of	  undertaking	  
experiments.	  The	  energy	  examples	  (at	  least	  in	  par.	  8.1	  and	  8.3;	  less	  so	  in	  8.3)	  
were	  more	  explicit	  in	  their	  consideration	  of	  possible	  disruptive	  structural	  
governance	  consequences	  –	  by	  calling	  for	  explicit	  reflection	  upon	  possible	  need	  
for	  regulatory	  changes.	  In	  telecommunications	  experiments	  this	  element	  was	  
less	  obvious	  although	  relevant	  references	  were	  made	  –	  such	  as	  in	  the	  
Implementation	  Policy’	  of	  the	  Radio-­‐communications	  Agency	  (see	  par.	  7.1).	  	  	  	  
Both	  sectors	  clearly	  show	  an	  acknowledgement	  of	  how	  on	  the	  ground	  
innovation	  and	  regulation	  go	  hand	  in	  hand,	  rather	  as	  a	  matter	  of	  co-­‐evolution	  
than	  as	  one	  of	  both	  taking	  the	  lead.	  
	  f. When	  exceptionality	  follows	  from	  specific	  legal	  acts,	  the	  nature	  of	  relevant	  regulatory	  powers	  in	  terms	  of	  the	  nature	  of	  their	  norm-­‐object	  and	  norm-­‐conditions.	  
On	  the	  one	  hand	  the	  subject	  matter	  of	  experimentation	  suggests	  that	  
appropriate	  regulatory	  exceptions	  require	  subjective	  norm-­‐conditions	  and	  
discretionary	  norm-­‐objects	  –	  so	  as	  to	  allow	  tailor-­‐made	  arrangements.	  On	  the	  
other	  hand	  the	  sensitivity	  of	  making	  exceptions	  and	  moving	  away	  from	  existing	  
rules	  concerning	  risk	  and	  benefits	  and	  modes	  of	  interaction	  (providing	  some	  
legal	  certainty	  to	  all	  stakeholders	  involved)	  calls	  for	  rather	  strict	  conditions	  
and	  carefully	  prescribed	  norm-­‐objects.	  It	  is	  no	  wonder	  that	  the	  examples	  show	  
that	  in	  practice	  regulators	  have	  come	  up	  with	  a	  mix	  of	  both.	  From	  a	  perspective	  
of	  ‘innovative	  entrepreneurship’	  this	  may	  be	  disappointing,	  while	  from	  a	  
position	  of	  legal	  certainty	  this	  is	  reassuring.	  If	  we	  take	  innovation	  to	  be	  a	  public	  
interest	  than	  surely,	  considering	  the	  complex	  arrangements	  that	  we	  did	  find,	  
there	  lies	  a	  challenge	  ahead	  as	  regards	  balancing	  these	  two	  interests	  in	  
innovation	  in	  the	  most	  effective	  and	  efficient	  way,	  while	  ensuring	  that	  this	  
balance	  is	  seen	  as	  legitimate	  and	  just.	  	  
10.	  In	  conclusion	  	   What	  we	  take	  from	  our	  attempt	  at	  mapping	  instances	  of	  ‘regulating	  experimentation’	  is	  that	  we	  need	  far	  more	  examples	  than	  we	  could	  and	  have	  considered	  in	  this	  paper	  and	  that	  a	  more	  in-­‐depth	  analysis	  is	  required	  to	  reveal	  the	  true	  meaning	  of	  arrangements,	  also	  in	  the	  light	  of	  our	  theoretical	  framework	  and	  its	  potential	  of	  use	  for	  design	  and	  evaluation	  of	  such	  arrangements.	  Clearly	  the	  aspect	  of	  facilitation	  is	  one	  that	  was	  underexposed	  in	  this	  paper	  –	  which	  is	  partly	  due	  to	  getting	  the	  ‘permissive	  picture’	  right,	  but	  also	  due	  to	  an	  (admittedly	  unspoken)	  hesitance	  to	  analyse	  intricacies	  of	  facilitative	  arrangements	  (of	  an	  exceptional	  nature),	  given	  their	  enormous	  range.	  A	  follow-­‐up	  on	  this	  is	  much	  needed.	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   While	  further	  and	  deeper	  ‘case-­‐studies’	  will	  be	  entertained,	  this	  study	  will	  also	  need	  to	  be	  extended	  by:	  1.	  Looking	  more	  closely	  into	  EU-­‐legislation	  and	  regulation	  (if	  only	  to	  enhance	  suitability	  of	  analysis	  to	  general	  design	  purposes);	  2.	  the	  regulatory	  aspects	  specific	  to	  network	  industries	  as	  a	  particular	  area	  of	  application;	  3.	  and,	  finally,	  an	  elaboration	  of	  the	  parameters	  of	  legal	  design,	  so	  that	  mapping	  can	  actually	  support	  the	  formulation	  of	  design-­‐guidelines.	  	  	  As	  authors	  of	  course	  we	  welcome	  constructive	  comments	  and	  criticisms!	  
Enschede,	  The	  Netherlands	  October	  14,	  2014	  
